On July 6, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it had test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile in the South Pacific. Due to fears of revealing sensitive data, specific information was intentionally concealed. The CCP’s official media did not boast about this, but later promoted the PLA Rocket Force, accidentally exposing a lot of embarrassing situations.
The missile test-fired by the CCP submarine belongs to the navy, but more land-based missiles deployed by the Rocket Force are considered the CCP’s “ace in the hole.” On July 1, in celebration of its 105th anniversary, the CCP honored a group of so-called “outstanding Communist Party members” which was publicized by the party media. On July 13, Xinhua News Agency published an article titled “National ‘Two Excellences and One First’ Style | ‘Missile King’ He Xianda: Roaring through the Skies in this Lifetime.” This article was reprinted by many pro-CCP media outlets in Hong Kong and overseas.
The article mentioned that He Xianda, a first-class sergeant, squad leader, and launch technician of a Rocket Force brigade, was the only individual in the entire army to be awarded the title of “National Outstanding Communist Party Member.” The focus of the Xinhua article was to promote how He Xianda achieved “I operate the missile, I listen to the Party’s command,” but some unavoidable details uncovered unknown behind-the-scenes situations.
In 1997, when He Xianda took off his work clothes and put on a military uniform to enter the missile camp, fate played a joke on him – as a new recruit, he was assigned to the kitchen. However, six months later, during the brigade’s missile professional theory assessment, the cook He Xianda ranked in the top three. By then, the steamed buns he made were already big, chewy, and fragrant.
When He Xianda enlisted in 1997, he was a cook in a CCP missile brigade, skilled at cooking. However, the article continued to describe that a few months later, He Xianda transitioned from the kitchen to the launch pad, becoming a missile loading operator.
The so-called “missile loading operator” is the personnel responsible for lifting the missile onto the launch vehicle. Although it does not require much technical expertise, handling missiles poses higher operational risks and demands some professional skills. However, it was surprising that the CCP military casually transferred a cook to a higher-risk job that required operational skills. This seemed like a joke; if other developed countries’ militaries were aware, they would probably be astonished. However, this was what the CCP military did.
The article continued with even more incredible descriptions: within just five months, he mastered all the skills required in loading the missile, claiming the title of “first loader” in the entire brigade.
A cook without prior professional training as a loader becoming the “first loader” of the entire brigade in just five months highlighted He Xianda’s hard work individually; however, it also revealed the overall low quality of soldiers in the CCP missile forces. This might explain why He Xianda was suddenly transferred from a cook to a front-line launch team. The CCP missile forces belong to a specialized branch, lacking both manpower and professional personnel. The actual combat capabilities of the force could be easily deduced as lacking.
The Xinhua article continued to describe that in 1999, during the Beijing Parade, He Xianda was not promoted. Standing by the launch platform on the Gobi Desert, he was distraught. The platoon leader sat with him late into the night.
From 2000 to 2003, after working as a missile launcher for three years, He Xianda eagerly hoped for a promotion but was not granted one. Many launchers had been promoted before him, possibly owing to connections, just needing to accumulate some qualifications in key positions. He Xianda lacked these connections, rendering him unable to follow the same promotion path. However, he likely demonstrated “loyalty,” with no one of higher quality able to replace him.
In 2012, as the unit expanded and urgently needed a commanding officer, He Xianda boldly proposed that a non-commissioned officer be the launch manager.
After waiting for 12 years, He Xianda finally seized the opportunity for promotion, more like a self-nomination. He led the launch unit to outshine over a hundred professional officers and non-professionals, achieving top scores in both theoretical and practical operations.
In December of that year, just 15 minutes before the missile launch under extreme cold conditions, an alarm went off indicating abnormal voltage in a core component. He Xianda, with his hands feeling the icy pipes and interfaces under the launch vehicle, after a few minutes, emerged saying, “The circuit is normal; we can proceed.” His comrades marveled, saying, “Old He’s hands are even more agile than instruments.”
The CCP wanted to highlight He Xianda’s personal capabilities, going so far as to say his hands were “more agile than instruments.” The article did not mention that he had resolved the issue or found the true cause of the abnormal voltage in the core component. It seemed more like he judged there was no problem based on past experience, allowing him to ignore the instrument’s warning and continue with the mission.
He Xianda, a commanding officer, took on repair duties, indicating that even after him, the personnel level on the front line did not surpass him; they still depended on him. However, the article claimed that the battalion He Xianda belonged to was granted the honorary title of the “Pioneer Battalion of Missile Launches” by the Central Military Commission. Such a level surprisingly represented the top level of the CCP missile forces.
The article went on to describe how He Xianda mentored not only one soldier but more, starting from the basics and gradually progressing them to missile operators.
This is the true level of the CCP missile forces. The party media’s propaganda exposed the true situation of the CCP Rocket Force, showing that the qualifications of the officers and soldiers were generally low.
On July 6, the day the CCP launched the submarine missile, the CCP military report published an article titled “A Brigade of the Rocket Force Adheres to Mission Tasks and Conducts Routine ‘Mission + Ideological’ Double Debriefing – Where the Position is, the Ideology is Sharpened.”The article described that within the Rocket Force Brigade’s field command tent, a mission debriefing meeting was taking place as the propaganda secretary interrupted the training staff. The brigade’s party secretary told the reporter that during the deepening of political and ideological training, the party committee of the brigade insisted on solidifying “Mission + Ideological” double debrief as a rigid mechanism. They not only debriefed tactical shortcomings but also delved into ideological deviations and attitudes, diligently ensuring the “cleanliness of ideology.”
The Rocket Force’s officers originally had generally low professional skills, yet the political officers acted as if they were highly involved. In recent years, the higher echelons of the Rocket Force continued to be purged, inevitably affecting the army’s morale negatively, but the CCP’s political training persisted. While the success of the CCP’s submarine missile test on July 6 remains uncertain, the real level of the CCP Rocket Force was inadvertently exposed by the party media.
In summary, the stories of He Xianda and other soldiers like Fang Yongzheng in the CCP missile forces revealed significant issues regarding the overall quality of officers and soldiers. Despite their lower academic backgrounds, these individuals were used as typical examples in CCP propaganda, confirming the lower quality of personnel and organizational management levels within the CCP missile forces.
