In the face of military threats from the Chinese Communist Party, cognitive warfare, and the global restructuring of supply chains in Taiwan, a forum titled “Taiwan-US Security and Strategic Analysis: Inevitable Triangular Conflict Among the U.S., China, and Taiwan?” was held at the New York Taiwan Center on the afternoon of July 25. Experts in defense and military affairs, international finance, diplomatic strategy, and civil diplomacy were invited to analyze issues such as the Taiwan Strait strategic landscape, arms procurement trends, cognitive warfare, and civil society resilience.
The forum was moderated by Vice Executive Director of Hello Taiwan, Feng Zixin, and featured speakers including Executive Director of Hello Taiwan, Jiang Mingxin, retired Major General of the Republic of China Army and former President of the Political Warfare College of the National Defense University, Yu Zongji, international finance and macroeconomics economist Wu Jialong, and Associate Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University, Cheng Qinmo. Many of the speakers had just completed an intensive round of meetings in Washington, D.C., bringing frontline observations to the overseas Taiwanese community in New York.
Wu Jialong pointed out that the commonly used framework of “cross-strait relations” and even the further “US-China-Taiwan” framework are insufficient to explain Taiwan’s true situation. He believed that the complete structure should involve all four parties: the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan. He emphasized that for Beijing, its relationship with the U.S. has always been central, and the Chinese Communist Party does not have independent policies toward Taiwan or Japan; both are subordinate to the U.S.-China relationship.
Wu Jialong reminded that the widely circulated statement by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “What happens in Taiwan is considered an issue for Japan as well,” often only quotes the first half. He mentioned that Abe’s full statement was, “What happens in Taiwan is considered an issue for Japan, which means an issue for the U.S.-Japan alliance,” highlighting the coverage of the Taiwan Strait within the Japan-U.S. security system. He analyzed that Japan cannot stay out of the Taiwan Strait issue, not due to the geographical proximity of the southwestern islands and Taiwan, but rather because as a trading nation, Japan’s lifeline is its sea transport routes. If the Taiwan Strait route is cut off, Japan’s fundamental national security will be affected.
Wu Jialong reviewed the Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1996 and the subsequent adjustment process of the U.S.-Japan security system, believing that the U.S.’s formal commitment to the security around the Taiwan Strait is actually directed towards Japan. He pointed out that recently, Japanese Prime Minister Taro Kono made it clear during a budget committee inquiry in the House of Representatives that if a military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait or sea and air blockades pose a “survival crisis” for Japan, the Self-Defense Forces can exercise collective self-defense rights under relevant security legislation. In terms of the occasion and clarity of the statement, this position is more advanced than the rhetoric from Abe at a private forum years ago.
Discussing Taiwan’s own preparedness, Wu Jialong stated that Taiwan lacks strategic depth due to its limited land area, and there is no buffer for reacting after the first strike. Therefore, resources must be invested in defense during peacetime. He emphasized the need for a mentality of readiness for combat and not relying on other countries for security assurances. He stressed that Taiwanese people must take charge of their defense capabilities and determination.
Associate Professor Cheng Qinmo, who has long researched diplomatic and international relations issues, contrasted the changing forms of warfare with the Russia-Ukraine war. He noted that contemporary warfare is no longer limited to traditional land, sea, and air battles but has extended to the realms of cyberspace and cognitive warfare, with civilian forces directly involved. One phenomenon in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the role of Starlink, which has never appeared in the history of warfare.
Cheng Qinmo pointed out that in this type of warfare, the traditional emphasis on large forces, heavy artillery, and command systems has decreased significantly, replaced by unmanned vehicles that must be combined with artificial intelligence to become strategic-level weapons. He believed that from this perspective, the pessimistic view that the first battle will be the last in the Taiwan Strait does not necessarily hold true, as Ukraine’s endurance until now serves as an example.
He mentioned that contemporary warfare no longer distinguishes between the front line and the rear. Despite Russia’s vast strategic depth, once it started targeting Ukraine’s energy facilities, it also faced difficulties. Applying this logic to China, Cheng Qinmo further analyzed that modern warfare heavily relies on innovation and creativity, and authoritarian systems inherently suppress creativity, which is a weakness of totalitarian states and a relative advantage of democratic systems.
Using Ukraine as a cautionary example, Cheng Qinmo discussed how Russia’s infiltration of Ukraine began on the day of Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Following long-term manipulation, Ukraine elected a pro-Russian president in 2010, leading to the hollowing out of its defense. In 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine was almost incapable of organizing resistance. He stated that the defense of a country could be destroyed within the term of a president, less than four years. This serves as a vivid example that Taiwan should learn from.
Regarding democracy itself, Cheng Qinmo pointed out that democracy is not a perfect system, but until a better system is found, it remains the best arrangement for safeguarding human rights within society. Currently, democratic countries face challenges where authoritarian nations exploit the openness of democratic systems to undermine democracy, even using democratic processes to challenge democratic values.
“Quality of democracy is determined by the quality of its citizens,” Cheng Qinmo emphasized. He stated that many countries have experienced regression and returned to authoritarianism after achieving democracy. Although Taiwan has been fortunate, fortune does not guarantee the eternal preservation of democracy. He advocated strengthening democratic resilience through responsibility, participation, and identification, citing the historical experiences of the Polish Solidarity trade union and the Czech Charter 77 to demonstrate the power that civic organizations and overseas compatriots can exert. He also mentioned that if the trade pact had not been blocked years ago, Taiwan’s situation during the pandemic might have been significantly different – he personally estimated the death toll could have reached 80,000 to 100,000, primarily among the elderly.
During the Q&A session, moderator Feng Zixin, on behalf of the overseas Taiwanese community, inquired about changes in arms procurement policies and how overseas compatriots could assist amid the diversification of forms of warfare.
Yu Zongji stated that Taiwan’s key to countering the Chinese threat lies in unmanned aircraft. He pointed out that the biggest internal obstacle comes from the Legislative Yuan’s freezing and cutting of special defense budgets, as well as the separate special budgets proposed by the executive branch being put on hold for processing. He strongly criticized the opposition camp’s defense position during the meeting and called on Taiwanese voters to see the problems clearly.
However, Yu Zongji also emphasized that despite internal constraints, Taiwan should actively seek international cooperation as a breakthrough. He mentioned that arms manufacturers in the U.S., Australia, and Japan have been actively seeking cooperation with Taiwan in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles, not limited to drones but also underwater unmanned vehicles. Taiwan’s strengths lie in mass production, precision machinery manufacturing capabilities, and world-leading system integration capabilities, exemplified by the domestically made submarines.
On the same question, Wu Jialong offered a different perspective. He believed that the weapon system itself is not the real issue since the U.S. has various channels to bypass the deadlock of Taiwan’s defense budget. He cited examples such as U.S. military aid to Taiwan not requiring approval through Taiwan’s defense budget process, and the Lend-Lease Act model used to support the U.K. during World War II, which has been invoked in recent years in discussions related to Taiwan, allowing for the acquisition of commodities through leasing to avoid the time-consuming delivery queue of arms procurement. He also mentioned the possibility of the U.S. procuring Taiwanese-made drones and deploying them at other points along the first island chain.
According to Wu Jialong, in his personal assessment, the U.S. raises the issue of arms procurement to test the opposition party’s position on Taiwan.
Regarding how to implement democratic values, Wu Jialong presented his advocacy discourse in Washington, highlighting that the biggest misjudgment of U.S. foreign policy in recent decades was underestimating the nature of the Communist Party, leading to what he termed as the “wrong globalization.”
He analyzed that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. supported China’s reform and opening up without linking trade with human rights, and assisted China in joining the World Trade Organization under the status of a developing country. This was founded on the thinking of “peaceful evolution” and “contact policy,” in hopes that economic development would lead to the rise of the middle class and subsequently promote political democratization. However, Wu Jialong pointed out that China only embraced economic openness without political openness. Under a system where power determines the distribution of benefits, the rewards of globalization end up being harvested and transferred overseas by the ruling elite, leading to long-term domestic demand deficiency and reliance on surplus capacity for exports and international friction.
Based on this, Wu Jialong asserted that large developing countries and authoritarian states are not suitable for global integration since this would only solidify their authoritarian systems. He argued that the U.S. should deepen ties with small democratic countries, with Taiwan being a suitable partner.
Executive Director of Hello Taiwan, Jiang Mingxin, shared insights from their recent visit to Washington, D.C. He outlined their engagements, including meetings with think tanks on Monday, hosting a full-day forum at the Capitol Hill on Tuesday with six different sessions covering various aspects of Taiwan-U.S. relations such as civil rights, human rights, national security, and cybersecurity, involving congressional sponsors for approval to use the congressional space. The week concluded with intensive meetings with members of Congress on Wednesday.
Jiang Mingxin noted that the team met with approximately 25 members of Congress within a day. He pointed out that Hello Taiwan is a civil organization without support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or arrangements by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and all their activities were completed through their own network connections. Moreover, due to the upcoming adjournment of Congress on Thursday and the busy schedule of representatives with meetings and votes, the scheduling difficulty was quite high.
He mentioned that on June 4 this year, Hello Taiwan screened the documentary “Invisible Nation” at the Capitol Hill venue, inviting many members of Congress to attend and show their support, leveraging the historical significance of the date to amplify the visibility of the issue.
Jiang Mingxin explained that Hello Taiwan’s operational direction involves collaborating with mainstream organizations of non-Taiwanese nationality to bring Taiwan to a broader arena through their platform. He emphasized that the Taiwanese community overseas is relatively small, and if they only operate within the Taiwanese community, their influence would be limited. Hence, the team chose to build connections with organizations such as the Red Cross, Rotary clubs, and mainstream American chambers of commerce. One critical partnership established was with the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC).
Jiang Mingxin stated that IPAC requires members to be bipartisan, and Taiwan previously had only two legislators participating. Last week, this number increased, with current participation rising to eight. He pointed out that IPAC members span various national parliaments, allowing them to propose motions in their respective legislatures and speak up for Taiwan, which makes the connection quite valuable. Thus, the team continues to assist in recruiting more American lawmakers to join IPAC.
Moderator Feng Zixin expressed during the forum that Hello Taiwan is not just a slogan but an organization actively working on the ground. In areas where the government system faces limitations, civil society can enter more diversely and friendlily, “no matter what our color, skin color, or religion is,” and collectively strive for Taiwan.
She explained that the questions raised during the forum came not only from the live audience but also gathered in advance from compatriots who could not attend, covering concerns of senior overseas community leaders, mid-generation, and younger generations, with experts addressing them one by one.
In closing, many speakers stressed that Taiwan’s security in the Taiwan Strait is not a problem Taiwan faces alone and is intertwined with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and the entire Indo-Pacific region. Cheng Qinmo stated that under a structure of sharing costs within the international community, “Taiwan does not have the luxury of pessimism.”