On Monday, August 24, the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), under the US Air Force, released a report indicating that from 2015 to 2025, hundreds of Western companies, universities, and research institutions had formal contacts and collaborations with the Chinese military or defense research institutions involving sensitive technologies in areas such as hypersonic missiles, submarines, electronic warfare, and advanced radar, raising national security concerns.
The 236-page report titled “The Global Footprint of China’s Defense Labs: Contacts and Collaborations With Foreign Institutions,” authored by contractor BluePath Labs, revealed that over the past 11 years, Western institutions had engaged in 731 instances of exchanges and cooperation with Chinese military laboratories, including visits, training, meetings, and research collaborations.
The report listed 426 foreign institutions that had contact with Chinese military or defense research institutions, including 123 from the United States. It documented 131 cases of contact and/or cooperation between Chinese defense labs and foreign institutions, covering content related to sensitive, dual-use, or purely military technology exchanges.
The report expressed concerns about the interactions between Western research institutions and Chinese military research labs, stating that such interactions posed urgent security risks, providing opportunities for entities focused on developing new technologies for the Chinese military to gain valuable technical knowledge.
However, the report also emphasized that the listed institutions did not necessarily intentionally violate laws or knowingly assist the Chinese military and that the status of any ongoing cooperation remains uncertain.
According to the report, the range of technologies exchanged between foreign institutions and Chinese military research units was extensive, with some technologies potentially assisting the Chinese military in developing advanced weapon systems.
The report highlighted sensitive technologies such as hypersonic missile propulsion and scramjet engine technology, ballistic missile penetration techniques, flight control systems, jet engine development, submarine acoustics and fluid dynamics, anti-electronic warfare technology, aerospace composite materials, and advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Other sensitive technology collaborations included precision guidance and target positioning, advanced radar, and research on anti-radar stealth technology for surface ships.
The report emphasized the direct relevance of these areas to China’s military modernization, missile development, space operations, electronic warfare, and naval capabilities.
Of particular concern was the substantial interactions between China and US military academies, defense enterprises, and defense research institutions, as indicated by the data.
The report cited several cases of cooperation between US companies and universities with Chinese military labs. For instance, Honeywell, a US aerospace software company, assisted the Chinese Ministry of Defense in developing fly-by-wire technology for aircraft in 2018 and engaged in advanced aerospace electronic technology exchange in 2024, technologies seen as having potential military applications.
Cisco, a network equipment company, participated in a cooperation project hosted by the Chinese military in 2019 related to enhancing electronic communication’s anti-jamming capability, with direct military application value. Additionally, Cisco provided assistance to a Chinese military communication lab.
One Chinese military communication lab publicly claimed cooperation with European and Asian companies such as Intel, Siemens, Nokia, DoCoMo, Philips, Orange, LG, and STMicroelectronics.
Regarding hypersonic technology, the report mentioned that in 2021, a Chinese defense technology key laboratory organized an academic conference on hypersonic compression technology, attended by scholars from Oklahoma State University, Rutgers University, as well as experts from Canada, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, and the UK.
In the same year, the University of Tennessee-Knoxville was implicated in a research collaboration related to the “ballistic missile penetration technology” key laboratory associated with the Chinese rocket force research institute, focusing on technology to breach enemy air defense and missile defense systems.
Furthermore, a People’s Liberation Army laboratory engaged in acoustic research on submarines and other underwater military equipment hosted a meeting with representatives from nine US universities.
The report noted that many Chinese military institutions involved in these exchanges had been placed on the US Department of Commerce’s entity list, subject to export controls or other restrictions.
In addition to the aforementioned US enterprises, the report named Bell Labs, IBM, Intel, and aircraft engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney.
The identified US universities included Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Caltech, UC Berkeley, Princeton, Columbia, and the University of Tennessee-Knoxville.
Even some US government agencies participated in defense cooperation with China, such as the Department of Energy, Air Force Research Laboratory, Army Research Laboratory, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and the National Science Foundation.
Beyond the US, countries like Australia, the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, and South Korea have also engaged in numerous exchange activities with Chinese military labs.
The Chinese units involved in the report included PLA Strategic Support Force-related institutions (involved in cyber warfare, space warfare, and information warfare), China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center, Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center (dedicated to space warfare), Military Science Academy, Naval Research Institute, Rocket Force Research Institute, and the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy.
The report highlighted that risks existed not only from formal technology exports or direct military cooperation but also in academic conferences, research training, joint research centers, and long-term research projects.
Researchers pointed out that Chinese defense and military units sometimes hosted conferences under academic or civilian names, downplaying or disguising their military background, making it difficult for foreign researchers, companies, or universities to identify their military connections. This practice could potentially exploit loopholes in Western policies restricting knowledge and technology transfer.
The report also noted that China’s “civil-military integration” strategy required civilian institutions and companies to serve defense construction, meaning that even if cooperation partners appeared to be civilian research units, related technologies, data, and personnel could still be integrated into the Chinese military’s weapons development system.