Recently, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has quietly unveiled the deployment of the Dong Feng-61 missile within its Rocket Force, confirming that this missile and other weapons first showcased over a year ago during a military parade in Beijing were merely prototypes at the time. More than a year after its display, the Dong Feng-61 has officially entered service, being referred to by state media as an “upgrade” within the Dong Feng missile family. However, observers have noted that the Dong Feng-61 closely resembles the Dong Feng-41, with its visual differences being difficult to detect. The CCP has refrained from heavily propagandizing the “new type” Dong Feng-61 missile, suggesting there might be more to the story.
On November 5, state media reported that the Dong Feng-61 missile has officially been inducted into the Rocket Force. This date is significant as it marks the anniversary of the first test launch of China’s first short-range ground-to-ground missile, the Dong Feng-1, more than sixty years ago, further emphasizing the narrative of the “upgrade” of the Dong Feng missile series.
A military commentator interviewed by state media highlighted that the original Dong Feng-1, back in the day, was a copycat design with limited range and was never officially adopted for operational units. The commentator pointed out that many of China’s missiles and so-called new military technologies are based on imitation and copying, a trend that continues today, often resulting in significant underperformance compared to original designs.
The Dong Feng-61 missile made its debut at the military parade in Beijing on September 3, 2025, although it had not yet officially entered service, raising questions about the CCP’s intention to showcase military strength prematurely. More than a year later, the announcement of the missile’s deployment has provoked reflections on the stark contrast between the instant promotion of new weapons and their actual readiness for service.
Another military analyst mentioned in the state media interview pointed out that the land-based nuclear missile capability has achieved “iterative reinforcement,” suggesting improvements, but this term implies an awkward combination of “iteration” and “reinforcement.” While “iteration” suggests it is a new generation of the missile, inherently implying it should exhibit performance far exceeding that of the Dong Feng-41, “reinforcement” conversely suggests it is merely compensating for deficiencies or defects rather than demonstrating a genuine upgrade.
This mixed messaging likely reflects the realities faced by the military analysts, who may wish to align their comments with state propaganda but are also aware of prevailing truths. Hence, they present a narrative that includes both “iteration” and “reinforcement,” ultimately implying that the Rocket Force’s existing capabilities may not be sufficiently robust. With the Dong Feng-5, Dong Feng-31, and Dong Feng-41 already in service, one might question what the term “sufficiently robust” actually encompasses.
On November 6, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Defense held a routine press conference where there was a noticeable absence of any mention of the Dong Feng-61 missile’s deployment. Additionally, the Chinese military’s official website failed to timely reissue the announcement from state media, indicating a potential reticence within the military reporting structure.
Without specific information released by the CCP, speculation about possible changes to the Dong Feng-61 continues. Some analysts have interpreted comments from state media commentators to suggest that the Dong Feng-61 is similar to its predecessor, the Dong Feng-41, with only minor modifications; they cite that both missiles bear significant visual similarities, utilizing the same road mobile launchers with closely aligned launch tube designs.
Further analysis has proposed that enhancements to the Dong Feng-61 may include advancements in guidance system accuracy, electronic systems, propulsion efficiency, rapid maneuverability, and penetration tactics.
More than a year after the Dong Feng-61’s initial reveal, a Chinese media article remarked on its likeness to the Dong Feng-41, questioning the need to assign a new designation to what seems almost identical. The article identified three potential key upgrades that could have been made:
First, the missile may have adopted a more powerful propellant; however, the article suggests that this is unlikely due to stagnation in solid missile fuel technology over recent years, particularly with the unchanged dimensions of the missile’s body implying a fixed operational range.
Second, the possibility of the Dong Feng-61 being equipped with a more precise guidance system appears more promising, given that the Dong Feng-41’s guidance system has not seen an update since its development around 2015.
Third, there is speculation that the Dong Feng-61 could come with a range-extending hypersonic warhead. This comparison is drawn from examples like the Dong Feng-16 and Dong Feng-26, which transitioned to hypersonic warheads through their redesignations.
Another analysis suggested the Dong Feng-31 itself might have switched to a hypersonic warhead configuration, emerging as an “intercontinental anti-ship ballistic missile.” The most recently revealed Dong Feng-31BJ features a significantly longer body compared to the Dong Feng-31AG, suggesting incorporation of a hypersonic warhead design.
In retrospect, the consistently existing media discussions about the Dong Feng-61 seem to have received tacit approval from the Chinese military. This might signify an indirect approval from the military establishment amidst ongoing crackdowns on various “fake” military media or online accounts.
Finally, it was noted that both the Dong Feng-5C and Dong Feng-61 have positioned themselves as the only two intercontinental missiles in the world employing a diversified hypersonic warhead configuration, achieving peaks in both range and evasion capability associated with intercontinental missiles. This construction could be interpreted as a narrative of having surpassed U.S. and Russian capabilities, aligning perfectly with the CCP’s propagandistic rhetoric.
If the Dong Feng-61 operates as an improvement over the Dong Feng-41—including any enhancements in hypersonic warhead technology and guidance systems—what does this imply for the future of the Dong Feng-41? The Dong Feng-41 missile was inducted into service in 2016 and publicly unveiled in 2019, with estimates placing its operational range between 12,000 to 15,000 kilometers and the ability to carry multiple warheads. The introduction of the Dong Feng-61 ten years later raises questions about whether the production of the Dong Feng-41 has already ceased.
According to data released in recent Japanese defense white papers, the quantity of Dong Feng-41 missiles currently in service with the Rocket Force has remained constant at 44, similar to figures from 2025. The quantities observed in 2020 and 2021 were only 18, rising to 24 in 2022 and 2023, then increasing again to 36 in 2024, but stagnating at 44 in 2025 and 2026.
This evidence suggests that following the emergence of the Dong Feng-61, the Dong Feng-41 may cease production. Despite the CCP’s previous fanfare regarding the Dong Feng-41, there was a halt in large-scale production just as production was set to ramp up—a timeline that raises concerns about operational legitimacy. Military commentators’ statements which include both “iteration” and “reinforcement” hint at deeper issues within the current missile program.
The Dong Feng-41 may have undergone serious defects that necessitated the creation of the Dong Feng-61, utilizing a new designation to obscure the truth—a practice reminiscent of methods employed by the Soviet Union and Russia. Yet, with the Dong Feng-61 resembling its predecessor so closely, labeling it an “upgrade” appears to be a stretch.
The transition from Dong Feng-41 to Dong Feng-61 occurred during a period characterized by a sweeping purge within the Rocket Force; multiple commanders have been ousted, alongside a significant number of officials linked to military-industrial enterprises, particularly those involved in missile development and production. It is likely that serious corruption has plagued the development and manufacturing processes associated with the Dong Feng-41, leading to the discovery of defects and ultimately halting its production.
On September 25, 2024, the CCP conducted its first test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean in over four decades, reportedly showcasing the Dong Feng-31B. Ideally, the Dong Feng-41 should have undergone this test given its status as the latest in the series; however, issues may have been identified, necessitating a fallback to the Dong Feng-31 for verification.
Given recent data from Japanese defense assessments indicating the Dong Feng-31 missile quantity remained stable at 86 units in 2023 and 2025, there may be suspicions surrounding its reliability, potentially resulting in a suspension of production or deployment. Following the September 2024 test launch of the Dong Feng-31, figures surged to 230 units in 2026, while the Dong Feng-41 saw no test launches for validation before its cessation in production—a situation likely foreshadowing confirmed technical problems.
With the cessation of the Dong Feng-41 and an increase in Dong Feng-31 production paired with the launch of the upgrade of the Dong Feng-61, it seems the Rocket Force strives for the reported “reinforcement” or “enhancement.” However, the extent to which the Dong Feng-61 meets expectations remains uncertain, and even if it gains approval for mass production, time will be required for its effective integration. Currently, the primary reliance of the Rocket Force’s intercontinental ballistic capabilities rests on the Dong Feng-31.
The Dong Feng-31 is hailed as a third-generation intercontinental ballistic missile and is considered the land-based version of the submarine-launched ballistic missile JL-2, making its first public appearance during a military parade in Beijing in 1999. A decade later, U.S. intelligence estimated that China had fewer than 15 operational Dong Feng-31 missiles.
The maximum range of the Dong Feng-31 only permits it to reach parts of the northwestern United States, and in order to achieve its maximum range, it can only carry a single warhead. In contrast, the U.S. Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile was deployed in quantities of around 1,000 during the 1970s, leading the United States to place greater reliance on submarine-launched systems, with a smaller proportion of nuclear warheads assigned to land-based missiles.
The superior successor, the Dong Feng-31A, extends its reach to cover most of the continental U.S., and is believed to still be limited to a single nuclear warhead. This variant was showcased during the 2015 military parade, followed by the introduction of the updated Dong Feng-31AG in 2017. While significant problems with the Dong Feng-31 may not be evident, it likely has yet to reach its intended standards, resulting in continued improvements.
Coinciding with the announcement of the Dong Feng-61’s deployment, the CCP also disclosed the formal indictment of former Politburo member Ma Xingrui on corruption charges, alleging that his mismanagement has spanned over 25 years, dating back to his tenure as deputy general manager of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.
This indicates an ongoing effort to clean house within China’s military-industrial sector. Recent years have seen numerous officials with military backgrounds face removals, with many having connections to Ma Xingrui and afterward becoming unaccounted for.
The ongoing scrutiny has led to the confirmation of the expulsion of 33 Central Committee members, including several military industrial officials who had been “missing” for an extended period, encompassing vital sectors like nuclear technology, aerospace, and naval industries.
According to statistics, at least ten academicians linked to military industries have been delisted in recent years, spanning fields such as high-powered microwaves, nuclear weaponry, radar systems, and missile guidance.
On August 24, an announcement from the Chinese military procurement network addressed irregular procurement issues within the Rocket Force. This suggests that the problems surrounding the current military arsenal extend beyond mere concerns related to the Dong Feng-41.
In a recent series of military developments, the CCP delivered its Fujian aircraft carrier equipped with an electromagnetic catapult, even as reports surfaced regarding design overlaps between the catapult and the landing zones.
Chinese media have reported that Xi Jinping personally decided to shift the carrier’s initial steam catapult design towards an electromagnetic version. Following this, the Fujian returned to Shanghai for further alterations and has yet to see any public demonstration of its capabilities.
On October 30, 2026, a brief report detailed the first launch and landing of a Wing Loong-21 drone aboard the Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan. This has not been met with extensive coverage or promotion, indicating potential uncertainty regarding the genuine competency of these advancements.
As the purported successor to the Dong Feng-41, the Dong Feng-61 raises further skepticism regarding the authenticity of claims surrounding the true performance of the CCP’s weapons systems. It appears that similar uncertainties may abound across various domains of China’s military apparatus.