Former EU Commissioner: Avoid Going Alone, Strongly Counter Chinese Dumping

In mid-July, the French solar module manufacturer Reden announced the closure of its only solar module assembly plant in France. This decision was primarily driven by intensified competition from Asian manufacturers, notably those based in China, and the escalating cost pressures. A former EU trade commissioner recently suggested that the EU should speak with one voice and take stronger measures to restrict the entry of Chinese goods into the EU market.

Reden’s solar panel manufacturing facility in Roquefort-sur-Soulzon Roqu, located in the Aveyron region of southern France, ceased operations in mid-July. This closure deal another blow to the French solar manufacturing industry, leaving Voltec as the sole remaining domestic manufacturer producing photovoltaic (PV) panels in France. Reden cited fierce competition from Asian manufacturers and the continuing rise in costs as the reasons for the shutdown. In 2026, China controls over 80% of the global solar components supply chain, if not more.

The closed factory had an annual production capacity of 200MW, officially commissioned in December 2024, followed by an investment of nearly 4.5 million euros for line upgrades. Originally intended to help Reden secure a portion of the photovoltaic industry chain, the factory operated for less than three years before the financial strain led Reden to halt its operations.

Former EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht recently mentioned in an interview with the Financial Times that the EU should take more decisive actions in limiting Chinese goods from entering the European market.

De Gucht, who served as the EU Trade Commissioner from 2010 to 2014, dealt with cases such as anti-dumping investigations on Chinese solar panels and probes into Chinese telecom equipment (Huawei, ZTE).

In De Gucht’s view, should the EU have rigorously enforced anti-dumping measures in 2013, the European solar industry might not have nearly disappeared. The EU’s current share in the global solar market has dwindled to around 0.2%.

The suspension of solar panel production at Reden Group serves as a tangible example of how the EU solar industry is affected by Chinese product competition.

Florence Burhin, the communication manager at Reden Group, expressed in an interview with the French version of “pv magazine” on July 13th, stating that “this business is no longer financially sustainable.” “pv magazine” is a globally renowned solar and energy storage industry media based in Berlin.

Reports from “pv magazine” indicated that due to fierce competition from Asian manufacturers and the failure of EU procurement policies to truly support domestic industries, Reden’s factory quickly fell into losses. With competitiveness on a downward trajectory and structural losses deemed irremediable, Reden decided to cut its losses early to prevent affecting the sustained operation and long-term development of the company’s other business sectors, especially in agricultural photovoltaics.

Reden’s internal sources mentioned, “The competitiveness gap with Asian competitors has widened, and we have no other economically viable options. Relevant policies introduced by Europe and France, such as the Net-Zero Industry Act, Industrial Accelerator Act, and Solar Pact, have yet to yield sufficiently concrete results, failing to effectively support the photovoltaic manufacturing industry in Europe or France.”

Before Reden’s closure of the solar panel manufacturing plant, EDF Renewables, a subsidiary of the French renewable energy company, had permanently shut down its former subsidiary Photowatt in January 2025. Photowatt closed due to prolonged losses, failed restructuring, and inability to withstand the low-cost competition from Chinese solar manufacturers. After unsuccessful attempts to find a buyer, the French renewable energy company decided to close the subsidiary.

Voltec, located in Alsace, France, has now become the sole remaining solar panel manufacturer in France.

Similar situations are not exclusive to France. Germany, once a hub for European solar manufacturing, has seen a diminishing number of solar energy enterprises due to the influx of cheap Chinese solar panels.

In 2024 and 2025, four solar-related plants in Germany closed or suspended production, including Meyer Burger module plant (2024), Meyer Burger cell plant (2025), Solarwatt (2024), and Aleo Solar (2025).

De Gucht, who vehemently opposed the significant influx of cheap Chinese products into the EU market a decade ago, suggests that the EU needs to leverage its influence more effectively to rebalance trade relations with China.

In an interview with the Financial Times, De Gucht said that the EU’s efforts to protect the dwindling industrial base from the impact of cheap Chinese competition had not succeeded.

He stated, “The main reason being that we didn’t really stand up to them and show the influence we naturally possess.”

De Gucht believes that EU member states should cease individual bilateral negotiations with China as this only makes them more susceptible to Chinese pressure.

Among EU countries, Spain has been most actively engaging in negotiations with Beijing. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has made several visits to China in recent years, aiming to deepen economic and trade cooperation, particularly in the field of new energy. Spain within the EU advocates for maintaining cooperation with China, avoiding excessive confrontation, and using Chinese new energy technologies to accelerate green transformation.

Currently working as an international trade lawyer, De Gucht straightforwardly suggests that Spain should clearly convey to Beijing: “We welcome doing business, but you must comply with certain rules.”

He exemplifies, “If the EU mandates that at least 70% of imported electric vehicles must be manufactured in Europe, the entire landscape will change.”

During De Gucht’s tenure as EU Trade Commissioner, he attempted to prevent China from monopolizing critical industries, but often faced failures due to internal disagreements within the EU. The most notable instance was the Chinese solar panel anti-dumping case in 2013.

The Chinese solar panel anti-dumping case was one of the most representative trade disputes between the EU and China, as well as one of the EU’s largest anti-dumping investigations at that time.

In the late 2000s, Europe (especially Germany) was once the global hub for the solar energy industry. European companies invested substantial funds in establishing solar cell and module manufacturing capacities. However, after 2010, Chinese companies rapidly expanded and, with financial support from the Chinese government, began exporting low-cost solar panels to Europe.

European manufacturers argued that Chinese companies were selling at prices below normal market rates, causing harm to European firms. In 2012, the European solar manufacturing organization EU ProSun filed a complaint with the EU, requesting an investigation into whether Chinese solar panels were being “dumped.”

Following the EU investigation, it was considered that Chinese exporters might gain unfair competitive advantages through selling below cost, government subsidies, and preferential loans. The then EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht argued that if Chinese enterprises were exporting at unfair prices with government support, the EU must protect its own industry.

In June 2013, the EU announced provisional anti-dumping duties on Chinese solar panels: an initial rate of approximately 11.8%, with the possibility of rising to an average of about 47.6% in case of failed negotiations. It was one of the EU’s most substantial trade remedy measures for a single product at that time.

The Chinese government retaliated with retaliatory measures, launching investigations into European wine and threatening actions against European automotive products. Some EU countries, particularly Germany, feared a trade war with China and thus sought a compromise.

In the end, the EU did not fully implement the 47.6% tariff but reached a “price undertaking” with Chinese exporters in July 2013: Chinese solar companies agreed to set minimum export prices, restrict certain export volumes, and accept EU supervision. Enterprises complying with the agreement could avoid high anti-dumping tariffs, while those exceeding quotas or violating regulations had to pay duties.

While this case provided brief protection for some European businesses, it did not reverse the industry trend. Today, Europe has virtually lost its solar manufacturing industry, heavily relying on the Chinese solar supply chain.

The influx of cheap Chinese exports, not only impacting the solar industry but also the overall manufacturing sector in Europe, has led to a continuous widening of the trade deficit between the EU and China. In 2013, the EU’s goods trade deficit with China was 104 billion euros; by 2025, this deficit had surged to 360 billion euros, approximately 3.5 times higher than in 2013.