At the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the focus is set to be on the decision to implement “Comprehensively Strict Party Governance,” diverging from the usual economic agendas. According to reports from “Breaking Weekly,” a senior CCP official stated that Xi Jinping’s move aims to solidify selective anti-corruption measures, prevent future leadership reversals, and maneuver through challenges of passive bureaucratic behavior and unclear succession arrangements.
The session is scheduled to take place from October 26th to 29th in Beijing. Xinhua News Agency reported that on September 21st, the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee reviewed the draft of the decision on “Consistently Advancing Comprehensive Strict Party Governance” and decided to submit it for deliberation at the Fifth Plenum. This meeting is not centered around economic transformation or five-year plans but prioritizes the theme of “Comprehensively Strict Party Governance,” emphasizing the unwavering commitment to strictness.
The Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) recently published an analysis anticipating the upcoming Fifth Plenum, suggesting that the meeting may reveal China’s political trajectory. As Xi Jinping prepares to extend his rule ahead of next year’s Party Congress, he may raise higher demands on officials, although enhanced control does not guarantee more efficient government operations.
Regarding the intensified anti-corruption efforts under Xi Jinping, official data cited by the article shows a substantial increase in the number of cases handled by China’s disciplinary and supervisory agencies, reaching 1.01 million cases in 2025, significantly higher than about 155,000 cases in 2012.
Specifically, the number of officials officially disciplined for “formalism” and “bureaucracy” rose from around 46,000 in 2023 to 118,000 in 2025, with a further 16% increase in the first eight months of 2026 compared to the same period the previous year. The majority of these disciplinary actions in 2025 involved excuses, inaction, improper behavior, or false job performance.
The data reflects that Xi Jinping’s accountability efforts have expanded from traditional corruption to attitudes and work practices. Xi Jinping has criticized officials who superficially support strict party governance while being passive or feigning ignorance when faced with problems. In January of this year, he further mentioned instances where inspections and audits found inadequate implementation of significant Party central decisions.
Against this backdrop, officials opting for a “lying flat” approach is not just a personal choice. The article points out that grassroots cadres, facing increasing tasks, limited budgets, and strict accountability, tend to avoid risks by sticking to familiar routines rather than exploring innovative approaches. Some officials even jest that they are “using formalism to combat formalism.”
Moreover, concerning the Fifth Plenum’s focus on “Comprehensively Strict Party Governance” and deliberation on “major decisions on strict Party governance,” a senior CCP official mentioned in “Breaking Weekly” on October 19th that Xi Jinping’s background in formulating this decision reflects his recognition that the anti-corruption campaigns since the 18th Party Congress have sparked significant internal disputes and divisions within the Party. By passing this decision under the Party’s name, it can lend legitimacy to past anti-corruption efforts and pave the way for consolidating power for the upcoming 21st Party Congress.
Independent analyst Cai Shunkun echoed similar sentiments in his video commentary. He suggested that Xi Jinping’s concerns about potential reassessment or even denials of his selective anti-corruption measures in the future prompted him to make a historic decision to defend the past decade of anti-corruption and Party cleansing efforts, imposing constraints on future leaders.
Cai Shunkun also noted that this historical assessment and decision do not guarantee that any successors, whether handpicked by Xi or not, will entirely uphold his selective anti-corruption initiatives; there is even a possibility of a thorough reconsideration of Xi Jinping’s legacy.
Furthermore, in examining the succession question in the context of power struggles, the ASPI analysis considers it a crucial variable overshadowing the preparatory work for the Fifth Plenum.
The article suggests that if Xi Jinping enters a fourth term, he might start grooming potential successors. However, the likelihood of formally appointing a clear successor, similar to his own appointment as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in October 2010, appears slim.
Delaying the selection of a successor may preserve Xi Jinping’s direct power, but could also lead to the loss of effective executors of his policies. Conversely, designating a successor grants more power to that individual, which will likely grow over time, introducing uncertainties to Xi Jinping’s ability to predict or control their decisions.
Xi Jinping is aware of the importance of succession planning but recognizes that choosing a successor cannot guarantee stable political circumstances for that individual in the future, possibly creating a power center hard to manage prematurely.
Cai Shunkun shares a similar perspective, mentioning that for leaders with highly concentrated power, premature designation of a successor might prompt bureaucratic calculations about political prospects, hastening alliances with future leaders and accelerating power struggles.
Moreover, Cai Shunkun incorporates military personnel shocks within the same context, highlighting the investigation and handling of former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, which has disrupted the interests of the “princelings” and “military princelings,” destabilizing the military leadership.
However, Cai Shunkun also emphasized that Xi Jinping’s widescale purge within the military hierarchy likely stemmed from the lessons learned after Hu Yaobang was ousted by the military.
He speculated that Xi Jinping may have realized the decisive role the military plays in determining future political directions if his health were to falter, which could be a primary reason behind the significant military cleansing following the 20th Party Congress.
Amid the power struggles, three indicators from the Fifth Plenum can be observed externally.
Firstly, the positioning of personnel. How vacancies in the Central Military Commission are filled and which military or political figures enter the Central Committee would showcase Xi Jinping’s grasp on critical positions.
Secondly, shifts in the leadership echelon. Particularly, the early promotion of “post-70s” officials to provincial or ministerial levels, the Central Committee, or other crucial positions may hint at the political trajectory for the next Political Bureau and longer-term power structures.
Thirdly, the advancement of ideological and disciplinary institutionalization. The ASPI article points out that Xi Jinping’s “Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building” proposed in June of this year, focusing on centralizing authority, ideological cohesion, enhancing cadres’ capabilities, and organizational execution. If these principles receive more concrete institutional arrangements during the Fifth Plenum, it could influence the historical evaluation and political inheritance in the post-Xi era.
The article anticipates Beijing may expand the authority of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, elevate the Party building and inspection leadership groups to more powerful committees, and utilize big data to enhance monitoring of local affairs, government-business relations, and covert interest transfers.