Analysis: Calculations behind the CCP’s “Pseudo-Law Enforcement” against the Philippine Military

Recently, the Chinese Communist Party has defined Philippine military personnel as targets that interfere with the normal law enforcement operations of the Chinese Coast Guard, attempting to portray the sovereignty dispute over Thitu Island as an alleged illegal behavior dealt with by Chinese law enforcement agencies. Beijing refrains from labeling the conflict involving Philippine navy personnel as military friction between two countries, instead packaging the disputed South China Sea area as an internal space under Chinese jurisdiction.

On July 20, a confrontation occurred near Thitu Island between Chinese and Philippine personnel. The Philippine military stated that Chinese Coast Guard personnel struck Philippine navy personnel on the head with wooden sticks and damaged a Philippine rubber boat. The Chinese Coast Guard, on the other hand, claimed that Philippine vessels approached and collided with Chinese ships, with Philippine personnel initiating the attack using oars and wooden sticks. Subsequently, both sides summoned each other’s diplomats.

On July 21, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated in a press conference that Philippine illegal “stranding” military personnel “roughly interfered with China’s (CCP) Coast Guard’s normal law enforcement,” and China thereafter “firmly responded in accordance with the law.” This narrative places Philippine military personnel in a position where they are being policed and controlled by Chinese (CCP) Coast Guard, defining the Thitu Island conflict as the supposed illegal behavior dealt with by Chinese law enforcement agencies rather than a maritime clash between Chinese and Philippine forces.

A Chinese overseas source familiar with the CCP system, Mr. Yao, told Epoch Times, “The Philippines deployed military personnel, but Beijing accuses them of obstructing Chinese Coast Guard law enforcement. According to this narrative, the Chinese Coast Guard appears as the authority while the Philippine military is portrayed as violating Chinese jurisdictional order. This indicates the CCP’s attempt to include foreign military forces within its administrative law enforcement scope, treating Thitu Island as part of China.”

According to public information, Thitu Island is located within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. In 1999, the Philippine government grounded the warship “BRP Sierra Madre” on the island and stationed military personnel there. China claims Thitu Island as its territory, repeatedly demanding the Philippines to remove the warship while intercepting and monitoring Philippine actions to resupply with its Coast Guard vessels.

In this round of questioning, the Chinese Foreign Ministry once again emphasized that Thitu Island belongs to China and urged the Philippines to restrain “frontline personnel.” Mr. Yao stated that this phrasing downplays the military status of the opposing personnel, portraying the conflict as Chinese law enforcement personnel being attacked. He said, “Clearly, the CCP seeks to categorize this dispute with the Philippines within its jurisdictional scope, similar to recent incidents involving the harassment of Taiwan using Coast Guard ships instead of warships.”

In the CCP system, the Coast Guard has been transferred to the Armed Police Force, under the unified leadership of the Central Military Commission, not belonging to local law enforcement agencies and able to coordinate with the Navy and maritime militia. During escalated situations in the South China Sea, peripheral naval forces can still provide military support. The CCP positioning itself at the conflict’s frontlines under the guise of law enforcement agencies does not mean its military forces have withdrawn.

On July 22, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with the Philippine Foreign Minister in Manila. The Philippines raised objections to Chinese personnel attacking Philippine personnel, while Wang Yi accused Philippine ships of colliding with Chinese patrol boats and criticized certain Philippine military and police personnel for causing trouble. Both sides exchanged protests regarding the Thitu Island conflict once again.

Mr. Meng, a Chinese military scholar, said, “The Coast Guard assumes two roles for Beijing. Externally, it claims to be enforcing the law, reducing the risk of provoking a military response. However, operationally, it is under the command of the CCP Central Military Commission, with Navy support in the background. By framing military pressure within law enforcement structures, external observers may believe that China’s non-deployment of the Navy is a deliberate effort to reduce its influence, which may not be the case.”

Previously, the CCP has used Coast Guard vessels around Taiwan to depict administrative control. The recent Thitu Island conflict further demonstrates that Beijing is applying the same model to foreign military forces. Mr. Meng stated that their approach is to “first claim the disputed waters as Chinese territory, define Coast Guard actions as normal law enforcement, and then position Philippine military personnel as the targets of enforcement.”

By deploying the Coast Guard controlled by the Central Military Commission to the frontline of South China Sea conflicts, China creates the illusion of jurisdiction through each patrol, interception, and so-called surveillance operation, avoiding the conflict being labeled as a direct confrontation between two national militaries. Beijing is expanding control in the South China Sea under the guise of “law enforcement,” gradually bringing international sovereignty disputes into the CCP’s proclaimed internal jurisdictional territory.