The Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party has decided to convene the 20th Fifth Plenary Session in October, with the theme of “Comprehensively Strengthening Party Governance.” This signifies that during this meeting, before and after it, there will be an enhanced version of the party rectification movement.
The official statement from the CCP’s Political Bureau meetings is usually directly from Xi Jinping, who first praises the “great achievements in comprehensively strengthening party governance” and then mentions that “profound changes have occurred in the global, national, and party situation,” along with facing many new circumstances and issues. In essence, this is a political tactic of shifting blame.
This is because, after the 19th National Congress of the CCP, a large number of members of the Central Committee personally selected by Xi Jinping have been implicated in corruption scandals. In this current Central Committee, at least around 70 individuals have encountered troubles, accounting for nearly 20%. This is the most serious situation since the end of the CCP’s “Cultural Revolution” in 1976.
Xi Jinping’s defense is that in terms of governance, most of it has been a “great achievement,” with only a small portion of issues being attributed to objective factors.
By the time of the Fifth Plenary Session in October, he will face immense pressure.
According to the CCP’s party regulations, the Central Political Bureau and its Standing Committee are “elected” by the Central Committee and are accountable to it.
While Xi exercises dictatorship within the Central Political Bureau, he still needs to present reports and make explanations to the entire Central Committee at the plenary session.
The authoritarian political system of the CCP has been functioning for many years, where high-ranking officials are subject to political coercion and vested interests, leading to a rigid rule of unanimous approval in the plenary session. However, with changing circumstances, although Xi Jinping’s power is more centralized, his authority is undermined, and when he faces all Central Committee members to explain, he may not be free from inner pressure.
One major reason for Xi Jinping’s high pressure is that he had set a trap for himself in advance.
On August 29, 2016, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee issued the “Opinions on Preventing the Promotion of Leaders ‘With Diseases,'” highlighting accountability for such promotions. The regulations stipulate that those causing severe repercussions due to such promotions will be subject to accountability, including the top leadership of the CCP, which includes Xi Jinping.
Although Xi Jinping stands above the CCP’s party discipline and national laws, under the pressure from the powerful Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, current Central Committee members are unlikely to oppose Xi’s reports or decisions made in meetings, nor openly demand accountability from him. However, officials’ dissatisfaction with Xi is accumulating, and Xi is likely well aware of this growing discontent.
During the Fifth Plenary Session, when Xi reports to the Central Committee, his rhetoric will surely include phrases like “profound changes have occurred in the global, national, and party situation” and “comprehensively strengthening party governance also faces many new circumstances and issues,” as part of his defense.
Xi Jinping will seek to absolve himself of political responsibilities related to corruption in the bureaucracy, opaque personnel decisions, and may heavily penalize Zhang Yuxia, a princeling in the military. Before the Fifth Plenary Session, the authorities might publicly announce the final decision on the Zhang Yuxia case to affect public opinion.
On January 24, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Yuxia and Central Military Commission member and Chief of the Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli were suddenly implicated, with military reports accusing the two of “seriously undermining the Chairman responsibility system of the Military Commission” and “endangering the party’s ruling foundation,” among other charges. There have been no further updates since.
Overseas commentator Cai Shengkun revealed that Zhang Yuxia has admitted trying to force Xi Jinping to relinquish power and indicated that “rewriting history is only a step away.” Zhang Yuxia allegedly also received support from some party elders.
Rumors suggest that after Zhang Yuxia’s arrest, many elders and families of the red second-generation appeared in support of Zhang, using both soft and hard tactics.
Another commentator, Chen Pokong, recently stated to the Epoch Times that there might be shocking announcements during the Fifth Plenary Session, and individuals like Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli could be branded as anti-party cliques. Xi Jinping aims to imply that including people within the Political Bureau, all past and present high-ranking officials have compromising information in his hands and he can bring down whomever he wishes.
If indeed the “anti-party clique” is brought up, this would be a significant development.
Of course, anti-party, while a term used against the evil CCP, is essentially a positive term itself, used in intra-CCP struggles, often devoid of ideological implications, merely as a means of control and manipulation.
Throughout CCP history, anti-party cliques are often associated with ambitious individuals. For instance, in the 1970s, there were Lin Biao and Chen Boda’s anti-party clique (later classified as the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Clique) and the Jiang Qing Counterrevolutionary Clique (the “Gang of Four”). Lin Biao was criticized as a bourgeois ambitionist and conspiracy theorist, officially accused of plotting to overthrow the party and seize power. After Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and others were overthrown, they were dubbed bourgeois ambitionists and conspiracy theorists, attempting to usurp party power.
The terms “ambitionist” and “conspiracy theorist” were less openly used post-Deng Xiaoping era but have resurfaced under Xi Jinping, with individuals like Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Ling Jihua, and Sun Zhengcai being singled out for having “political ambitions swelling and engaging in conspiratorial activities.” Among them, Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, and Ling Jihua were rumored to be involved in cross-faction alliances, implicated in attempted political coups against Xi Jinping. Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong attempted to prevent Xi from ascending to supreme power. Sun Zhengcai secretly venerated the dragon robe in a room, positioning himself as Xi’s successor.
Previously, the authorities accused Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli of “seriously undermining the Chairman responsibility system of the Military Commission” and “endangering the party’s ruling foundation,” using such strong language to suggest that Zhang and Liu were involved in coup-like actions and to pave the way for the subsequent branding of the “ambitionists.”
If the Xi Jinping regime indeed labels Zhang Yuxia as an ambitionist, the underlying reason might be Zhang Yuxia’s attempt to ally with retired elders and some second-generation reds to obstruct Xi’s re-election at the 21st National Congress. The term “endangering the party’s ruling foundation,” within the current context of the CCP, essentially means endangering Xi’s leadership foundation, impeding his lifelong rule.
Xi fears being deposed and purged upon stepping down, so the smooth re-election at the 21st Congress next year is paramount to him. His heavy-handed approach towards Zhang Yuxia aims to deter others with dissenting views and divert blame for the governance failures during his tenure. However, with the CCP regime in crisis, public anger and official discontent rising, and amid internal power struggles within the top ranks of the CCP, this deteriorating red ship is not sailing far.