In the 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party dispatched undercover agents to Shanghai, using a secret radio to send intelligence to Yan’an, boasting it as the “indestructible radio wave.” Today in the 21st century, the CCP has sent a new breed of “agents” to Europe and America, transmitting a steady stream of radio waves to Beijing.
On August 10, British officials stated that cameras installed on British Navy drones were sending data to internet addresses in China. During a routine security assessment, it was discovered that the cameras mounted on the Navy’s K3 Scout unmanned reconnaissance vessel were sending so-called “heartbeat communication” to a device in China.
The British Ministry of Defense publicly stated that these transmissions only confirmed the cameras were online and functioning normally, with no evidence of sensitive information being sent. Nevertheless, they swiftly severed all network connections for the cameras.
The role of Navy drones in modern warfare is increasingly crucial. Ukraine has previously used drones to attack Russian naval vessels and ships transporting Russian oil. In July of this year, the United States for the first time deployed drones in combat, launching drone strikes on Iranian ports, destroying a submarine and a ship repair facility.
The national security threat from the CCP is not limited to the UK alone. The component found sending signals to China is part of the K3 Scout unmanned drones manufactured by Kraken Technology, a company based in Fulham, UK. Kraken recently secured a $49 million drone contract from the US Special Operations Command.
Furthermore, thousands of Chinese electronic products flood into the United States, akin to the thousands of agents dispatched by the CCP to the US.
In the 1950s, the CCP released a film titled “Indestructible Radio Waves,” narrating the story of a couple of undercover agents in Shanghai transmitting intelligence to the CCP headquarters in Yan’an through radio.
In the 21st century, the CCP’s emphasis on intelligence work remains unwavering. In 2017, the CCP enacted the National Intelligence Law, stipulating that Chinese companies and citizens are obliged to “support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence work in accordance with the law, and keep confidential the national intelligence they are aware of,” which effectively compels companies to support the CCP’s intelligence collection efforts. In 2021, the CCP issued the Counter-Espionage Law, requiring Chinese citizens to collaborate with Chinese national security agencies.
Under the coercion of the CCP’s oppressive laws, Chinese companies have become the eyes and ears of the CCP infiltrating Europe and America.
Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC), a Chinese state-owned defense enterprise, constructs 80% of the port cranes in US ports. These port cranes are large specialized lifting equipment used for loading and unloading vessels at container terminals. A congressional investigation in 2025 revealed that each movement of these cranes can be monitored by the Chinese government. The investigation report highlighted that some of ZPMC’s port cranes could even be controlled remotely and at worst, shut down completely.
A joint congressional investigation found unauthorized cellular data modems hidden on some of ZPMC’s cranes, which could bypass port firewall protections.
Mark Green, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee and Republican representative for Tennessee, stated, “These were not designed to specification, and they were added without informing anyone.”
On August 6, cybersecurity company VulnCheck discovered backdoors in at least 20 routers produced by Shenzhen Zbtlink Electronics. The research found that this vulnerability could allow access and control of the device and potentially access and control other devices on the network.
Jacob Baines, Chief Technology Officer of VulnCheck, mentioned in an analysis report that this backdoor software automatically connects to a specific IP address and a Chinese-registered domain every 35 seconds, providing anyone with control or hijacking of these domains the ability to control the routers and potentially exploit them to access other devices on the same network.
In May 2025, American experts found illegal communication devices not listed in product documentation in some Chinese-made solar inverters. A supplier revealed that unregistered communication devices, including cellular radio units, were found in batteries from multiple Chinese suppliers. These malicious components provided additional, undisclosed communication channels, potentially allowing remote bypassing of firewalls, leading to disastrous consequences.
Experts cautioned that using illegal communication devices to bypass firewalls, remotely shut down inverters, or alter their settings could destabilize the power grid, damage energy infrastructure, and trigger widespread power outages.
“This essentially means there is a built-in method to physically destroy the power grid,” Reuters quoted experts as saying.
Apart from Chinese-manufactured hardware acting as spies, Chinese-made software can also metamorphose into espionage tools.
In February 2025, Ivan Tsarynny, CEO of Feroot Security, a cybersecurity company based in Ontario specializing in customer data protection, informed ABC News that the code of the popular global artificial intelligence tool DeepSeek might actually conceal a direct pathway to China.
“We found direct connections to servers and companies inside China controlled by the Chinese government.”
Users registering or logging into DeepSeek might unknowingly create accounts in China, making their identities, search inquiries, and online activities transparent to the Chinese national system.
Tsarynny stated that by using AI software to decrypt portions of DeepSeek’s code, he discovered deliberately hidden routines that could send user data to a website, CMPassport.com, which is an online registration site operated by China Mobile, a telecom company owned and operated by the CCP.
In 2019, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) barred China Mobile from operating in the US, citing that “Unauthorized access to customer data may cause irreparable harm to US national security.” In 2021, China Mobile was delisted from the New York Stock Exchange and in 2022, it was added to the FCC’s national security threat list.
Former Deputy Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security, John Cohen, told ABC that DeepSeek is a blatant example of suspected surveillance by the Chinese government.
“National security officials are always suspicious that there are backdoors in technologies sold by Chinese companies that allow the Chinese government access to that data. And in this case, the backdoor has been discovered and opened.”
In July 2025, an investigation by the European Data Protection Board revealed that the Chinese-made social media app TikTok permits remote access to user data from China, placing users at risk of surveillance.
Over the past year, the FCC has issued several prohibitions targeting the CCP.
In October 2025, the FCC ordered major online retail websites in the US to remove millions of listings for banned Chinese electronic products. Affected products include home security cameras and smartwatches from companies like Huawei, Hangzhou Hikvision, ZTE, and Dahua.
In March of this year, the FCC announced banning the import of all new foreign-made consumer routers. It is estimated that China controls at least 60% of the US household router market share.
In July, the FCC voted to prohibit the sale of devices containing essential hardware components from Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE in the US. Although equipment produced by Huawei was already banned from obtaining new authorizations as early as 2022, devices containing Huawei parts could still continue to gain approval to enter the US market.
Additionally, according to Reuters, the FCC is currently formulating a measure to ban the import of new Chinese optical transceivers. These transceivers enable data to travel at the speed of light through fiber optic cables within data centers. This measure aims to prevent Chinese companies from stealing data, installing malicious software, or disrupting services in American data centers, which store chips used for training and running AI models.