The latest report from the National Security Bureau of the Republic of China (Taiwan) indicates that as of September this year, the Government Service Network (GSN) of Taiwan has been facing an average of approximately 2.58 million cyber intrusions per day. Since June, there has been a rising trend, with the total detections in July exceeding 100 million times. This could possibly be related to preparations for intervention in Taiwan’s local elections.
The Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China will invite the Director of the National Security Bureau, Tsai Ming-Yan, to present the “National Intelligence Work in the Second Half of This Year and Bureau Affairs Report” on the 22nd, followed by questioning. The report from the National Security Bureau points out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cyber army has continuously targeted key infrastructure in Taiwan. In the first half of this year, there have been frequent cyber disruptions in academic research, telecommunications, and defense supply chain sectors in an attempt to interfere with Taiwan’s defense policies, disrupt international cooperation, and steal confidential and sensitive technology, indicating that cyber attacks have infiltrated various aspects of government operations, research, and defense industries.
The National Security Bureau states that the CCP has been conducting periodic joint military exercises around the Taiwan Strait, with Chinese military aircraft infringing on Taiwanese airspace over 1,450 times and conducting 28 joint military readiness patrols from January to September this year. Despite a slight decrease in overall military exercises compared to the same period last year, the Chinese military continues to test the response capabilities of the Taiwanese military through other drills. Additionally, during Taiwan’s Han Kuang 42 military exercises, Chinese naval and air forces were deployed to test the combat readiness of Taiwanese forces.
The CCP has been escalating its maritime activities in the surrounding waters of the Taiwan Strait, with the National Security Bureau stating that since June, the CCP has extended the patrol range of its coast guard and maritime surveillance ships into the eastern waters of Taiwan and the western Pacific under the pretext of countering Japan and the Philippines in maritime boundary negotiations. This is also complemented by the dissemination of disinformation to create a false impression of “maritime jurisdiction.”
The National Security Bureau warns that the CCP is intensifying cross-border repression and united front infiltration against Taiwan. In terms of “cross-border repression,” the Bureau points out that the CCP instructs collaborators abroad and in Taiwan to monitor and track specific individuals in Taiwan to obtain private information as leverage for threats. They also send threatening emails under the guise of anti-CCP activists to smear the reputation of repression targets, incite physical conflicts, vandalism, staged accidents, aiming to intimidate them through violent actions, creating a chilling effect.
Regarding united front tactics, the National Security Bureau indicates that the CCP continues its strategy of promoting “integration and unity.” Through forums, visits, and other activities, the CCP aims to attract various individuals from Taiwan to engage in exchanges in mainland China, using initiatives like the “10 Measures for Cross-Strait Exchanges and Cooperation” to promote united front propaganda, particularly targeting Taiwanese youth, businesses, and enterprises to strengthen their alignment with the CCP.
In terms of infiltration operations, the National Security Bureau mentions that the CCP seeks to penetrate Taiwanese military units and government agencies through contacts or online connections to obtain sensitive information. In the past seven years, the number of espionage cases prosecuted by the National Security Bureau (excluding cases under the Anti-Infiltration Act) has increased from 6 individuals in 2020 to 73 individuals in 2026. Of those cases, 179 individuals have been sentenced, with 163 convicted, resulting in a conviction rate of 91%. The average sentence length has also risen from 1 year in 2020 to 6 years and 6 months in 2026.
On the front of cognitive warfare, the National Security Bureau points out that from January to September, the CCP has spread controversial messages regarding Taiwan’s energy, food safety, defense policies, etc., aiming to disrupt the government’s policies and manipulate public opinion, while highlighting specific candidates’ positions and reputations and issues related to regional development to influence the outcome of the local elections.
According to statistics from the National Security Bureau, the intelligence team has tracked about 2.5 million pieces of controversial information through anomalous accounts during this period (compared to around 1.69 million pieces during the same period last year), with a significant increase observed on platforms like Facebook, forums, Threads, YouTube, where the proportion of controversial information has notably risen on Facebook (from 43.6% to 68.9%) and Threads (from 4.5% to 9%), indicating that these platforms have become primary channels for the CCP’s cognitive warfare operations.
The National Security Bureau emphasizes that the CCP often establishes narrative frameworks through official or state media and then uses proxy accounts, internet trolls, and public relations companies to spread false information through methods like content farms, fake websites, AI-generated audio-visual content, and fake accounts to manipulate information on social media platforms.
Based on comprehensive intelligence analysis, the CCP is using various technological methods and human intelligence to focus on and collect significant current events, candidates’ positions, election trends, and poll data for the local elections in Taiwan. Subsequently, they aim to formulate cognitive warfare strategies, expand the use of AI technology for information manipulation, and attempt to influence the support tendencies of Taiwanese voters and election results.