On August 13, conservative American political reporter Natalie Winters released an investigative report on her personal website titled “Secret Nuclear War Pipeline Established Between Chinese (CCP) Spies, Former U.S. Military Leaders, and Blacklisted Chinese Weapons Research Centers”.
The report alleges that “a Beijing-based propaganda spy organization, pledging allegiance to the highest leadership of the CCP, funded the establishment of a secret nuclear channel that allowed some former top U.S. national security officials to have face-to-face contacts with researchers responsible for Beijing’s nuclear weapons development.”
Winters found from some Chinese records that these meetings were not diplomatic activities of the U.S. government. Most of this information comes from Chinese reports, some of which have been deleted or removed from public view.
The operating organization behind these meetings – the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF) – has been identified by congressional investigators as a “tool for the CCP’s political warfare” and is part of Beijing’s broader influence system of united front work.
The American former officials involved in these “exchanges” possess extraordinary knowledge, connections, and reputation within the U.S. national security apparatus.
According to the report, within about a year, the channel evolved from private strategic discussions to direct contacts between the highest-level former U.S. national security officials and Chinese (CCP) nuclear weapons researchers, meetings with Chinese (CCP) diplomats, and contacts with senior CCP officials.
The report states that the CCP divides dialogues with the U.S. into three levels: Track 2, 1.5 Track, and Track 1. Track 2 is unofficial, 1.5 Track narrows the distance between non-official participants and government officials, while Track 1 is governmental diplomacy.
In her report, Winters stated, “In other words, organizers associated with Beijing openly described a process of helping to shape the content and conditions of subsequent formal negotiations through private contact with former U.S. officials.”
In September 2024, the Grandview Institution hosted the first “China-U.S. Strategic Security and Stability Dialogue”.
Supported by The Pacific International Exchange Foundation (PIEF), a branch of CUSEF in mainland China, established in Beijing, the Grandview Institution claims to be an independent think tank dedicated to building effective dialogue between China (CCP) and various countries around the world.
The conference focused on highly sensitive national security issues, including nuclear policy and strategy, crisis management, regional conflict points, and the future of strategic stability between the U.S. and China. Participants also discussed the “new definition of strategic stability between China and the U.S.”
This conference marked the beginning of establishing ongoing private channels between former U.S. officials who have been involved in developing U.S. nuclear policy and national security policy and their Chinese counterparts.
The Grandview Institution reported on this event on September 30, 2024.
(A link to the article.)
A month later, conversations became more sensitive.
From October 11 to 13, 2024, the Grandview Institution in Beijing hosted the first “Nuclear Fail-Safe Dialogue”, inviting U.S. former officials and nuclear experts to discuss nuclear policy, nuclear posture, and the nuclear weapons management system.
Participants discussed nuclear command and control procedures, nuclear posture, and certain aspects of nuclear weapon and delivery system design.
Themes of the discussion included post-ballistic missile launch destruct mechanisms, personnel reliability programs, policy to extend leadership decision-making time, and the possibility of sharing early warning data for ballistic missile launches.
The Grandview Institution reported on this event on September 16, 2025.
(A link to the article.)
By April 2025, the level of U.S. participants had significantly increased.
PIEF sponsored the second “China-U.S. Strategic Security and Stability Dialogue”, claiming to be co-organizers alongside CUSEF.
The U.S. delegation members included former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and other senior former U.S. military officials. The agenda covered U.S. and China’s nuclear strategies, nuclear policy, nuclear posture assessments, global nuclear balance, and potential U.S.-China crises and conflicts.
Before the dialogue began, the U.S. delegation held talks with the Chinese (CCP) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association. They also met with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Xiaobo of the CCP Central External Liaison Department and Ma Hui, a senior official in North American Affairs.
According to Winters’ investigative report, at this stage, this mode of interaction no longer resembled academic exchanges but seemed more like cultivating influence for the CCP. This involved finding former officials in Washington who still have influence and connections, repeatedly involving them in interactions under CCP control, introducing them to increasingly higher-ranking Chinese (CCP) political figures, and maintaining a private channel outside normal U.S. government scrutiny.
The Grandview Institution reported on this event on April 8, 2025.
(A link to the article.)
Winters’ report stated that six months later, PIEF funded the second “China-U.S. Nuclear Fail-Safe Dialogue” held in Beijing.
The U.S. delegation included former Secretary of Energy, former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and former senior officials of the National Nuclear Security Administration. They were knowledgeable about U.S. nuclear policy as former managers of U.S. nuclear institutions.
On the other side of the table were personnel from the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP): Zhao Wuwen, Director of the Strategic Research Center of the CAEP, Sun Xiangli, Deputy Director of the center, Zhang Qizheng, Associate Researcher, and Sun Xiangli, Deputy Director of the China Institute of Nuclear Strategic Planning. This institution is a wholly owned subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation and a core professional think tank.
Other attendees were from Tsinghua University’s International Relations Department, Fudan University’s Institute of Development Studies, and the Shaanxi Institute of International Studies.
The China Academy of Engineering Physics is an institution recognized by the U.S. government for being responsible for China’s (CCP) nuclear weapon research, development, and testing, subject to U.S. export controls since 1997.
The discussions covered the U.S. nuclear fail-safe review system, global nuclear energy situations, China’s nuclear fail-safe procedures, emerging technologies, and potential international cooperation.
The report stated that PIEF expressed the process had moved beyond conceptual discussions into “system design” and practical implementation stages.
On the second day, private dialogues evolved into further contacts with senior Chinese (CCP) government officials. Grandview Institution staff accompanied U.S. participants to meet with Sun Xiaobo, Director of the Arms Control Department of the Chinese (CCP) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Tang Zhiwen, a senior official of North American Affairs, and met again with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ma Hui.
The Grandview Institution reported on this event on October 17, 2025.
(A link to the article.)
The conference convened again on December 16 and 17.
The report stated that CUSEF supported the third “China-U.S. Strategic Security and Stability Dialogue”, attended and co-hosted by CUSEF President Zhou Jiancheng. CUSEF previously released summaries of dialogues but later removed them from its website.
At this dialogue, Sun Xiangli, Deputy Director of the China Institute of Nuclear Strategic Planning, was again dispatched by Beijing. Other CAEP personnel attended as observers.
The conference discussed traditional nuclear deterrence, emerging technologies, the impact of artificial intelligence on nuclear security, and crisis management.
The Grandview Institution’s report mentioned that the China-U.S. dialogue “could begin with Track 2 (China-U.S. Strategic Security and Stability Dialogue) and create conditions and select content for Track 1 and Track 1.5 dialogues.”
The Grandview Institution reported on this event on December 18, 2025.
(A link to the article.)
In her investigative report, Winters stated that to fully understand the role CUSEF played in these dialogues from start to finish, one must examine the entire development process of these dialogues.
PIEF was established in September 2012 and is the mainland Chinese entity of CUSEF, initially funded with 20 million RMB from CUSEF and supervised by the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries.
PIEF’s constitution states that the foundation “upholds the overall leadership of the Chinese Communist Party”. It is required to establish a communist party organization and allows party representatives to participate in management meetings. Most importantly, its constitution gives the party organization a role in reviewing major decisions and “foreign activities”. One of its missions is to organize and fund high-level official and unofficial U.S.-China dialogues aimed at establishing “strategic mutual trust”.
CUSEF has been repeatedly scrutinized by U.S. investigators as it reflects a broader strategic of the CCP’s united front work. U.S. congressional investigators described CUSEF as a “tool for the CCP’s political warfare”. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission described the CCP’s united front work as an attempt to “co-opt and neutralize” potential opposition forces to the CCP.
According to FARA documents, Winters revealed that journalists, editors, and columnists from some of the largest mainstream news organizations in the U.S. accepted funding from CUSEF for free trips to China.
Winters pointed out in her report that the actions of CUSEF aim to establish connections with congressional staff, scholars, military personnel, and policy elites. The format of the China-U.S. dialogues essentially applies this model to a target group far more sensitive than the former.
The report stated that several U.S. former officials participating in the dialogues supported by PIEF did not limit their contacts with China to academic levels. Some of them received substantial payments from multinational companies with intricate connections to the Chinese market and Chinese (CCP) joint venture partners.
(The original report)