Scholar: New Zealand no longer silent, frequently exposing Chinese Communist espionage activities.

For a long time, it has been widely believed that New Zealand is the weakest link in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and the most vulnerable to coercion from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, the recent national intelligence warnings issued by New Zealand have been increasingly critical of the CCP, with officials even joking that New Zealand’s attitude towards the CCP is tougher than that of Australia.

According to a recent article by Anna Fifield, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), on the website of the Lowy Institute, New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service’s latest annual threat assessment report, released on Thursday (August 12), specifically identifies the CCP among the numerous spy agencies hungry for intelligence collection, aiming to obtain critical asset information through aggressive intelligence gathering efforts against New Zealand and its allies.

The article further emphasizes that while many countries engage in espionage activities against New Zealand, only the CCP conducts large-scale espionage operations.

Fifield points out that over the past four years, New Zealand’s intelligence agencies have continuously warned about CCP activities targeting New Zealand, including political or commercial espionage, expanding influence and infiltration efforts, as well as crackdowns on the New Zealand Chinese community.

In contrast, in a similar threat assessment report from the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, CCP activities were not directly named.

The CCP has reacted strongly to New Zealand’s increasingly sharp rhetoric, often attempting to silence New Zealand or at least soften its stance. In June of this year, the CCP imposed travel bans on four New Zealand lawmakers who had visited Taiwan, in an attempt to redraw the lines for New Zealand. Last month, the CCP angrily condemned New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters for accusing the CCP of habitual lying.

Andrew Hampton, the director of New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service, highlights in the report’s preface the country’s strategic significance as located in the Pacific region near Antarctica, closely connected to other parts of the world, making it an enticing target for threat actors, particularly amid the current global turbulence.

As the global situation presents ongoing challenges in the coming months, coupled with New Zealand’s upcoming national elections in November, the situation is cause for concern. In a recent joint warning with its Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partners, New Zealand has raised alarms about the CCP’s extensive online recruitment efforts, enticing foreign individuals with lucrative offers to steal confidential or sensitive information, targeting individuals with national security clearances, military personnel, and those with access to sensitive government information.

Fifield’s article serves as a cautionary tale, noting that both the public and private sectors are increasingly under scrutiny as targets for foreign entities and their proxies. Next year, foreign government espionage activities are expected to intensify and espionage agencies may resort to extreme measures to achieve their goals.

Foreign spies are not only interested in collecting classified information, but they also target research findings from universities and research institutions. This is because modern warfare has blurred the lines between military and civilian technologies, with commercial tools like artificial intelligence and drones being weaponized, turning ordinary civilian technologies into potential military assets.

Fifield further warns that foreign government spies may also exploit international front companies and supply chain intermediaries to deceptively obtain sensitive technology under seemingly legitimate pretexts. For example, the Chinese Purple Mountain Observatory, which has connections to New Zealand’s space research, attempted to install ground space infrastructure in New Zealand.

Furthermore, a Russian state agency tried to acquire sanctioned specialized components through an offshore subsidiary of a New Zealand registered company to enhance Russia’s military capabilities.