New Zealand Security Intelligence Agency recently released its annual report, revealing a case where the Chinese Communist Party intended to deploy satellite tracking devices using observatory facilities. Scholars interviewed believe that this event reflects New Zealand’s significant increase in security measures against China, as the country strengthens coordination with its “Five Eyes Alliance” allies to address related risks.
The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) released the “2026 Security Threat Environment Report” on Thursday, warning that with intensifying global geopolitical competition, New Zealand faces escalating security threats from foreign spies, foreign interference, cyber attacks, and extremism. The report indicated that foreign governments and their proxies are targeting the New Zealand government, businesses, universities, and research institutions in an attempt to access intellectual property, innovative technology, and various non-public information.
The NZSIS anticipates that spy activities will increase in the next 12 months, with some espionage operations acquiring information and system access successfully. The report specifically stated that while multiple countries engage in espionage activities in New Zealand, Chinese intelligence agencies may be the most active force, with China being the only country conducting large-scale espionage activities in New Zealand.
The report disclosed a case involving space infrastructure. The New Zealand security intelligence department found that the Purple Mountain Observatory in China attempted to install Ground-Based Space Infrastructure (GBSI) in New Zealand. The organization advanced the plan through a local New Zealand company.
The NZSIS believes that due to the close connection between the Purple Mountain Observatory and the government, China “has the ability to request the transfer of collected data,” and the relevant data is likely to be actively provided to the Chinese government. This was not the first time the Purple Mountain Observatory attempted to install a similar GBSI device in New Zealand, and it is “unlikely to be the last.”
Public information indicates that GBSI refers to ground systems and equipment located on the Earth’s surface that interact with spacecraft (satellites, probes, etc.) in space. In addition to functions such as astronomical observation and space weather monitoring, it also includes satellite tracking and surveillance capabilities, orbit and location tracking of satellites, rockets, space debris, or other space objects in low Earth orbit (LEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO), geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), using radar, optical telescopes, sensors, etc.
Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Studies researcher Shen Mingshi told Epoch Times that the revelation of China’s attempt to establish satellite tracking facilities in New Zealand highlights China’s potential use of civilian scientific research to expand overseas strategic footholds through “civil-military fusion.”
Shen further stated, “It not only affects the security of the Five Eyes alliance or South Pacific countries but also shows that New Zealand’s policy towards China, which used to be more focused on economy, has now shifted towards strengthening counter-espionage, resisting Chinese intelligence collection, or issues related to military security. In other words, its national security policy has shifted.”
Sydney University of Technology associate professor Feng Chongyi shares a similar view. He believes that New Zealand’s stance on national security, foreign interference, and high-tech fields is undergoing noticeable changes. This shift is not only related to changes in New Zealand’s domestic political environment but also to the overall adjustment of China security policies among Australia, the United States, and other “Five Eyes Alliance” countries.
He pointed out that while New Zealand’s agriculture and dairy exports still heavily rely on the Chinese market, the country is forming a more visible “dual-track” approach: maintaining trade relations with China economically, but emphasizing coordination with the United States and “Five Eyes Alliance” in defense, intelligence, technology, and national security.
New Zealand’s geographical location in the South Pacific makes it an ideal location for tracking satellites, space debris, and scientific data, making it attractive for monitoring foreign military capabilities and intelligence operations.
Shen Mingshi mentioned that if China establishes satellite tracking and space surveillance facilities in the South Pacific, it could not only obtain relevant local information but also further observe the military deployments and naval activities of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries in the region.
“In recent years, China has actively sought influence in the South Pacific. If China establishes facilities for tracking spaceflight and spy satellites in the South Pacific, it means China has established a foothold in the region and can more closely monitor the military deployments or movements of ships from countries like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in this area.”
He noted that if such facilities involve the Five Eyes Alliance member countries, they may bring intelligence security risks. Once New Zealand becomes a target for data collection by China, its related satellite communications or military information may become potential targets, affecting intelligence cooperation among the Five Eyes Alliance members.
“If New Zealand’s intelligence is collected by China, it may intercept some related military or intelligence satellite signals between the Five Eyes Alliance and New Zealand. This will undoubtedly amount to leakage, or it will reduce the cooperation between the Five Eyes Alliance and the advantages of the entire alliance,” he said.
New Zealand is a member of the Five Eyes Alliance and has close intelligence cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.
The “2026 Security Threat Environment Report” also revealed the extensive infiltration of foreign powers in networks, involving businesses, universities, and even overseas diaspora communities.
The report stated that foreign powers also attempt to acquire sensitive technology in New Zealand through shell companies, supply chain intermediaries, investment opportunities, and talent recruitment. Some intermediaries create the illusion of normal business cooperation, hiding the identity of the ultimate end-user; once the technology is obtained, it may be transshipped through multiple countries and trade centers to conceal its ultimate destination.
The report warned that some dual-use technologies may be acquired through academic cooperation, talent projects, and scholarships. As commercial technologies such as artificial intelligence and drones become increasingly easy to convert for military purposes, these risks are on the rise.
The report also noted that Chinese national security laws require individuals and organizations within China to cooperate with Chinese intelligence agencies when requested, which means that companies and institutions must fully consider the data and intellectual property risks that may arise from the relevant legal environment.
Meanwhile, New Zealand’s intelligence agencies warned that foreign intervention is affecting local Chinese and other diaspora communities. The report indicated that some foreign governments exert pressure on overseas communities through threats to families, refusal of consular services, detention of passports or visas, travel restrictions, property rights limitations, and demands for diaspora members to cease participating in specific protests or political activities.
The report believes that overseas communities, including diaspora communities, should be protected individuals rather than being responsible subjects for foreign interference. The New Zealand Security Intelligence Agency believes that China remains the most active country engaging in foreign interference activities in New Zealand, albeit emphasizing that other countries are also carrying out similar activities.
Regarding New Zealand’s release of the “2026 Security Threat Environment Report,” Feng Chongyi believes that it indicates a shift in New Zealand’s current security policy. It does not completely sever economic and trade ties with China but gradually raises the threshold in the security domain.
He pointed out that New Zealand itself does not have much high-tech sophistication, but because it shares technology and intelligence with the U.S., it now needs to cooperate with the U.S. to plug this loophole and prevent China from using the more open channels of scientific research, education, and business cooperation within the Five Eyes Alliance to obtain sensitive technology and information aimed at restricting flows to China.
He stated that from this perspective, the current shift in New Zealand’s security policy goes beyond mere adjustments in foreign policy.