On August 28, the National Health Commission of the Chinese Communist Party released the “Statistical Bulletin on the Development of Health Care Industry in China in 2025”, revealing that in 2025, the number of deaths in China continued to exceed the number of births, with both the birth rate and the number of births declining. The total number of births in the year was 7.92 million, a decrease of 1.62 million compared to 2024; the birth rate dropped to 5.63‰, down 1.14 per thousand points from 2024.
According to the report, in 2025, a total of 7.92 million births were recorded in China, with a birth rate of 5.63‰; while the number of deaths was 11.31 million, with a death rate of 8.04‰.
Data disclosed in the past five years show that the annual number of births in China from 2021 to 2025 were 10.62 million, 9.56 million, 9.02 million, 9.54 million, and 7.92 million, respectively. After the national birth rate increased by 0.38 per thousand points in 2024 compared to the previous year, the birth rate in 2025 once again fell by 1.14 per thousand points compared to 2024.
Looking at a longer period, the 7.92 million births in 2025 decreased by 2.7 million compared to 10.62 million in 2021, a reduction of about one-fourth over the four years.
Official data shows that China’s natural population growth has been negative for several years, and the negative growth rate further widened in 2025.
The rebound of births in 2024 was seen as a signal of improvement in the overall population situation.
That year, the number of births was 9.54 million, an increase of 520,000 compared to 2023; the birth rate also rose from 6.39‰ in 2023 to 6.77‰.
However, in 2025, the number of births quickly dropped to 7.92 million, not only offsetting the previous year’s increase but also decreased by 1.62 million compared to 2024. This is the reason why the data of 2025 drew high attention: the birth rebound in 2024 did not sustain a continuous upward trend.
On the other side of the declining birth rate is the continuous increase in the proportion of the elderly population.
Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of the Chinese Communist Party shows that by the end of 2025, the population aged 60 and above reached 323.38 million, accounting for 23.0% of the total population; those aged 65 and above reached 223.65 million, accounting for 15.9%. Compared to 2024, the population aged 60 and above increased by 13.07 million and those aged 65 and above increased by 3.42 million.
According to the common classification standard used in China’s population aging research, when the population aged 65 and above reaches 14%, it means entering into a deep aging society, and reaching 20% signifies entering a super aging society.
Measured by this standard, China is currently in the stage of deep aging society, and the size of the elderly population is still expanding.
Meanwhile, the population aged 16 to 59 decreased from 857.98 million in 2024 to 851.36 million in 2025, with the proportion of the total population dropping from 60.9% to 60.6%.
This parallel structural change of “low fertility + aging” implies that there will be greater pressure on future labor supply, pension security, medical services, and family care.
A core shift in China’s population issue is the decreasing population capable of childbearing.
The National Bureau of Statistics of the Chinese Communist Party explicitly mentioned in 2021 that there was a decrease of about 5 million women of childbearing age (15-49 years old) that year, with a reduction of approximately 3 million women in the peak childbearing period of 21-35 years old.
The continuous downward trend in births over the past few decades has reduced the population base entering the childbearing age group. Even if the fertility desire of some families improves, the shrinking population of women capable of childbirth will structurally constrain the birth rate.
In recent years, the Chinese government has been implementing measures to support childbearing, including childcare subsidies and services. However, despite these efforts, the number of births declined again in 2025. The long-term impact of these policies on the birth rate is still subject to observation.
Factors influencing family reproductive decisions involve not only subsidies but also housing, education, healthcare, childcare, female employment, and family expectations regarding future income and living costs.
Apart from the quantity of births, the gender structure is also an important backdrop to China’s population issue.
Among the newborns, there is still a higher proportion of boys. In 2025, the sex ratio of newborns in China was 111.5, meaning that for every 100 girls born, there were 111.5 boys born. This ratio exceeds the natural balance range of 103 to 107 for newborn gender distribution.
This indicates that the gender imbalance in the birth population in China has not yet been resolved.
The long-term high gender ratio at birth may further exacerbate gender imbalances in marriage markets in some regions.
As the related male population reaches marriageable age, some areas may face problems such as surplus male population and difficulties in marriage matching.
Looking from both ends of the spectrum of birth and elderly populations, China’s population structure is forming a more evident pattern of “one elderly person for every child”.
One end sees the continuous trend of births falling below deaths, leading to a shrinking young population base; while on the other end, the population aged 60 and above has exceeded 320 million and continues to rise.
This will directly impact future pension, healthcare, long-term care, childcare, and public financial expenditure.
According to the Health Commission’s report, in 2025, 145.7 million elderly people aged 65 and above received health management services in grassroots medical and health institutions.
Therefore, population policy is transitioning from merely “encouraging more births” to gradually addressing multiple changes such as declining birth rates and population aging.