Former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji passed away on August 12, widely known as the “Iron-fisted Premier.” Zhu Rongji’s strong image during his tenure stood in stark contrast to the current Premier Li Keqiang. The succession of premiers after Zhu Rongji gradually saw a decline in power, moving towards autocratic authoritarianism, seen as a sign of the regime’s decline.
Zhu Rongji served as Premier from 1998 to 2003.
In April 1991, Zhu Rongji, personally appointed by Deng Xiaoping, became Vice Premier, taking charge of the economy while serving as Executive Vice Premier. After Deng Xiaoping’s passing in 1997, Jiang Zemin’s power expanded rapidly as he controlled the military and became the “core of the party.” Despite constraints from many senior leaders, Jiang’s only restriction was not being able to interfere with the economic decision-making power firmly held by “Economic Czar” Zhu Rongji. Despite Jiang Zemin’s limitations, the State Council headed by Zhu Rongji had significant autonomy in economic matters.
Zhu Rongji was known for his decisive actions during his tenure, vigorously tackling the daunting issue of the “Triangle Debt.” He personally went to the northeastern provinces where the debt crisis was most severe, taking charge and resolving the situation on the spot.
During Zhu Rongji’s tenure, he implemented tax reforms, currency reforms, joined the WTO, abolished welfare housing policies, and initiated state-owned enterprise reforms with significant impact.
However, Zhu Rongji’s state-owned enterprise reform was essentially government-led privatization. The acquirers of numerous state-owned enterprises and assets were often red aristocrats or offspring of bureaucratic groups. The “reforms” also led to massive layoffs in state-owned enterprises, plunging workers into dire straits, leading to significant criticisms from both the public and the private sector.
Furthermore, the marketization drive under Zhu Rongji’s era did not progress in sync with political freedoms, public opinion supervision, and judicial constraints. During the era of Zhu Rongji, which was also the late period of Jiang Zemin’s rule, corruption ran deep, materialism was rampant, and everything was measured by money, status, and interests, leading to a moral decline in society.
An article by Taiwan’s Central Broadcasting Corporation opined that summarizing Zhu Rongji with just three words as a “reformer” would be a misunderstanding of his historical position. Zhu Rongji’s true uniqueness lies in being a technical bureaucrat who viewed the market economy as a tool while being extremely conservative in politics. Today, many of his reform achievements have vanished.
Wen Jiabao served as Premier from 2003 to 2013.
Despite some degree of strength during Wen Jiabao’s tenure, often considered on par with Hu Jintao, leading to the term “Hu-Wen administration,” the State Council maintained significant independence.
Wen Jiabao once introduced a 4 trillion RMB investment plan. However, during the Hu-Wen period, local governments heavily borrowed to inject supplementary funds, leading to extensive infrastructure construction and real estate development, resulting in a rapid accumulation of local debts that persist today.
Wen Jiabao repeatedly advocated for political reforms during his premiership, but his actions failed to meet expectations, particularly among intellectuals. Due to the all-encompassing party leadership system in China, Wen Jiabao was also criticized for having good intentions but lacking the power to implement substantial changes.
The governance of Hu-Wen administration was also influenced by former CCP leader Jiang Zemin.
One notable incident occurred during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. While directing rescue efforts in the disaster area, Wen Jiabao expressed rare anger and frustration due to hindered rescue operations and delayed responses from the military and related departments. It was reported that the then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Guo Boxiong, established a private earthquake relief headquarters in Sichuan, refusing to obey Wen Jiabao’s commands as the head of disaster relief. Guo Boxiong was a close associate of Jiang Zemin.
In 2012, at his final premier press conference, Wen Jiabao warned that without successful political reforms, economic reforms could not be fully realized, achievements could be lost, new problems might emerge, and the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution could reoccur. He emphasized that reform must progress; stagnation and regression were not viable options.
This was seen as a caution to Xi Jinping’s rise to power.
Li Keqiang served as Premier alongside Xi Jinping from 2013 to 2023.
After assuming office in the North Building of Zhongnanhai in 2013, Li Keqiang was initially referred to as part of the “Xi-Li administration.” The partnership between Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang was a compromise among various factions of the CCP rather than Xi’s choice, allowing Li Keqiang some level of authority during his premiership.
However, in the later stages, Li Keqiang was regarded as a “weak Premier.”
During the “institutional reforms” in 2018, Xi Jinping significantly sidelined Li Keqiang’s authority under the guise of strengthening party leadership, diverting power from many spheres. Xi Jinping strengthened party control by taking over various party committees such as the Central Finance and Economics Committee and the Comprehensive Deepening Reform Committee, weakening the decision-making power of the State Council while emphasizing party control.
Nevertheless, Xi Jinping’s pursuit of total control and consolidation of power faced the most significant obstacle in Li Keqiang. Some essential positions held by Li Keqiang in central decision-making and coordinating bodies were immune to Xi’s influence, such as the role of Director of the Central Organization Commission (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection).
Li Keqiang’s achievements included promoting administrative streamlining and encouraging market vitality at the micro-level. However, under Xi Jinping’s authoritative regime, Li Keqiang’s policy space was noticeably restricted.
From the onset, Li Keqiang focused on “deleveraging,” but as he neared the end of his term, China’s physical economy debt ratio had increased rather than decreased from a decade ago. Despite Li Keqiang’s efforts to advance business tax reforms by replacing business tax with value-added tax and proposing property taxes as a primary revenue source for local governments, local authorities still struggled to break free from reliance on land finance, leaving the debt dilemma unresolved.
Many policies associated with “Li Keqiang’s economics” were left unimplemented, with major decisions marginalized. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi Jinping vigorously promoted a “zero-COVID” approach while Li Keqiang found it challenging to stabilize the economy.
In a public statement during the National People’s Congress in 2020, Li Keqiang revealed the harsh reality that 600 million Chinese people earned less than one thousand yuan per month. This figure was not included in official statistics and highlighted the challenging living conditions faced by many. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping was pushing local governments for the “successful eradication of poverty.”
Li Keqiang was seen as a representative of the reformist faction in both official circles and civil society, often viewed as a thorn in Xi’s side. His sudden death upon retirement raised suspicions of Xi Jinping’s involvement.
Li Qiang assumed the role of Premier in 2023.
Li Qiang was a key aide to Xi in the past, dubbed by observers as “Xi’s shadow Premier,” not even meeting the criteria to be called a “weak Premier.”
With the conclusion of the era of technical bureaucrats ruling, following the 20th National Congress of the CCP, all power now emanated from Xi Jinping. The CCP bid farewell entirely to collective leadership models from the “Hu-Wen administration” and “Jiang-Zhu administration,” solely embracing the “Xi core.”
Upon taking office, Li Qiang adjusted the positioning of the State Council, making significant changes to the “State Council’s Working Rules,” emphasizing that the State Council is primarily a political body and must systematically learn and implement Xi’s important directives. Compared to the previous version in 2018, the new working regulations were entirely “Xi-ified.”
The Central Committee was responsible for national institutional reform and organizational management, historically led by the Premier of the State Council, such as Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao, and Li Keqiang. After Li Keqiang’s retirement in March 2023, Xi Jinping personally assumed the role of director, with the new Premier Li Qiang serving as the Deputy Director.
While former Premier Li Keqiang traveled on a special aircraft similar to Xi Jinping, Li Qiang was limited to charter flights for overseas travel, indirectly reflecting a downgrade in diplomatic settings.
During the National People’s Congress in March 2024, Li Qiang was excluded from the arrangement to hold a Premier’s press conference—a tradition that spans over thirty years post the NPC session.
Following the 2018 tightening of party control through institutional reforms, the establishment of the “Central Committee for Financial Work” in 2023 saw direct party command over financial affairs bypassing the State Council. Additionally, the newly established Central Social Work Department tightened control over all of society. The CCP further blurred the lines between party and government, moving toward a “unity of party and government.”
Xi Jinping’s large-scale cleanse of the officialdom had a significant impact on Li Qiang’s cabinet. Just over seven months into Li Qiang’s cabinet formation, two State Councilors – Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Defense Minister Li Shangfu – were removed and remained unfilled, a rare occurrence.
In his three years in office, China’s economy under Li Qiang continued to stagnate. While Xi Jinping and propaganda chief Cai Qi adamantly touted the narrative of the “bright economic prospects,” Li Qiang had limited opportunities to speak out. In 2024, during the World Economic Forum in Dalian, Liaoning, Li Qiang mentioned that China could not resort to drastic measures to uplift the economy. However, his statements received little attention.
Chinese issues expert Li Lin remarked that the curve from strong to weak among the past four Chinese Premiers was the result of power struggles within the CCP leadership, closely tied to the regime’s trajectory. With the disappearance of political elders, the CCP has entered the era of Xi Jinping, reaching the pinnacle of authoritarianism and personal dictatorship. However, with the Premier even falling short of being considered “weak,” it signals a decline in the regime itself.