Recently, the Chinese Communist Party revised the “National Defense Mobilization Law.” The new amendments, which changed “reservists” to “reserve personnel” and included provisions for the requisition of civilian resources, have sparked attention. Several experts have analyzed the implications of the new provisions domestically and internationally, pointing out the aggressive and expansive nature of the CCP regime as a core threat.
The new revised “National Defense Mobilization Law” by the Chinese Communist Party is an update to the 2010 regulations, comprising 14 chapters and a total of 82 articles, set to come into effect on October 1 this year.
Differing from the law established during Hu Jintao’s tenure in 2010, the new law includes phrases such as “adhere to the leadership of the CCP” and “adhere to the overall national security concept,” following the trend of documents issued since Xi Jinping took office.
For the first time, the new provisions define “national defense mobilization” as “activities that ensure a quick transition from peace to wartime, transforming economic and social strength into defense capabilities.”
Researcher Li Zhengxiu from the Taiwan Institute for National Policy Research told Dajiyuan that the CCP’s substantial revision of the “National Defense Mobilization Law” incorporates numerous new elements, including emerging fields and finance. The Beijing authorities likely drew lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war and the economic sanctions faced by Russia after its attack on Ukraine, prompting them to make these preparations.
Su Ziyun, director of the Institute of National Defense Strategy and Resources at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Security, analyzed that while all military measures are defensive in normal countries, under the CCP’s expansionist tendencies, they can turn into support for the regime’s external expansion. Therefore, these preparations related to wartime legalities pose a threat.
“The key is not in the ‘National Defense Mobilization Law,’ but in the aggressive and expansionist nature of the CCP regime, which is the real issue,” he said.
A significant change worth noting is the replacement of “reservists” in the 2010 version of the law with “reserve personnel” in the 2026 version, involving more individuals related to reserve forces in the mobilization system.
Apart from “reservists,” “reserve personnel” now also include reserve human resources that can be conscripted or mobilized to supplement active-duty forces, such as other retired military personnel, ordinary citizens meeting military service requirements, and trained individuals.
Su Ziyun explained that reservists refer to those who can be mobilized, serving as a supplementary concept, while reserve personnel might already be assigned and ready, enabling them to join combat directly with their units during mobilization. This reduces the gap between reservists and active-duty personnel, making support for the frontline more efficient.
“The obligation for male citizens aged 18-60 and female citizens aged 18-55 to undertake national defense duties” is not a new content in the 2026 version of the law. However, the previously announced “Regulations on Entry and Exit Administration” to be officially implemented by the CCP on September 15 has sparked associations that “restricting nationals from leaving China is to retain military forces for war preparedness.”
China National Radio interpreted the new CCP regulations, indicating that once mobilization orders are issued, designated conscripted personnel cannot leave their registered locations without permission, those outside must immediately return or stay put, and report as scheduled. It emphasizes that individuals undertaking national defense duties, especially those unemployed previously, may receive certain subsidies.
Some netizens on overseas social platforms voiced concern: young people in China facing unemployment, and even Chinese nationals returning from abroad to visit their families, are likely to become cannon fodder.
Independent commentator Cai Shenkun told Dajiyuan that the CCP, observing the lack of reserve personnel after Russia invaded Ukraine and many young people fleeing, is aware that initiating a war over the Taiwan Strait, which would likely involve Japan and the US, may not be completed quickly. Hence, they are making thorough preparations for military reserves.
Su Ziyun stated that the revised “National Defense Mobilization Law” enhances the CCP’s protectionist policies, potentially turning visits by overseas Chinese into one-way trips (i.e., no return ticket).
The new provisions revised the previous “civilian resource requisition and compensation” to “civilian resource collection, requisition, and compensation,” expanding from mere “requisition” to “collection and requisition,” where collection involves property transfer, while requisition is temporary use.
Li Zhengxiu remarked that if it’s “requisitioned,” you might be able to refuse; with “collection,” it becomes compulsory. The CCP may argue that for the country’s sake, they can take possession first. In normal countries, the government must make a list and potentially return the seized items in the future, compensating for damages.
The new provisions redefine civilian resources subject to collection and requisition as “facilities, equipment, transportation, venues, and other resources utilized for social production, services, and daily living owned or used by organizations and individuals.” Other resources could encompass factory capacity, even data and skilled personnel.
Moreover, Article 64 of the new regulations states, “Any organization or individual has an obligation to accept the lawful collection and requisition of civilian resources.”
Ma Yixiang, former Secretary-General of the Taiwan Forward Foundation and a reserve colonel in the Air Force, expressed concerns on Facebook that if an armed conflict erupts in the Taiwan Strait, American, Japanese, or European companies face the risk of their assets in China being mobilized for war efforts; Taiwanese businesses might face an even more absurd situation where their capital, equipment, technology, and production capacity on the mainland are ultimately used to support military actions against Taiwan by the CCP’s national defense mobilization system.
Su Ziyun pointed out that the CCP is using this law to expand its power, reducing the state’s obligation to compensate, which constitutes unfair rights and obligations. Seizing private property for public use will likely accelerate the outflow of foreign businesses.
He mentioned that even democratic countries have similar requisition systems, but with compensation and parliamentary and public oversight. In China, however, the CCP’s word is final, lacking any supervision mechanisms. This highlights the difference between authoritarianism and democracy, showing that the problem lies not in the mobilization law but in the CCP itself.
Cai Shenkun believed that the CCP’s “National Defense Mobilization Law” implies numerous power-expanding elements. Once a military emergency is declared, the CCP could control everything, including substantial deposits, which is why they are restricting outbound travels, particularly not wanting wealthy individuals to leave.
Regarding the acquisition approach, Cai likened it to what the CCP did after coming to power—confiscating, requisitioning, forcibly buying, and nationalizing various sectors of society, often issuing IOUs that were rarely repaid.
The new CCP law also mentions that post-implementation of national defense mobilization, control measures can be applied to transportation, networks, energy, food, and restrict the movement of personnel and materials within relevant regions.
On the evening of August 30, Shanghai Telecom experienced a widespread network outage. The telecom authorities cited partially malfunctioning lines as the cause that night. This incident marked the third similar network outage event in Shanghai within two years, leading to speculations of war simulations and stress tests.
The previous revision of the CCP’s “National Defense Mobilization Law” was 16 years ago. The timing of the current revision has sparked discussions, with many speculating it is in preparation for a conflict with Taiwan or engaging in war with the US and Japan in the Western Pacific, particularly along the first island chain.
The CCP’s recent revision has raised Taiwan’s alert level significantly. legislator Chen Guanting stated on August 31 that Taiwan must strengthen its capabilities for transitioning from peace to war, integrating civilian resources for preparedness, and accelerating the construction of national resilience, energy security, and defense autonomy.
Independent commentator Cai Shenkun told Dajiyuan that the CCP is currently facing fiscal exhaustion, and the increasing number of unemployed youth presents a significant problem, leading to societal discontent and discontent towards Xi Jinping. Such regimes typically seek external enemies when facing sharp internal contradictions, with Taiwan being a target they aim to conquer. The CCP’s revision of the “National Defense Mobilization Law” indicates preparations for war. Therefore, Taiwan should make thorough preparations. The US is already on guard against a major conflict instigated by the CCP in the Taiwan Strait.
Li Zhengxiu stated that presently, for the CCP and Xi Jinping, their internal issues are the focal point, and an immediate urgency for a war with Taiwan is unlikely.
Su Ziyun mentioned that the CCP has been enhancing wartime preparations, and while increased vigilance from Taiwan is necessary, baseless fears should be avoided.