On November 1, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially released a document known as the “Decision on Strict Party Governance,” which had been passed during the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee. This document outlines a series of measures aimed at strengthening anti-corruption efforts, particularly by targeting individuals close to leaders, enhancing investigations into unusually large family assets, and discussing the concept of intra-party democracy at length. Experts have commented that the document is heavily influenced by internal power struggles, with Xi Jinping attempting to justify a significant purge within the party. The uncertainty surrounding the future of the regime continues to grow, raising the likelihood of a fragile governance structure.
The announcement came from the official state news agency, Xinhua, as part of the CCP’s ongoing attempts to portray a unified front. The “Decision,” a lengthy document comprising 17,000 words, calls for significantly enhancing oversight over leaders and their families. Key measures include cracking down on “first secretaries,” younger officials, and nepotistic corruption within leadership families, as well as auditing households where expenditure appears to exceed reported income.
Veteran analyst Sheng Xue commented that historically, the CCP has never been fair or just, whether through its constitution, legal regulations, or party rules. She pointed out that Xi Jinping’s family has long benefited from their influence and power, raising the question of whether he would indeed punish his own relatives. According to her, the CCP is now facing severe financial strain that threatens its ruling capacity, compelling its members to seek funds through any available means. Ultimately, it is those wielding absolute power who will decide on sanctions against individuals.
Another seasoned commentator, Tang Jingyuan, echoed similar sentiments, emphasizing that the focus on identifying the “inner circle” of leaders and scrutinizing family wealth anomalies has become a typical strategy for the CCP. It has been a recurring theme for years. Observers are well aware that Xi’s family, including his sister and brother-in-law, has accumulated vast wealth through their connections to power.
The “Decision” also emphasizes reinforcing party loyalty and firmly opposing any criticism of the central authority, laying out seven key principles to uphold. This includes eradicating “double-dealing individuals” from the party.
Sheng Xue elaborated that Xi’s distrust extends to everyone, compelling him to enforce loyalty through an alleged party ethos. Thus, the obedient are favored, while a significant number of party members have become “double-faced,” engaging in contradictory behavior that reflects poorly on their character and values. “Using this standard, most party members could potentially become targets for purging. The upper echelons of the CCP are unlikely to remain unscathed, and internal strife will only escalate.”
Tang Jingyuan remarked that the party’s stringent governance and anti-corruption measures are interlinked, grounded in the essence of internal power dynamics. Anti-corruption campaigns have evolved into primary instruments of intra-party conflict. “As long as power struggles and ideological battles exist, concepts like ‘seven key principles’ or ‘double-dealing individuals’ will remain intractable,” he asserted.
In an unusual twist, the “Decision” discusses party democracy, asserting the need to strictly implement democratic centralism. It mandates the regulation of authority among top party officials, prohibiting the establishment of an “echo chamber” or patriarchal structures, and disallowing layers of protection for the personal authority of key leaders.
Tang Jingyuan opined that the emphasis on party democracy appears to be a direct challenge to Xi Jinping’s authority. It suggests that Xi’s preeminent position within the party may have been substantively undermined, representing a potential return to a model of collective leadership.
The communique released following the Fifth Plenary Session already hinted at themes of intra-party democracy. Senior China observer Lin Heling commented that the communique’s elaboration on issues of party democracy was surprisingly detailed, especially in light of Xi Jinping’s reputation for centralizing power without consideration for democratic principles. The contents of the release might be interpreted as an indirect critique of Xi’s unilateral governance.
Lin noted that the main outcome of the Plenary Session permits Xi Jinping to begin his fourth term at next year’s 21st National Congress of the CCP. Yet, his governance style has faced implied disapproval.
Conversely, Chinese affairs expert Li Linyi suggested that this is not necessarily indicative of Xi’s intent to foster party democracy but rather signifies a shift away from patriarchal leadership. However, he pointed out that Xi remains exempt from these new regulations, highlighting the nature of dictatorial governance.
The “Decision” additionally discusses anti-corruption and personnel management, claiming that since the 18th National Congress, Xi has eliminated serious internal threats within the party, state, and military, purportedly establishing a new era of strength for the party.
Sheng Xue remarked that Xi views his actions as integral to strengthening the party, although many perceive these moves as steps towards a party in decline, entering a phase reminiscent of the later years under Mao Zedong. As he purges figures such as Zhang Youxia, Xi employs rhetoric to legitimize his actions against others, asserting the correctness of his approach.
The commentary brings to mind the later years of Mao Zedong, when extreme dictatorship led to rampant distrust, creating a climate where even trusted comrades became potential adversaries. The increasing paranoia and intensifying purges surrounding Xi Jinping reflect a troubling trend, with the number of individuals he can trust dwindling.
In this precarious environment, Xi can only tighten his grip, operating within the oppressive logic of the CCP’s authoritarian structure. The official communique from the Fifth Plenary Session does not mention the concepts of “two establishments” or “two safeguards,” yet the document released on November 1 underscores the recognition of Xi’s central position within the party as a “major political achievement,” urging party members to unite closely around him.
Tang Jingyuan suggested that factions opposed to Xi are manipulating the party’s strict governance to enact a “tightening of Xi’s power,” indirectly undermining his authority and attempting to distance his loyalists from positions of power. Nonetheless, this anti-Xi sentiment maintains an underlying commitment to preserving the party from collapse.
According to Sheng Xue, the language in the documents from the 20th Plenary Session indicates Xi’s increasing wariness towards his party, particularly within higher echelons. His public relations efforts continue to elevate his own status, reminiscent of Mao Zedong’s tactics. Yet, Xi faces a society far more complex than Mao did. With active information flow, advanced internet access, and widespread overseas travel, the CCP can no longer maintain a vice-like grip on the populace.
The risk of regime fragility is escalating, leading to concerns that Xi Jinping’s fate may not differ favorably from that of Mao Zedong; after all, Mao passed away from illness.