In recent years, some self-media accounts in China have been using methods such as “hanging resumes” to “pre-announce” the downfall of officials. The official Chinese media recently pointed out the rare phenomenon of some public officials acting as “moles,” forming an underground industry chain that relies on anti-corruption information from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Scholars have indicated that the leaking of such information is not only for profit but also involves power struggles. It is suggested that the recent publications by the official media may be related to the upcoming 21st National Congress of the CCP, where authorities may seek to block various factions from spreading rumors.
According to a recent investigative article by “Half-Month Talk,” a publication under Xinhua News Agency, some self-media accounts would release detailed resumes of officials before their downfall or use homophones, aliases, and suggestive language. For example, on July 6, 2025, a WeChat public account published the detailed resume of Zhou Xianwang, former party committee member and vice chairman of the Hubei Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Two days later, the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection website announced that Zhou Xianwang was under investigation.
It is claimed that once information about officials being investigated or demoted leaks, it spreads first in certain chat groups on messaging apps where new members are required to pay a fee to join. After operators of some public accounts obtain the information, they then publish suggestive content on public accounts to attract readers to enter new paid groups. Each public account is reportedly linked to 3 or 4 groups, with entry fees ranging from tens to hundreds of Chinese yuan.
An analysis from a law enforcement officer cited in the article suggests that some individuals within the system act as “moles” to leak relevant information in order to gain traffic revenue.
Feng Chongyi, an associate professor at the University of Technology Sydney, stated to Epoch Times that since Xi Jinping came to power, there has been an emphasis on establishing a so-called “comprehensive national security system,” placing significant control over the internet. The authorities have invested substantial manpower and resources to block unfavorable information and spread useful information, which is also part of the CCP’s information warfare.
Feng Chongyi further pointed out that due to the recent internal suppression within the CCP, some individuals working within the system, who have been harmed, are dissatisfied with the current situation. There may also be undercover anti-CCP individuals. They utilize various means to publish the information they wish to disseminate or repost information they want to share. Of course, in addition to these reasons, the motivation for many to publish such information is purely financial.
Based on this, Feng Chongyi believes that under the CCP’s rule, although the entire regime appears tightly controlled, internal dissatisfaction and other factors create numerous vulnerabilities.
In response to the chaos described in the official media articles, veteran political scholar Sun Guoxiang told Epoch Times that this is a new type of leakage, originating from the highly opaque anti-corruption and personnel systems of the CCP. Since anti-corruption cases pass through various stages involving disciplinary inspection, organizational, public security, and local party and government departments, many insiders are knowledgeable. However, the lack of public verification channels in society gives internal information high economic scarcity and commercial value. Thus, by monetizing through self-media traffic, paid groups, and multi-level resale, political secrets can be transformed into tradable information commodities.
He believes that the acknowledgment by the official media that the sources of leaked information involve individuals within the system also indicates that the issue is not just online rumors but a breakdown in the confidentiality and discipline within the power structure.
Despite the CCP official media emphasizing that these irregularities involve profit chains, Sun Guoxiang points out that besides seeking profits, some leaks may have political motives, including testing public opinion and internal party reactions, targeting opponents and their networks, warning officials and businessmen to distance themselves for self-preservation, or creating a fait accompli of someone’s imminent downfall to force higher-ups to act swiftly.
“It could also be different departments or factions vying for agenda-setting power and the right to interpret cases before they are fully resolved,” he said.
The article in “Half-Month Talk” also mentioned that interviewed experts and grassroots cadres have proposed various governance suggestions to address the industrial chain of corruption leaks. Guizhou and other places have established mechanisms for information sharing and joint operations between the disciplinary inspection and supervision agencies and the public security department to promptly identify the authenticity of information and debunk rumors, followed by tracing the origins to combat them.
Sun Guoxiang expressed that the publication of this article by the official media may indicate preparations to crack down on “moles,” clean up self-media, and regain political messaging and interpretive rights. This may be highly related to the upcoming leadership changes at the 21st National Congress.
The 21st National Congress of the CCP is scheduled to be held in the autumn of 2027. Hong Kong’s “Ming Pao” previously reported that inspections by senior CCP officials have been initiated, signaling the full entry into the “time of the 21st Congress.”
Sun Guoxiang analyzed that as the 21st National Congress approaches, the demands for personnel information from various factions and interest networks increase. Therefore, the authorities cracking down on “pre-announced downfall” at this time may be aimed at investigating “moles,” blocking factional leaks, further restricting the circulation of unofficial political information within China.
However, Sun Guoxiang believes that further strengthening totalitarian and opaque governance by the CCP will result in less visible political information in society but will not eradicate the leakage problem. As internal information becomes harder to access, its value in the market increases.
Feng Chongyi stated that with every leadership transition within the CCP, there are promotions, demotions, and deliberate leaks as part of internal power struggles. The CCP regime, lacking genuine ideological support, inevitably gives rise to various forms of “high-level intrigues” and conspiracy theories.
It is noteworthy that the previously behind-the-scenes Chinese state security agencies and bureaus have been actively publishing articles in recent years on so-called cases involving secrets and espionage. However, these departments have not made any statements regarding the “mole” issue that the official media is focusing on.