Russian Military Pays the Price for Losing Starlink
The Russian military is paying the price for losing access to Starlink. In early February 2026, SpaceX shut down unauthorized communication terminals used by the Russian military on a large scale, leading to a severe decline in the coordination capabilities of Russian frontline forces. Russia attempted to substitute with its domestically produced Rassvet low-orbit satellites, but faced difficulties due to limited technology and disruptions in the industrial chain.
According to real-time satellite tracking data from N2YO on August 31, the second batch of 16 Rassvet satellites launched by Russia on July 19 failed to reach the expected 870 km altitude by the end of August. Many satellites remained at altitudes ranging from 300 to 400 km, with some already experiencing orbit decay. At least two satellites are on a trajectory to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere. These satellites operating well below the expected altitude will have significantly shortened lifespans due to atmospheric drag.
Previously, Russia’s first batch of 16 Rassvet satellites launched on March 24 also faced challenges, with only a few maintaining the 550 km orbit by the end of August. The current constellation of just over a dozen satellites in orbit fails to provide continuous signal coverage similar to Starlink, offering only two communication windows of about 90 minutes each per day.
In modern warfare that demands constant data updates and real-time response to combat commands, prolonged communication blackouts like these pose a significant threat, leaving frontline forces vulnerable to attacks.
Moscow’s rushed deployment of a domestic low-orbit communication satellite system following SpaceX’s action in February is directly linked to the blockage of unauthorized Starlink use by the Russian military. On February 1st, Musk stated that SpaceX’s measures had prevented unauthorized Russian usage of Starlink.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Fedorov also mentioned that Kyiv is working with SpaceX to establish mechanisms allowing only authorized terminals to operate.
This incident highlights the unique role of Starlink services in modern warfare. The Russian military used Starlink to connect frontline forces, drone operators, and command centers, enabling the transmission of drone imagery, coordination of assault operations, and improved artillery calibration. The discontinuation in February was akin to cutting off a crucial part of the Russian military’s communication capabilities, directly impacting drone operations and troop coordination.
According to intelligence assessments released by the UK Ministry of Defense in March 2026, the efficiency of Russian frontline drone operations significantly declined after losing Starlink support.
During the initial phases of the full-scale invasion, due to deficiencies in Russia’s conventional tactical communication system “Azart,” frontline troops were often forced to resort to unencrypted civilian radios or mobile phones for communication under Ukrainian electronic warfare pressure, leading to the exposure and targeting of high-ranking commanders. Since late 2023, Russian frontline forces had been procuring Musk’s Starlink terminals through smuggling routes in countries like the UAE and Kazakhstan, operating a significant number on Ukrainian soil.
These illicit Starlink terminals rapidly established communication networks for Russian battalion-level units, enabling high-definition drone reconnaissance video transmission, integrating drone operators, fire guidance, self-propelled artillery, and rocket artillery units into a digitalized command platform, drastically shortening Russian reconnaissance and strike chains. Frontline Russian assault teams even utilized Starlink to set up temporary command nodes on mobile armored vehicles, guiding first-person view (FPV) attack drones for precise strikes.
The sudden communication breakdown brought disastrous tactical chaos to Russian frontline forces. In a combat environment devoid of satellite network support, reconnaissance drones couldn’t transmit real-time images back to command centers, forcing operators to rely on very high-frequency radios susceptible to terrain and electronic interference. This compression caused almost half of the effective reconnaissance radius of drones, disconnections, or delays in information transfer, leading Russian frontline forces to rapidly descend into local battlefield confusion.
The coordination capabilities between infantry and armored assault units were equally paralyzed due to the network disruptions.
Loss of battlefield information sharing between assault infantry and armored units led to individualistic actions, discord in coordination, and incidents of infantry guiding artillery fire onto friendly forces. This compelled Russian military command centers to push forward to maintain line-of-sight communication, exposing them to Ukrainian attack drones and precision fire.
This doesn’t imply that Russia has completely lost satellite services; the existing Rassvet satellites still pose a threat to Ukraine. Some operational Rassvet satellites in orbit can still enable Russian forces to conduct precise strikes on Ukraine using remotely controlled unmanned systems, albeit under severe time constraints.
However, the impact during the 2022 Musk-led Starlink cutoff event was more pronounced. At the critical stage of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in late September 2022, Musk decided to shut down Starlink services in parts of Ukraine, resulting in a sudden communication blackout and disrupting frontline drone operations and artillery coordination, hampering Ukraine’s encirclement efforts. Musk played the role of a strategic decision-maker in this event, exposing Ukraine’s military reliance on private satellite communication systems. It was reported that Musk had engaged with U.S. officials, expressing concerns about Ukraine using Starlink to support potential escalated strikes on Russia.
Both Russia and Ukraine have realized the strategic risks of relying on services provided by private companies and are attempting to mitigate them.
In light of the technical issues faced during the launch of the first batch of Rassvet satellites, Russia hastened the launch of the second batch in an attempt to fill the void left by Starlink discontinuation. However, all 16 satellites launched in the second attempt failed to reach the intended operational altitude, indicating a lack of technical readiness for rapid satellite constellation deployment, potentially leading to further delays in the project.
Unless Russia significantly improves the success rate of Rassvet satellite launches, establishing a satellite constellation resembling Starlink may prove challenging.
According to the Russian aerospace company 1440 Station, Russia plans to proceed with “tens of launches” to deploy “hundreds of satellites.”
Ukrainian President’s Advisor Serhii Beskrestnov believes that Russia would need to successfully launch 200 to 300 satellites to establish a stable and round-the-clock network connection in Ukraine, a target that Russia is unlikely to achieve in the short term.
Russia’s inability to launch satellites at the required speed and scale is partly due to its reliance on the costly and scarce Soyuz-2.1b medium-lift rockets. Since 2022, Russia has conducted only 6 to 8 aerospace launches using the Soyuz-2.1b rocket. At this rate, even if all Soyuz-2.1b launches were dedicated to Rassvet satellites, Russia could only launch a maximum of 128 satellites every four years, with no guarantee of their successful operation.
As of August 2026, only 37.5% of Rassvet satellites had achieved operational altitudes. Restrictions in launch frequency and success rates make it almost impossible for Russia to achieve its goal of deploying “hundreds of satellites” into orbit in the short term.
Ukraine’s attacks on the production and launch facility of Rassvet satellites are weakening Russia’s ability to establish a satellite constellation.
During the night of August 14 to 15, Ukrainian forces attacked the Progress Aerospace Rocket Center, where the Soyuz-series carrier rockets are manufactured. These attacks indicate that Ukrainian forces may not only threaten Russia’s limited carrier rocket production but also potentially inhibit launch infrastructure. Ukraine’s assaults on critical aerospace facilities in Russia pose a significant obstacle to the development and enhancement of Russian military space intelligence and communication capabilities.
In contrast, Ukraine has adopted a completely different strategy to address the satellite communication crisis. Following the Starlink event in 2022, Ukraine, in collaboration with European partners, shifted focus from “finding another Starlink” towards establishing a multi-constellation, multi-supplier, multi-level space communication and intelligence system. Introducing low-orbit satellite networks from European communication satellite companies (Eutelsat OneWeb), EU GOVSATCOM, and the longer-term EU security satellite communication system (IRIS²).
Ukraine also began segregating communication and reconnaissance layouts. ICEYE, a Finnish commercial satellite company, provides SAR radar images to address the “seeing” aspect, while Starlink, the European satellite network, and EU government satellite communication systems address the “receiving” aspect. Drones and ground combat systems then convert intelligence into tactical actions. Ukraine opted not to replace Starlink with its system but to establish a more resilient and diversified satellite information system.
Since 2026, SpaceX has made a 180-degree turn to support Ukraine, halting the use of unauthorized Starlink terminals by the Russian military. Clearly, uncertainties and strategic risks associated with private satellite constellations persist, albeit with different targets. The underlying strategic risks have always revolved around military, diplomatic, and political maneuvers, rather than the constellations themselves.