The Chinese Communist Party is assisting Russia in maintaining the war in Ukraine, while its military is also studying the lessons learned from this conflict, including tactics that could be applied to block Taiwan.
Moscow has expanded attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure, including electricity, food, and fuel supplies, targeting gas stations, supermarket warehouses, ports, merchant ships, and power facilities.
In early October, Russian drones attacked the South Bridge and North Bridge in Kyiv for the first time during the war, crucial transit points along the Dnieper River within the capital. The destruction caused partial or complete closures of these transit points, disrupting road and rail traffic across the river. Ukrainian officials warn that further attacks could lead to long-term bridge closures.
Russia’s actions against Ukraine’s electricity, fuel, and transportation routes suggest how the CCP may handle Taiwan, as Taiwan’s key chokepoints are ports and energy docks rather than bridges.
An analysis report titled “The Age of Energy Warfare: Lessons from the Ukraine and Iran Wars” released in July 2026 by the Modern War Institute based at West Point in New York, pointed out that the Chinese military could potentially paralyze Taiwan’s “highly concentrated and fragile power grid” through large-scale missile strikes. Unlike Ukraine, which can import electricity through the European grid, Taiwan is not connected to an external grid and must generate its own power.
According to Taiwan’s Energy Administration, by 2024, about 96% of Taiwan’s energy relies on imports, meaning the country needs to depend on imported fuels to keep its power plants running.
By 2024, natural gas and coal are estimated to account for approximately 43% and 40% of Taiwan’s electricity supply, respectively, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Taiwan’s three liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving terminals, located in Yong’an District of Kaohsiung City, Taichung City, and Taoyuan City, all reside on the island’s west coast. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has mandated a reservation of at least 11 days’ worth of natural gas, which will be increased to 14 days by 2027.
The Chinese military has previously conducted attacks and blockade exercises near Taiwan’s ports. In the “Mission of Justice-2025” exercise held on December 29-30, 2025, the Eastern Theater Command designated “blockading key ports” as one of the objectives, with rocket launches near Keelung and Kaohsiung. The exercise involved naval and coast guard forces, practicing how to implement the blockade of the Taiwan Strait.
The Chinese military has also conducted joint training with the Russian military, incorporating real combat experiences from Ukraine. The “Central-2026” joint military exercise took place from September 28 to October 3 in Russia’s Chelyabinsk Oblast, involving Chinese, Belarusian, Kyrgyzstani, Mongolian, and Pakistani military personnel.
Photos released by the official Chinese military account “China Military Bugle” show Type 99A main battle tanks conducting live-fire exercises and coordinating with drones and unmanned ground vehicles. Drones provide target data to Chinese ground forces, while tactical drones, armed helicopters, and unmanned ground vehicles coordinate simulated strikes on frontline targets.
Taiwan’s defense plans have also drawn from Ukraine’s drone warfare experiences. In July of this year, Raymond Greene, Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), urged Taiwan to establish a “hornet’s nest” composed of airborne, surface, and underwater drones, citing Ukraine’s experiences.
The report “Hellscape for Taiwan: Rethinking Asymmetric Defense” published in February 2026 by the Center for a New American Security proposes an “asymmetric hellscape” concept, deploying thousands of drones within approximately 50 miles off the Taiwanese coast to form a multi-layered defense zone. The Chinese military is preparing to counter such defense measures, as demonstrated by a naval unit’s simulated interception and elimination of low-altitude kamikaze drones during an exercise in January.
An analysis report titled “Learning Without Bleeding: China’s Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine Drone War” released on October 7, 2026, by the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlights how Chinese analysts are studying the Russia-Ukraine conflict from the perspective of Russia, a target of Ukraine’s drone attacks. The experiences and lessons learned in anti-drone warfare are swiftly being incorporated into Chinese weapon systems.
For decades, the Chinese military has lacked significant combat experience. A report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission details how lessons from Russia’s battlefield experiences can help elevate Chinese tactical and readiness levels, particularly in drone warfare and urban combat.
The commission suggests that Russia may share Western weapon data, while Chinese military journals display a keen interest in American weapon systems used by Taiwan, including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). During the “Mission of Justice-2025” exercise, Chinese media reported on troops intercepting and inspecting ships carrying HIMARS heading to Taiwan, with a video showcasing these launchers as simulated targets.
Apart from joint exercises, Beijing has been assisting Moscow through energy purchases, the provision of civilian and military supplies, as well as diplomatic support.
Reports also cite CCP’s provision of drone engines to Russia, training of Russian drone operators, and the use of satellite imagery to assist in targeting. Washington has imposed sanctions on Chinese companies involved in producing Russia’s “Garpiya” attack drones.
In summary, the Chinese military is studying how to overcome Ukraine’s demonstrated defensive capabilities, while Washington and Taipei seek to adjust these defense capabilities to deter foreign attacks.