In Taiwan, the price of satire aimed at Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping through the medium of traditional cross-talk has taken a troubling toll on local performer Huang Yi-Hao. Recent events have included not only a venue that was targeted with a mess of excrement but also a car accident declared by prosecutors to be premeditated. The Taiwanese authorities have linked both incidents to financial backing from within mainland China, categorizing them as instances of “cross-border repression.” However, the Chinese government has vehemently denied these claims, labeling them as fabrications.
As several countries become increasingly aware of such allegations, the case underscores the real threats facing performers in Taiwan when they step off the stage. Ensuring the safety of these artists has become a pressing concern for the Taiwan government.
On November 5, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council presented a report to the Legislative Yuan, indicating that since 2005, there have been 131 individuals involved in 149 instances of cross-border repression from the Chinese Communist Party against Taiwan. These cases reportedly feature a range of issues, including physical attacks, criminal accountability, and psychological intimidation, classified into nine distinct categories. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice is reportedly considering amendments to the Anti-Infiltration Act to include harsher penalties for relevant offenses. Civil society groups, including the Judicial Reform Foundation, have also called for strengthening the legal framework to combat such infiltration, as well as the possibility of implementing a foreign agent registration system.
However, the prospects for legislative change remain uncertain. The opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the People’s Party, hold a majority in the legislature. Some lawmakers have raised concerns that the ruling party may have ulterior motives by revisiting these incidents ahead of elections, and they have called for concrete evidence and applicable standards to avoid stigmatization. Balancing the protection of critics while ensuring that countermeasures do not restrict free speech presents a collective challenge for lawmakers across various nations.
After attending discussions regarding the legal proposals at the Legislative Yuan, Huang expressed optimism that all three legislative parties appear to agree on the urgency of establishing a legal framework to address these issues. He underscored that the delay in the amendment process is less significant than the necessity of completing the legislation itself, which requires support from opposition members. He specifically mentioned the need for KMT Legislative Speaker Fu Kun-Chi, who represents Hualien, to support the bill, urging all parties to move beyond mere rhetoric and avoid using this situation as a political weapon against each other.
Huang also touched upon the difficulties in seeking help. Following the car accident, he disclosed to the police his suspicions of potential foreign pressure; however, he felt a sense of uncertainty when he raised the issue. He believes that other potential victims may similarly hesitate. Huang emphasized that the government should educate the public about how to seek help when they notice unusual activities. Those who have publicly criticized the Chinese Communist Party should remain vigilant but should not succumb to panic.
He acknowledged the support received from the police and the government in the aftermath and noted that establishing clear reporting and response mechanisms is crucial. The Mainland Affairs Council has stated it will establish a hotline for reporting such incidents.
In December 2025, Huang Yi-Hao performed an adaptation of a traditional cross-talk piece titled “Ba Ma Gua” at Taipei’s Comedy Club, critically addressing Xi Jinping’s policies in a rapid-fire delivery. A video of this performance was widely circulated in Mandarin-speaking communities globally after it was uploaded online in January.
On May 29, someone threw paint mixed with excrement at the comedy club prior to one of Huang’s performances. Prosecutors in Taipei filed charges in September against two Taiwanese individuals, alleging one was instructed by unidentified people in China to hire another for NT$50,000 (about USD 1,500) to commit the act. The accused believed to be the instigator of the attack denied any wrongdoing.
According to the indictment by the New Taipei District Prosecutor’s Office on October 21, the second incident was orchestrated by an individual identified only as “K” from China. This person allegedly offered NT$450,000 (approximately USD 14,000) for an operation to seriously injure Huang, rendering him unable to perform. The hired individual installed a GPS tracker on his motorcycle and crashed into Huang’s vehicle on September 11 near his home, with the incident recorded on video. Huang suffered a contusion to his right pelvis. Prosecutors claim that the instigator, K, later deemed the injuries too minor and refused to pay the remainder of the agreed amount.
Five defendants are facing charges of attempted serious injury, with prosecutors seeking sentencing ranging from 2 years and 7 months to 5 years and 6 months. No verdicts have been reached in either case.
Taiwanese prosecutors characterize both incidents as politically motivated violence funded from abroad and designed to instill fear among the populace. The Mainland Affairs Council condemned these acts, while President Lai Ching-Te remarked that such tactics aim to undermine public trust in democratic institutions.
Beijing has completely denied these accusations. In June, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council termed the allegations as “nonsense.” On October 28, they reiterated their stance, calling the claims “fabricated,” accusing the Democratic Progressive Party of inciting confrontation and raising such issues during election periods. Taiwan is scheduled to hold local elections on November 28.
A crucial blank remains in identifying the financier. The genuine identity of K, whether they acted under the direction of the Communist Party, and the source of funding have yet to be substantiated with public evidence.
Internally, doubts have also been raised within Taiwan. On November 5, KMT lawmaker Weng Hsiao-Ling argued in Parliament that individuals from mainland China should not automatically be equated with the actions of the Communist Party. She questioned whether the government had ever published a list of foreign hostile forces and whether there were other organizations, apart from the CCP, that posed a threat to Taiwan. Liang Wen-Chieh, Deputy Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, responded that while the government has not released a public list, several judicial decisions have characterized the Communist Party as a hostile foreign force, and currently, no other external entities are known to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. Minister of Justice Tseng Ming-Chien stated that recent cases have shown involvement from foreign powers.
Weng, a legal scholar serving as a KMT at-large legislator, emphasized the need for legal clarity, noting that current laws in Taiwan do not include a charge for “cross-border repression,” and “hostile foreign forces” lack a clear definition, which could contravene legal principles.
Huang Yi-Hao was present to observe the discussions. When asked whether other foreign hostile forces existed outside the CCP, he expressed difficulty in naming any and suggested that Weng could compile such a list herself.
Regarding the challenges of providing evidence, Huang did not shy away from the issue: tracing financial flows from mainland China is indeed challenging, and Beijing often delegates sensitive matters to private individuals or organizations, allowing for official denials. Nevertheless, he believes this should not serve as an excuse for inaction, asserting that threats and violence originating from abroad should be legally addressed regardless of whether they are instigated by state, private entities, or individuals.
A report from the U.S. human rights organization Freedom House indicated that from 2014 to 2025, there were 319 documented cases of transnational persecution related to Beijing, ranking it the highest globally. The Chinese government has consistently rejected such allegations.
The targets of these cases predominantly include exiles and overseas communities: Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hongkongers, and pro-democracy activists. Taiwan’s situation is unique, as the victims are not exiled but citizens residing within their own society, while Beijing regards Taiwan as part of its territory, denying the notion of any “cross-border” context in these cases.
In recent months, incidents of this nature have surged. On July 1, the Chinese Communist Party’s “Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law” took effect, raising fears among critics that its implications might extend beyond its borders. On July 6, Akio Yaita, the executive director of an Indo-Pacific strategic think tank, was assaulted in Taichung by a Chinese man residing in Hong Kong. Nine days later, a pro-democracy activist named Li Jian was beaten in Flushing, New York, by three individuals whose identities remain unknown. On October 4, the FBI arrested California real estate agent Zhang Wan-Ying at Los Angeles International Airport, alleging she acted on instructions from a Chinese official to surveil Lai Ching-Te’s family while visiting the U.S., with charges filed for acting as an unregistered foreign government agent.
An analysis by the Jamestown Foundation in November suggested that pressure from Beijing on Taiwan’s dissidents might be escalating to include violent intimidation. While Huang Yi-Hao’s case may not be the first of its kind, it potentially represents an escalation in tactics. A report by the human rights group Safeguard Defenders has indicated that the CCP’s overseas networks involve at least 91 countries and nearly 1,250 designated contacts, spanning systems of policing, justice, and United Front strategies.
In recent years, democratic nations have increasingly recognized cross-border repression as a threat to sovereignty and national security. For the first time, leaders at the Group of Seven (G7) summit issued a dedicated statement regarding this issue in June 2025. Canada has revised its national security and criminal laws in 2024, and bipartisan U.S. senators proposed legislation in July this year aimed at strengthening accountability and punishment for related actions. However, a May commentary from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) noted that responses from democratic countries still lack adequate coordination and exhibit numerous gaps.
Taiwan faces an even more complicated situation, lacking an appropriate legal definition for these acts. The incident involving the excrement can only be prosecuted under charges of intimidation and property damage, with potential sentences of less than two years.
Initially, Huang believed it was just a regular car accident until the police, investigating the incident involving the excrement, reviewed surveillance footage revealing the concerning circumstances. He noted that if he had opted for reconciliation instead of pressing charges, police intervention would have been unlikely.
