In February of last year, Chinese researcher Quan Hengdao was sentenced by the Tokyo District Court in Japan for leaking commercial secrets, receiving a 2-year, 6-month prison sentence with a 4-year probation (effectively released on paying a fine). In comparison, Chinese-American engineer Zheng Xiaoqing, convicted in the United States for stealing commercial secrets from General Electric under the charge of economic espionage, was sentenced to 2 years in prison. The differences in the legal classification and sentencing between the United States and Japan in cases involving the theft of core technology are apparent.
To address the systemic loopholes in current regulations, the Japanese government is actively strengthening its national security defenses. On July 31, they officially established the “National Intelligence Agency” and plan to enact complementary legislation like the “Anti-Espionage Law” starting from 2027.
Analysis indicates that as relevant legal frameworks are gradually established, cases of espionage involving military and significant commercial secrets will face stricter criminal standards in the future. On the other hand, the establishment of the “National Intelligence Agency” has raised questions about whether it can further promote Japan’s deepening intelligence cooperation with the “Five Eyes Alliance”.
The first director of the National Intelligence Agency in Japan is 58-year-old Kazuya Hara. He entered the police department in 1990, serving as a secretary to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and later as the director of the Police Department Security Bureau. In 2023, he became the Cabinet Intelligence Officer. Since Prime Minister Sanae Takichi took office last year, he has been pushing for the establishment of the National Intelligence Agency.
Reported by Nikkei Shimbun, in May of this year, Kazuya Hara met with US intelligence officials to explain the purpose of Japan establishing the National Intelligence Agency. Having been stationed in the United States and Russia, he was described by several former Cabinet Intelligence Officers as one of the top intelligence talents in the Police Department.
Currently, the Japanese National Intelligence Agency, formerly the “Cabinet Intelligence Investigation Office”, has about 700 personnel responsible for collecting, analyzing, and assessing security and national intelligence. This new organization will integrate the intelligence held by various departments such as the police department, public security bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Defense, becoming the central hub of the Japanese government’s intelligence.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Tameshi Kihara stated, “In the current complex and severe international situation, the establishment of the National Intelligence Agency is of great significance in enhancing the overall intelligence capabilities of the government.”
Researcher Shen Mingshi from the Taiwan Institute of National Defense and Security mentioned in an interview with Epoch Times that the establishment of the National Intelligence Agency in Japan signifies a shift in post-war national security strategy from a focus on passive defense to a cross-department integrated intelligence system, in response to the complex security threats posed by China, Russia, and North Korea.
Regarding the significant adjustment of Japan’s intelligence system, CCTV, the Chinese state television, reported that this was a crucial institutional layout for the Sanae Takichi administration’s promotion of “remilitarization”. However, due to Japan’s long-standing lack of the “Anti-Espionage Law” and a specialized agency for coordinating anti-espionage work, it has been described by the outside world as a “spy paradise”. In this context, Japan has always been one of the key targets of China’s military and industrial espionage activities.
Masatoshi Fujitani, a member of the Japan Strategic Research Forum’s Policy Advisory Committee, once stated on the ABEMA program of the Japanese Internet TV that based on information from various intelligence agencies of other countries, China has dispatched around 20,000 to 25,000 spies or operatives to Japan. If one considers North Korea and Russia as well, the number of foreign operatives operating in Japan for these countries could be even larger.
In addition, Weekly Popular in Japan reported that China’s intelligence penetration into Japan does not mainly rely on traditional agents but uses a “military-civil fusion” strategy involving scholars, students studying abroad, corporate engineers, and private groups to gather military, technological, and commercial information, with an estimated number of individuals ranging from 30,000 to 50,000.
The aforementioned Quan Hengdao previously served as a teacher at one of China’s “Seven Military Academies,” Nanjing University of Science and Technology, before entering a national-level research institution in Japan, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, as a researcher. As Japan had not established the “Anti-Espionage Law” at that time, the Japanese media described his actions as almost without any constraints.
According to Japanese reports, Quan Hengdao sent the results of fluoride compound research to a Chinese chemical company headquartered in Beijing in 2018 via email. About a week later, the company submitted a patent application in China, which was approved two years later with Quan Hengdao listed as one of the inventors. It is noteworthy that this company’s Japanese branch is located in Tsukuba City, Ibaraki Prefecture, where the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology is situated, and Quan Hengdao’s wife is the president.
The Quan Hengdao case is not an isolated incident. In recent years, China’s penetration into Japan’s high-tech and industrial supply chain has extended beyond traditional espionage activities.
Japanese media previously revealed that China used platforms like LinkedIn to entice Japanese chemical engineers working in the semiconductor industry with high consulting fees to provide smartphone material technology. Another Chinese technician working for a Japanese electronics equipment company is suspected of returning sensitive agricultural temperature control technology to a Chinese company after having contacts with the Chinese military. Japanese investigators discovered the individual’s connections with the Chinese military, indicating a suspicion of stealing technology in line with China’s advancement of agricultural “modernization” policy.
Additionally, Japan has been the target of several nation-level cyber attacks originating from China in recent years, including a data breach attempt at the telecommunication giant NTT to extract communication information, highlighting how the intelligence warfare has expanded from traditional human penetration to the cyber domain.
Analysts point out that China is continually expanding its penetration into Japan’s technology, industry, and intelligence sectors through “military-civil fusion” and “grey zone” strategies. Despite the National Intelligence Agency’s role in integrating intelligence information, the challenge remains daunting due to the dispersed and covert infiltration methods.
Shen Mingshi stated that while the newly established Japanese agency has achieved the centralization of intelligence information, its focus is still on intelligence analysis and coordination, lacking authority for proactive overseas intelligence collection and enforcement powers for arrests.
Although the National Intelligence Agency in Japan has been officially established, core laws such as the “Anti-Espionage Law” are yet to be legislatively completed. According to the Japanese government’s plan, the National Intelligence Agency held its first meeting on July 31, initiating the drafting of the “National Intelligence Strategy” while simultaneously starting discussions on anti-espionage-related legislation, institutional design, and safeguarding human rights, aiming to submit these for parliamentary review as early as 2027.
Shen Mingshi believes that at this stage, the primary function of the National Intelligence Agency is to integrate cross-departmental intelligence, combine big data analysis, detect abnormal activities from scattered information, and promptly refer them to units with enforcement powers such as the Public Security Department of the Metropolitan Police Department and the Japan Coast Guard for handling.
He suggests that Japan should further promote enterprises and universities to establish more stringent review mechanisms, enhance scrutiny of exchanges and cooperation with a “military-civil fusion” background, particularly focusing on preventing China from obtaining sensitive technology and vital information through industry-academia partnerships, technology exchanges, and joint research.
Apart from reorganizing the domestic intelligence structure, another strategic goal of Japan’s establishment of the National Intelligence Agency is to deepen intelligence cooperation with the United States and the “Five Eyes Alliance”.
In 2020, then-Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono expressed Japan’s desire to expand cooperation with the Five Eyes Alliance, with the two sides maintaining close contact, and members of the alliance frequently seeking Japan to share intelligence. He humorously remarked at that time, “If we cooperate often, we may as well be called the ‘Six Eyes’.”
As the Five Eyes Alliance is not a formal international organization, Kono previously stated that Japan “just needs to pull up a chair next to their table,” demonstrating Japan’s proactive stance in intelligence cooperation.
However, several scholars believe that for Japan to further deepen cooperation, it still needs to address the deficiencies in systems and capabilities.
Suziyun Su, Director of the National Defense Strategy and Resources Research Institute at the Taiwan Institute of National Defense and Security, mentioned to Epoch Times that compared to the long-accumulated personnel infiltration, counterintelligence, and overseas intelligence collection capabilities of European and American intelligence agencies, Japan remains relatively weak in the field of human intelligence (HUMINT). Japan has historically relied on assistance from trading companies and private enterprises for foreign intelligence.
He believes that with the establishment of the National Intelligence Agency, Japan’s intelligence system might undergo two critical adjustments in the future: first, withdrawing more professional intelligence personnel from the Metropolitan Police Department to establish a cross-departmental operation mechanism, and second, aside from maintaining intelligence analysis functions, gradually enhancing overseas intelligence collection capabilities.
In contrast, Japan has consistently had a noticeable advantage in the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) domain. Leveraging advanced electronic technology, satellite systems, and radar networks deployed in the First Island Chain, the Japanese Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces have monitored military activities of China, Russia, and North Korea for an extended period, accumulating a significant amount of firsthand intelligence and becoming a crucial foundation for Japan’s participation in intelligence cooperation.
In recent years, the Five Eyes Alliance has continued to expand cooperation partners. The Taiwan National Security Bureau has confirmed cooperation with the Five Eyes Alliance in some aspects.
Suziyun Su stated that the United States has actively pushed for deeper intelligence cooperation with key allies in the First Island Chain, hoping to establish closer information exchange mechanisms with Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan to enhance regional early warning and deterrence capabilities.
Japan’s capabilities in signal intelligence have been repeatedly verified in actual combat situations. During the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, Japan intercepted communications showing Chinese armored forces entering Vietnam, and in 1983, intercepted Soviet fighter pilot conversations upon the shooting down of a Korean Air flight by the Soviet Union.
Shen Mingshi stated that Japan and the Five Eyes Alliance possess highly complementary strengths in intelligence cooperation. Japan’s strategic location at the core of the First Island Chain enables it to provide frontline maritime and aerial dynamic intelligence with a well-established radar, sonar, and electronic reconnaissance system around the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the Miyako Strait. If South Korea can also deepen cooperation in the future, the overall value of the intelligence network will further increase.
In addition to geographical advantages, Japan has profound capabilities in fields like semiconductor materials, precision machinery, and basic science, which can help allies reduce risks in high-tech supply chains and provide vital technological analysis abilities.
While the National Intelligence Agency in Japan has been officially established, core legislation such as the “Anti-Espionage Law” is yet to be legislatively completed.
Shen Mingshi pointed out that the year 2027 holds a special strategic significance as the timeframe aligns with the general assessment internationally of the potential for significant military actions by China against Taiwan. Consequently, Japan aims to strengthen its intelligence system and legal structures before this period.
He stated that Japan has traditionally placed a strong emphasis on human rights and privacy protection, leading any relevant law to provoke substantial discussion in parliament. Hence, systemic reforms are not easily achieved. Until the new laws are in place, Japan will continue to face national security risks posed by ongoing hostile infiltrations.
Suziyun Su believes that Japan’s most significant challenge lies in its peace constitution and existing restrictions on national security powers under the current legal framework. Before relevant laws are completed, how the government strengthens cross-departmental coordination through administrative orders, improves operational efficiency in the intelligence system, and safeguards national security will be crucial issues.
From the legal loopholes exposed by the Quan Hengdao case to the official establishment of the National Intelligence Agency, Japan is gradually reorganizing its long-distributed intelligence framework. However, whether they can complete the complementary legislation like the “Anti-Espionage Law” and enhance cross-department intelligence integration efficiency, while deepening cooperation with the United States and the “Five Eyes Alliance,” will be crucial indicators to observe if Japan’s intelligence reforms can be effectively realized.