A new study covering 184 countries shows that among the 15 countries globally most exposed to China’s power in 2025, 14 are democratic nations. Researchers speculate that this may indicate that the Chinese Communist Party is more willing to accumulate influence in democratic countries to bring about changes in their behaviors. The study also found that several major European economies have prominent exposure levels, with economic, trade, investment, and public diplomacy being crucial channels through which China extends its influence abroad.
The “China Exposure Index” (CEI) was led by George Yin, a senior researcher at the Center for China Studies at National Taiwan University, and jointly released by the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), and National Taiwan University.
This study, released on Wednesday (September 23), covers the period from 2013 to 2025, using open data and around 36,000 computer simulations to measure Beijing’s potential ability to influence other countries through economic, diplomatic, and military relationships.
Among the 15 countries with the highest exposure to China’s power globally, 14 are classified as democratic countries, with Russia being the only clear exception. This result contrasts with the expectation that China’s power might be more prominent in authoritarian, corrupt countries.
The study offers two complementary explanations for this unexpected correlation. Firstly, many democratic countries are also advanced economies and have established close trade and financial ties with China due to their economic development, providing Beijing with significant leverage.
Regarding the unexpected correlation, a second possible explanation is that China may systematically target democratic countries precisely because their values and policies differ from Beijing’s. The researchers suggest that if a country’s position already aligns closely with Beijing’s, there may be less urgency for Beijing to accumulate the power to bring about changes in that country’s behavior.
However, the researchers caution against directly equating the “China Exposure Index” with the success of the Chinese Communist Party in influencing a country’s policies.
The research team consistently distinguishes between “power,” “influence,” and “alignment.” “Power” refers to the potential capability to influence another party, “influence” is the actual result of this power changing the preferences or policies of the other party, while “alignment” denotes both parties originally sharing the same preferences.
In other words, even a country with high exposure may resist Chinese policies, while a country with lower exposure may already align with Beijing’s position.
Among the seven countries with the highest exposure to China’s power globally, four are located in Europe: Russia ranks 2nd, Germany 3rd, France 6th, and the United Kingdom 7th, with the remaining three being South Korea 1st, the United States 4th, and Australia 5th.
It is noteworthy that on a regional average basis, Europe’s exposure levels are higher than the global average, second only to the Indo-Pacific region. Between 2013 and 2018, the average exposure levels of Europe and the Indo-Pacific were statistically difficult to distinguish.
This finding has drawn special attention from the research team as Europe is geographically distant from the projection range of China’s military power.
The report states: “These results are contradictory to the initial expectations. Due to Europe’s geographical distance from Chinese military power projection, it was originally expected that Europe would exhibit significantly lower exposure to China’s power compared to the Indo-Pacific region.”
The study suggests that this demonstrates China’s power spreading globally, not only relying on military strength but also on economic ties and public diplomacy. Globally, among the 184 countries evaluated, 155 countries had a higher CEI score in 2025 than in 2013, indicating a rise in exposure is not a phenomenon exclusive to Europe.
The sources of exposure for each country also differ. Russia primarily reflects factors such as trade and military, while Germany, France, and the UK are more involved in economic ties and public diplomacy.
The research shows that Europe’s average exposure to China increased from 2013 to 2020 and then gradually declined. This turning point coincided with the European Union reevaluating its relationship with China. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also heightened Europe’s awareness of supply chain and strategic dependency risks.
In 2019, the EU viewed Beijing simultaneously as a partner, economic competitor, and “systemic rival” in its strategy towards China, gradually pushing for risk mitigation policies.
The average CEI for Europe rose from 0.44 in 2013 to 0.84 in 2020 and then fell back to 0.68 by 2025. However, the report describes the recent decline as “modest.” In other words, Europe’s exposure has decreased in recent years but has not reversed the overall upward trend of over a decade.
The report concludes: “Exposure to China’s power does not guarantee Europe’s compliance, but it provides Beijing with leverage.”
The CEI does not predefine fixed weights for various indicators but uses Bayesian latent factor analysis to estimate the relationship between different indicators and exposure to China’s power across 184 countries over 13 years.
Among indicators more relevant to European policies, direct investment from China (FDI) and Confucius Institutes stand out.
The presence of Chinese FDI in a country is seen as a significant signal for high exposure levels.
This aligns with concerns from some Western officials and think tanks in recent years regarding Beijing’s overseas investments potentially leading to strategic dependencies. For instance, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington pointed out in April this year that Beijing’s investments in energy and digital infrastructure in five Central Asian countries through the Belt and Road Initiative could create long-term infrastructure dependencies, with similarities to how Russia has formed dependency relationships in surrounding countries in the past.
Secondly, the number of Confucius Institutes also serves as a strong statistical identifier. Records show that in 2025, the UK had 30 Confucius Institutes, while Germany and Russia had 19 each, and France had 18.
Trade also shows a positive correlation with higher exposure, where the importance of “exports to China” is evidently higher than “imports from China.”
The research suggests that this aligns with historical cases: if a country’s businesses depend on the Chinese market, Beijing may impose restrictions on market access to create concentrated and exploitable vulnerabilities.