The impact of China’s declining birth rates is rapidly extending from population statistics to the education sector. According to official data, in 2025, over 20,000 kindergartens in China were closed, equivalent to an average of about 59 kindergartens shutting down each day. Since China’s population entered a downturn in 2022, demographic experts point out that the main reasons behind this trend include economic pressures from housing, employment, income, and childcare costs, which have weakened the marriage and childbearing intentions of young people.
Reports from “Caixin” website in mainland China indicate that in 2025, China saw the closure of 21,400 kindergartens, with the total number decreasing to 231,900, averaging nearly 59 kindergartens closing each day. The number of preschool children in kindergartens decreased by 3.58 million, a sudden drop of about 10% to 32.25 million.
Almost a year earlier, “Caixin” reported that in 2024, there were a total of 253,300 kindergartens nationwide, a decrease of 21,100 from 2023, a decrease of 7.69%. The data shows that the decrease in the number of kindergartens is continuing to expand, from 5.1% in 2023 to 7.69% in 2024, and surpassing 10% in 2025, indicating an accelerating trend of kindergartens exiting the scene.
The report states that primary schools in China are also facing a reduction in student enrollment. In 2025, the total number of primary schools nationwide decreased by approximately 8,000 to 128,300, marking the largest drop in nearly five years.
According to official Chinese data, the annual birth rate in China peaked in 2017 and has seen a significant decline for several consecutive years. The total population entered negative growth in 2022, with approximately 9.02 million newborns in 2023. While there was a slight rebound in 2024 due to factors such as the Year of the Dragon, it still remains far below the level of over 16 million births annually a decade ago. Changes in population structure have made kindergartens one of the earliest public services to be affected. The pressure for future adjustments in educational resources is expected to continue to increase.
The Chinese authorities primarily attribute the population decline to changes in population structure and attitudes towards marriage and childbearing. Factors such as a decrease in the number of women of childbearing age, delayed marriage and childbirth, and changing views on marriage and childbearing are cited, indicating that China’s population development has entered a new stage.
Many population experts, economists, and market research institutions believe that economic factors also play a significant role in influencing the willingness to have children. Economic pressures such as housing, income, employment, and childcare costs are considered key factors in recent years affecting the fertility intentions of young people.
Population expert Yi Fuxian has pointed out that factors such as youth unemployment, insufficient family income, the “lying flat” culture, and a lack of confidence in the future collectively weaken the desire of young people to marry and have children.
This pressure is also evident in Chinese social media. A video from the “China Reality” Youtube channel shows an electronic screen at a marriage registration desk in a city in China with 8 couples waiting to register for marriage but 34 couples registering for divorce, indicating that the number of divorces is approximately four times that of marriages. Some individuals express sentiments that marrying now has little benefit and can be troublesome. Some even suggest that not marrying when poor is a kind of virtue.
For instance, a mother named Tian Yu, who moved to Guizhou, expresses that raising two children while struggling to make ends meet for living and education expenses has become unbearable.
A young woman mentions that with high costs of cars and houses, low wages, long working hours, and high living expenses, the pressure is too great to even consider marriage and childbirth.
Another young woman who just lost her job expresses the irony of her situation, grateful for not having a mortgage, not being married, and not having children.
However, many attribute the decline in marriage rates to policy factors. Some comments on X platform suggest that enforcing policies to lower birth rates in the past, and now attempting to promote them, result in the closure of 59 kindergartens daily, indicating a loss of confidence and a complete failure of policies.
It is worth noting that recent policies by the Chinese Communist Party have not directly focused on the aforementioned economic factors. Recently, the CCP’s Cyberspace Administration and four other departments issued new regulations on the management of artificial intelligence, stating that these interactive tools should not “excessively cater to users, induce emotional dependence or addiction, and harm users’ real-life interpersonal relationships.”
The Wall Street Journal quoted researcher Matt Hien, who studies Chinese artificial intelligence policies, pointing out that authorities are concerned that excessive reliance on virtual companions may weaken people’s willingness to enter into marriage, further affecting birth rates.
From a policy perspective, this reflects the CCP’s attempt to address population issues from a social governance perspective. However, compared to curtailing AI’s companionship functions, many economists believe that slow growth in youth incomes, a weak job market, high housing costs, and inadequate social security are deeper factors influencing decisions on marriage and childbearing. If these structural issues are not improved, encouraging childbirth or regulating specific social behaviors may find it challenging to reverse the long-term trend of declining population.
The continuous closure of kindergartens reflects that population decline is beginning to impact the Chinese education system. As declining birth rates gradually extend to education, consumption, and labor markets, changes in population structure are becoming an important factor to observe in China’s long-term economic development.