The draft of the Chinese Communist Party’s “Anti-Corruption Law on Cross-Border” is currently under the first review at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Experts suggest that the new law is transforming past gray, informal, politically motivated cross-border fugitive hunting into a normalized toolbox under the guise of domestic law.
The official Chinese media reported that the draft of the “Anti-Corruption Law on Cross-Border” was submitted for the first review at the meeting of the 14th National People’s Congress Standing Committee on August 25th.
The draft consists of six chapters and 47 articles, focusing on the principles, scope, and propositions of the so-called anti-cross-border corruption work. The law is claimed to be beneficial in addressing the prominent issues of difficulty in discovery, evidence collection, asset recovery, and conviction in cross-border corruption cases.
Observers are concerned that China’s previous cross-border fugitive pursuit efforts have been criticized multiple times for violating international law, and even involving cross-border crackdowns.
Sun Guoxiang, a professor of International Affairs and Business Studies at Nanhua University in Taiwan, pointed out to Epoch Times that China’s past “Fox Hunt” operations, “Sky Net” operations, and so-called “persuasion back” initiatives have often been questioned for lacking transparent judicial processes, and even involving harassment, intimidation, coercion of family members, and enforcement without the consent of the host country. The new law appears to be transforming the previous gray, informal, politically motivated cross-border hunting into a normalized toolbox under the guise of domestic law.
However, domestic authorization does not equate to international cooperation. If cross-border fugitive pursuits can be conducted through extradition, judicial assistance, police cooperation, and asset return agreements, the legitimacy of such actions would be enhanced. Sun Guoxiang believes that if China continues to conduct cross-border pressure, threaten family members, carry out secret operations, or bypass local courts under the pretext of persuasion back, it would merely cloak cross-border crackdowns in legal terms, potentially violating the sovereignty, procedural justice, and human rights of other countries.
Sun Guoxiang stated that the new law would provide internal justification for Beijing’s actions, but it does not automatically gain external legitimacy.
Previously, China has introduced tools related to foreign affairs such as the National Security Law, Anti-Sanctions Law, Data Security Law, and Export Control Law. Sun Guoxiang believes that the latest “Anti-Corruption Law on Cross-Border” will create compliance pressures for businesses domestically, pose asset risks for high-net-worth individuals, and introduce judicial sovereignty and human rights scrutiny for foreign governments.
American economist David Huang, speaking to Epoch Times, stated that this official legislation aims to further bring Chinese residents and enterprises who previously moved funds abroad under regulation; meanwhile, it extends the enforcement and asset recovery capability of the government overseas, shifting towards an extraterritorial jurisdiction model. This indicates that Beijing is strengthening its control over cross-border funds, enterprises, and personnel.
He believes three key points are worth noting:
First, it will oversee all overseas individuals and assets involved, including ordinary businesses and individuals.
Second, the law explicitly covers Chinese enterprises going overseas. This includes provisions for corporate integrity compliance obligations and legal responsibilities, which is quite unusual. This model may primarily target systems like the U.S.’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and concerns about being prosecuted under foreign anti-bribery laws, thus pre-emptively avoiding legal actions.
Third, it targets banks, accounting firms, agents, cross-border asset arrangements, enabling tracing of fund flows, beneficiaries, overseas entities, etc. However, it should be noted that the recovered money may not necessarily be returned to the victims; rather, it is more likely used to bolster government revenue.
Huang stated that what is truly worth observing is that in the future, Beijing may argue that based on this domestic law, they can hold accountable enterprises, individuals, and institutions abroad related to Chinese citizens, Chinese enterprises, assets, so-called national interests, and even those closely associated with China.