In recent days, discussions and speculations about Xi Jinping’s successor have become a hot topic as the upcoming 21st National Congress of the Communist Party of China approaches, along with the upcoming leadership transition at the end of next year. Coincidentally, news from South Korea in these days mentioned that Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju-ae, has entered the succession process. This is a phenomenon worth comparing.
According to the South Korean National Intelligence Service’s report to the National Assembly, Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju-ae, is already in the final stages of the succession process. On September 1st, the ruling party’s secretary of the National Assembly Intelligence Committee, Yoon Geon-yeong, disclosed to the media about Kim Ju-ae’s frequent appearances in the media lately. The National Intelligence Service stated that this may be aimed at shaping the future leader’s image among the North Korean people.
This is not surprising, as there have been continuous claims since last year that Kim Ju-ae has been designated as the successor. In February 2026, the South Korean intelligence agency also made a similar evaluation to the South Korean National Assembly, based on the fact that 13-year-old Kim Ju-ae has appeared alongside her father at high-profile events, including her first known overseas visit to Beijing in September last year. Other signs include her appearances on the anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army and her trips to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, as well as indications that she has provided input on certain national policies. Kim Ju-ae is the only known child of Kim Jong Un and his wife Ri Sol-ju.
In terms of authoritarian dictatorship, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un’s situations and approaches are completely different. North Korea has had a hereditary succession of power starting from Kim Il-sung, which has now reached its third generation, essentially forming a system. Although there is a resemblance to the legitimacy of royal succession in Mount Baekdu’s bloodline, it is not as unchallengeable as historical dynastic successions, thus requiring early designation to allow the family heir to accumulate experience, establish prestige, and network, which is a process that takes several years or even longer. By the time of formal succession, the status is consolidated enough to fend off the ambitions of others seeking to seize power.
In mature democracies, with centuries-old electoral systems, leadership changes are part of the system. Because the power of the top leader is granted by the voters, it naturally resolves the issue of legitimacy, leading to no succession crisis at the national level. The biggest problem for authoritarian regimes lies in the source of power, not only the power source of the regime but also the personal power source of the autocratic ruler.
While political systems vary worldwide, the ultimate sources of supreme power are only two types: divine right of kings and political authority granted by the people. The Mount Baekdu bloodline of the Kim family regime in North Korea partially imitates the divine right of kings.
Mao Zedong also knew that seizing power can be a matter of the victor and the vanquished, but ruling once in power requires authorization. Therefore, before founding the regime, he convened leaders of seemingly independent “democratic parties” who had assisted the Chinese Communist Party to Beijing for a “Political Consultative Conference” and drafted a “Common Program.” In fact, this was to authorize these “democratic parties” to rule on behalf of the CCP, under the guise of representing the “people.” However, later on, Mao felt empowered, convened the National People’s Congress in 1954, ratified the May Fourth Constitution, and subsequently discarded the “Common Program.”
As the power of the CCP and its leader is neither divinely ordained nor democratically granted, each successive leader faced the same challenge once the founding generation of power withdraws from the historical stage. Within the core power circle, every individual theoretically has the right and desire to replace the dictator, leading to the root cause of succession crises among CCP successors.
Regarding Xi Jinping specifically, some people speculate that Wang Huning’s visit to North Korea was to pave the way for Xi’s daughter, Xi Mingze, to succeed him. This is considered the most improbable option.
China differs from European and Japanese monarchies in terms of the rarity of royal lineages extending for centuries or even millennia, with dynastic transitions being the norm. Once a dynastic transition occurs, there is no turning back. China, since the 1911 Revolution, has made the last two attempts to restore the imperial system in history – the 83-day reign of Yuan Shikai proclaiming himself emperor and the 12-day restoration by Zhang Xun, both ending in failure. Despite Yuan Shikai’s merits that compelled the Qing court to abdicate and his strength as a military leader, as well as his personal abilities and accomplishments, all surpassing Xi Jinping by far, he failed to pass on his power to his son and maintain his reign.
In the Kim dynasty, Kim Jong-il took 20 years from establishing a successor to the formal succession, while Kim Jong Un’s sudden succession also took over a year. In the case of Kim Ju-ae, at only 13 years old, she has been making political appearances for four years.
As for Xi Mingze, she has never appeared in the political arena, and the vast majority of people, including the bureaucracy, do not even know what she looks like.
Succession requires qualifications. Jiang Qing held a position of utmost trust in Mao Zedong regarding the Party line, and she entered politics from the start of the Cultural Revolution’s model operas, having been a leftist intellectual who sought refuge in Yan’an, with no lack of political achievements. From Mao’s passing to her arrest, she only persisted for 27 days. Hua Guofeng progressed through the ranks in an orderly fashion and was designated by Mao himself as the successor. However, within just over two years after Mao’s death, he had already lost real power.
Every country faces the issue of leadership succession. In Chinese history, the father-to-son inheritance under the monarchy system is relatively stable, forming a tradition that most adhere to, with a minimal chance of outsider usurpation. Most dynasties ruled by the same family for centuries, with any disputes typically remaining within the family. With the advent of modern democratic systems, the turnover of top leaders is settled through regular elections.
The CCP is an exception both historically and internationally, as the issue of leadership succession at the highest level has never been institutionally resolved. Mao Zedong’s word was law, and there was no room for others to question the designated successor. Only Mao Zedong himself seemed to entertain the idea of passing the torch to his son. He sent his son, Mao Anying, back from the Soviet Union to participate in land reform in rural areas, work in factory workshops, and go to the army for training. Although the official intellectuals of the CCP denied this, the “succession theory” is the most plausible explanation. Unexpectedly, his son ended up on the Korean battlefield and, even working at the headquarters, could not avoid the bombings from the United Nations forces.
Mao officially designated Lin Biao and Hua Guofeng as his successors. Lin Biao was the only designated successor stipulated in the party charter, but he could not escape his fate of being purged by Mao himself. The other three perceived successors, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, were personally overthrown by Mao, while Wang Hongwen was abandoned. Only Hua Guofeng can be considered as the one who officially succeeded, but his tenure was only 4 years. Hua relinquished power smoothly and peacefully, and he can be considered as having ended well, likely mainly due to his significant differences in strength compared to Deng Xiaoping, making him insufficient as a rival. Thus, it seems that even Mao Zedong’s authoritarian designation of successors did not lead to a truly successful transitional process.
Deng Xiaoping was well aware of the dangers that the succession crisis posed to the CCP’s regime. He sought to institutionalize the succession process, but he created a crisis himself before formalizing the system by ousting the two General Secretaries he had designated, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and urgently promoting the retiring Jiang Zemin. He then initiated his solution, known as the so-called “skip-generation designation,” which essentially involved the Party leader concurrently serving as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the President of the country, holding all three highest positions simultaneously for two terms. However, he could not designate his own successor. Instead, the previous Party leader or the party elders should designate the successor, who would enter the Political Bureau Standing Committee at the beginning of the second term, concurrently holding the positions of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Vice President of the country, accumulating experience and prestige. Both Hu Jintao and his successor Xi Jinping followed this model. This was a more stable period for CCP leadership succession, even though it only lasted for two generations of leadership.
Despite Xi Jinping’s highly authoritarian rule and the regime not being solely about Xi, he is also reluctant to transfer power to others, leading to instances where he rejects or even purges potential successors. When transitioning from his first to second term, Xi did not follow the established procedure for appointing the next successor, abolished term limits, and did not designate a successor during his second term, making it unlikely for new leadership to emerge at the upcoming 21st National Congress. In other words, the succession system remains underdeveloped and has been abolished prematurely.
The succession of Party leaders has become an unpredictable event once again. This non-institutional and random succession process within the CCP gives challengers a certain moral basis within the Party. Challengers can question the legitimacy of the ruling leaders at least in terms of their accomplishments and procedures, even if these challenges may not currently manifest into specific individuals.
Due to the significant influence of personal factors on political dynamics, the CCP succession indeed carries considerable risks. When Deng Xiaoping swiftly promoted Jiang Zemin, he certainly did not anticipate that Jiang would resist his own reform and opening-up policies, leading Deng to embark on his “Southern Tour” in 1992 and issue the warning that “those who do not reform will be replaced.”
Xi Jinping’s policies mostly align with those of the previous Standing Committee members who supported his leadership, which no one had anticipated. In the absence of a supreme being, the motto of “even if the deluge comes after death” manifests – since my family cannot benefit, neither can yours. This is an area where Xi Jinping is less stable than Kim Jong Un in terms of succession, as Kim Jong Un has to consider the transmission of the family bloodline, while Xi Jinping does not even have to consider this.
The reason Mao Zedong’s succession crisis was ultimately overcome was because at the time, there was a Deng Xiaoping who had recently demonstrated his boldness and ability to the entire nation and was qualified, along with a group of elders who had fought alongside Mao. They provided stability.
With the reversal of the elimination mechanism within the CCP, the leadership’s boldness and ability continue to deteriorate from one generation to the next. Once a succession crisis arises, it may lead to a bloody scenario, where it becomes a situation of “not a single hero remaining” anymore.