In a rare move, the German government has launched a large-scale operation against the espionage activities of the Chinese Communist Party in German universities. The Federal Criminal Police Office and prosecutors in multiple states simultaneously conducted searches at universities, residences, and workplaces in five federal states, leading to the arrests of a couple suspected of engaging in espionage activities for China. This case once again brings to light the issue of systematic theft of dual-use Western military and civilian technologies by the Chinese Communist Party.
The arrested individuals, Xuejun C. and Hua S., are both German citizens with Chinese backgrounds. According to information released by the German Federal Prosecutor General, this couple operated in Munich for a long time, establishing connections to collect intelligence in the fields of aerospace technology, information technology, and artificial intelligence at German universities and research institutions.
Their cover identities were diverse, including serving as interpreters or operating under the guise of an employee of a German car manufacturer. Xuejun C. owned a luxurious residence in the northern part of Schwabing in Munich, while also managing an automotive electronic systems company in Wuhan, China, publicly claimed to be founded by a “former employee of a renowned German car manufacturer.”
Xuejun C. also served as a director of a Germany-China “Technical, Educational, and Cultural Exchange” association established in 2014. The association is registered on a quiet street in Solln, Munich, next to a kindergarten. However, registration information shows that besides him, there are 6 other directors in the association, whose core mission is explicitly marked as “technology transfer.”
This model of using civil associations and companies as cover-ups to carry out technology transfers is extremely common in the Chinese intelligence collection operations in Europe and America.
They utilized the association to establish connections with German scholars, luring German scientists to China through “high remuneration and lectures for the general public” as bait. However, when the German professors arrived at the location, they discovered that the audience seated in front of them were not ordinary civilians but representatives of Chinese national defense and defense industry enterprises. This kind of “bait and switch” tactic is a common method used in Chinese intelligence operations.
In the midst of this storm, one of Germany’s most prestigious engineering universities, RWTH Aachen University, once again became the focal point of public opinion. The university confirmed that investigators had visited the campus, investigating a professor researching high-tech unmanned aerial vehicles. During the pandemic in 2021 and early 2022, the professor had been invited twice to deliver online academic presentations, with the audience being Chinese enterprises and research institutions. Currently, the professor is classified as a witness by the police, rather than a suspect.
German media investigative organization CORRECTIV had reported back in 2024 on the close cooperation between RWTH Aachen University and Chinese military or military-affiliated institutions: at least 19 professors had collaborative relationships with Chinese counterparts, and a large amount of funds from China continuously flowed into the university. Despite this unmanned aerial vehicle research professor’s relatively low-key approach to contacts with China in the past, he still could not entirely evade Chinese scrutiny.
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) regularly issue warnings stating that this is far from an isolated case, but rather a part of Beijing’s systematic and large-scale strategic technology theft strategy in Western countries. The German intelligence agencies have long warned that “China currently lags behind in satellite technology and semiconductor fields. Beijing is trying to bridge this technological divide through espionage.”
The Chinese Communist Party has established an intelligence network spanning multiple countries, with a focus on addressing its technological gaps in satellite technology, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, and other fields. The operation of this vast network is highly organized, with a specialized department within the Chinese security structure responsible for coordinating these technology collection efforts. Their role includes precise targeting of Western technologies urgently needed for Chinese military industry transformation, facilitated through university networks.
The core part of this operation is the so-called “Seven Sons of National Defense,” which are seven Chinese universities (Beihang University, Harbin Institute of Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, etc.). These universities appear to be ordinary civilian institutions, but they are directly subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party’s defense industry sector, bearing the heavy responsibility of military research and development.
According to Chinese law, all Chinese citizens have an obligation to cooperate with the state intelligence agencies – even if they are abroad in Germany. German intelligence investigations have revealed that highly valued students or company employees have been required to regularly report on their work progress at the Chinese Embassy or Consulate in Germany.
If someone refuses to cooperate, the Beijing authorities may even threaten to impose sanctions against their family members in China. Furthermore, some Chinese students on national scholarships traveling to Germany are required to sign contracts before going abroad, committing to absolute obedience and loyalty to the state. This “national system” style of intelligence collection renders Western universities high-risk areas.
A real case example involves a German medical technology company developing a special alloy for sterilizing medical instruments, which was stolen by a Chinese doctoral student and patented in China. In the eyes of military experts, warships coated with this metal will have extremely strong radar stealth capabilities. Given the frequent threats of military action in the Taiwan Strait by China, the leakage of such technologies has raised high concerns among Western military observers.
The German government acknowledges that since 2016, it has not had statistics on annual research cooperation between Germany and China in sensitive technology areas. The government stated that such collaborations are usually not systematically classified or documented in terms of sensitivity, whether domestically or internationally.
In other words, Germany does not know how many German-Chinese research collaborations involve sensitive technologies each year, how many of them may have military applications, which areas carry the highest risks, and the number of Chinese researchers participating in them.
Of particular concern is the government’s admission that the total number of students funded by the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) in German universities and research institutions is unknown. For other Chinese researchers in Germany funded by the German government, possibly involved in projects with “dual-use” military-civilian risks, the federal government has incomplete statistics.
Ayşe Asar, the Green Party’s spokesperson for research policy in the Federal Parliament, bluntly stated that the federal government is “too slow in action, too vague in attitude, and lacks determination” in addressing security issues. She emphasized that the government should not treat this case as an isolated incident, as it could be just the tip of the iceberg.
She specifically pointed out that German universities are currently in a precarious situation of “fighting alone” when it comes to sensitive collaborations, dual-use technology risks, and critical data handling. If the government does not accelerate the establishment of a unified research security protection network, Germany’s decades of accumulated technological advantages will continue to flow to Beijing’s military-industrial complex through these clandestine channels.
Asar highlighted the current issues: lack of data, unclear policies, and insufficient implementation. She criticized the government for still being in the phase of “vague case reviews and unenforceable commitments.” Furthermore, she noted that the government had promised to establish a “National Research Security Platform” by December 2025, but the platform has yet to materialize.
Asar also questioned why Dorothee Bär, the Minister of State for Research in the Federal Ministry, was not included in the newly established National Security Council. This new institution set up at the Chancellery is seen as a crucial core for future national security decision-making, yet the minister responsible for research and technology policies is not involved. She found this arrangement difficult to comprehend in the current context of heightened geopolitical tensions and technological competition.
As a key hub for European research, Germany has long upheld the principle of international cooperation, but facing the systematic technology plundering orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party, mere “openness” is no longer sustainable. Finding the balance between maintaining academic freedom and safeguarding critical technological security has become a major challenge for Berlin.
The espionage case between Munich and Aachen merely reflects the recent tensions in Sino-German technological relations. With the changing geopolitical landscape, European countries are increasingly adopting careful attitudes towards scientific and technological cooperation with China.