Recently, Xinhua News Agency of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) published an article praising the “Three Major Transformations” during the CCP’s establishment of power, highlighting the concept of “public-private partnership” once again. Analysts believe that this signals the CCP’s continued pursuit of an extreme leftist path, which may lead to disaster for China. What the CCP is currently doing is described as “nationalization without declaration,” where each step is disguised under the guise of being “legitimate” and “appropriate.”
On June 19th, Xinhua News Agency prominently featured an article titled “The Three Major Transformations: a Profound Social Transformation Like Never Before,” with the tagline “Great Journey.” The article extensively praised the socialist transformation from 1953 to 1956, particularly emphasizing the “public-private partnership” in the capitalist business sector. The piece quoted Xi Jinping stating that the coercion of private property into public property in the name of the state during that period was packaged as “achieving a historic leap from socialist revolution to socialist construction,” claiming it provided “valuable experience” for today’s “Chinese-style modernization.”
According to the CCP’s definition, the so-called Three Major Transformations refer to the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft industry, and the capitalist business sector from 1953 to 1956. Public-private partnership was regarded as a transitional method for the CCP to merge private property in the capitalist business sector.
Prior to this, the CCP launched the “Five Anti-Campaign” against private entrepreneurs, alleging that they bribed officials and defrauded state assets. During the movement, capitalists were subjected to large-scale investigations, forced confessions, denunciations, fines, back taxes, which led to numerous wrongful cases. Many capitalists and businessmen were coerced into suicide, while others were executed or tortured to death, marking the decline of the bourgeoisie in mainland China.
Public records show that in Shanghai from January 25 to April 1, 1952, there were 876 suicide cases (an average of over 10 per day) involving capitalists and their families due to the movement. The then mayor of Shanghai, Chen Yi, frequently inquired, “How many ‘airborne soldiers’ today?” referring to businessmen leaping to their deaths in despair. Similar waves of suicides occurred in other cities as well.
The CCP’s article mentioned above is not lengthy, being only about 1200 words, but it has drawn significant attention from external observers, prompting discussions on overseas platforms.
Independent commentator Cai Shengkun publicly criticized in a submission to @baodiantimes that the most dangerous aspect of this article is not its account of 1956 but its praise for the systemic deprivation of private property portrayed as a “great transformation,” “valuable experience,” and “institutional support.”
Cai mentioned in the article that historically, public-private partnerships relied on state power to force private entrepreneurs to surrender control of their enterprises. The CCP’s article glorifies the festivities of that era while deliberately overlooking the fear, pressure, and hopelessness behind the exit of private capital. The narration uses old factories, creative parks, cafes, and galleries along the Suzhou River as the backdrop, attempting to overlay a layer of modern life’s “sentimental filter.” This narrative is highly deceptive and cunning: it tries to retroactively justify the past brutal plunder through showcasing the cultural value of the loot today.
“New Heights” on X platform mentioned that the CCP’s celebration of the Three Major Transformations at this juncture aimed to preheat the atmosphere for the upcoming 21st Congress.
The article mentioned that this CCP article is not merely about nostalgic history but is a clear political signal released by the current CCP amidst financial and governance crises, indicating their intention for a new large-scale plunder of private capital and reasserting control over social resources. The intense pressure, coercion, and complete nationalization behind the “harsh judgment and ransom” of over seventy years ago are now being repackaged by the authorities as a shining example, setting the stage for the coming “new public-private partnerships,” leading China towards another dark age.
Many netizens commented, “The truth of history cannot be easily covered up.” “The reckless hand of looting has never stopped waving.” “Slowly but surely, things will return to the way they were.” “The crisis is already looming.”
Netizen Xu Mao’an said, “In my view, for the sake of communism, Mao Zedong not only saw the bourgeoisie destroyed, but eventually the largest class, the farmer class, also became mere obstacles hindering the rapid evolution of the system, eventually leading to many people being directly annihilated physically. Xi Jinping has inherited Mao’s legacy. Therefore, those who possess wealth need to be vigilant, and those without also need to be alert!”
In addition to the article published by Xinhua News Agency on June 19, the CCP’s People’s Daily also published an article on June 20 titled “Memorandum of Socialist Transformation (Great Journey)” and another on June 21 titled “Memoir of Road Exploration for Socialist Construction (Great Journey),” all exalting the so-called “great journey” of the general line of socialist transformation during the transitional period.
Independent political and economic scholar Zheng Xuguang, based in the United States, analyzed on X platform that these three articles are part of the CCP’s propaganda project named “Great Journey,” which has been utilized by the CCP’s Propaganda Department for many years as a brand reintroduced as a series of articles now, mainly serving the narrative of “self-confidence in the development of the 15th Five-Year Plan” and “autonomous industrialization.”
Zheng mentioned that as early as January 5, 2013, Xi Jinping threw out the idea within the Party that “one cannot negate the historical period before the Reform and Opening-up era by the Reform and Opening-up era, nor deny the Reform and Opening-up era by the period before the Reform and Opening-up era.” This is known as the “two negations.” Xi claimed that if Mao was wholly disavowed at that time, the CCP would not stand firm.
Zheng pointed out that this is the narrative orientation of Xi Jinping’s new era of the CCP – portraying the negative assets of the Mao Zedong era as positive assets, resurrecting a set of old policy tools from the Mao era for China’s economic and social “re-Maoization.” Therefore, the intention behind these three articles is not a call by Xi Jinping’s CCP leadership for “public-private partnerships” involving private businesses, but rather a latest propaganda offensive serving the mobilization activity of the 15th Five-Year Plan under the narrative guidance of the “two non-negations” principle put forward by Xi Jinping. However, the consequences it brings must not go unnoticed.
China expert Li Linyi told Dajiyuan that this series of articles under the so-called “Great Journey” should be in line with the propaganda needs of the CCP’s founding 105th anniversary. It does not represent any new signal but rather signifies the regime’s basic attitude towards this historical event, highlighting that the authorities have been following a leftist path, so slogans or measures supporting private enterprises in recent years are merely smokescreens.
The CCP implemented the “Private Economy Promotion Law” last year, with Xi Jinping himself stating that private enterprises are like “family members” and promising to protect them. However, the reality is that many private entrepreneurs have been either detained or committed suicide, with a significant number of cases being wrongful.
Last year, the British magazine “The Economist” reported that Chinese entrepreneurs were mysteriously disappearing at an alarming rate, with nearly one person being arrested every week.
The “Communist Manifesto” states, “The Communists can summarize their theory in a single sentence: the abolition of private property.” Based on this, Chinese economist Xiang Songzuo mentioned in a public lecture in 2019, “Nowadays, the prevailing mentality among private entrepreneurs is: ‘It is a choice forced upon us, to need us is a noble ideal.'”
In a submission to @baodiantimes, the author Finding expressed that the current CCP is unlikely to replicate the “public-private partnership assembly” of the 1950s as that would be too conspicuous. A more plausible approach would involve a multifaceted, gradual erosion.
The article outlined the first step already underway: party committees taking control and mixed-ownership reforms, akin to the gradual heating of water. For instance, internet giants have already had state assets acquire “golden shares” to obtain veto power.
The second step involves launching corruption or tax evasion investigations against specific entrepreneurs, first freezing assets, detaining individuals, then coercing them to “voluntarily” transfer equity to state-owned entities or accept state capital injection in exchange for personal liberty. Examples include Sun Hongbin (R&F) and Jack Ma (Alibaba).
The third step is administrative licensing and regulatory strangulation. Instead of direct confiscation, it involves revoking permits, refusal to renew, restricting financing channels, forcing product removal, pushing enterprises into operational crises, followed by state acquisitions at low prices under the guise of “relief.” For example, the educational training sector being effectively eliminated by a single administrative document.
The fourth step is “voluntary donations” and share distribution in the name of common prosperity. Entrepreneurs are coerced through political pressure to donate to state funds, charitable organizations, or local governments or are compelled to distribute bonuses to employees. Though appearing voluntary, it is essentially political wealth extraction. As the amounts grow larger, it parallels ransom. For instance, during the height of the common prosperity movement in 2021, corporations like Tencent and Alibaba announced substantial donations coinciding highly with political pressures.
The fifth step is nationalization of data and platform. Through relevant legislation, once data is nationalized, a company’s core competitive edge is essentially stripped away. For example, during Didi’s suspension and rectification period, its core data fell under the substantial monitoring of regulatory bodies.
The sixth step is wartime economic mobilization legislation. The amended “National Defense Mobilization Law” and related regulations passed in 2021 granted the state the legal authority to commandeer all private assets in an “emergency situation.” If the Taiwan Strait situation escalates or internal political crises ensue, this provision can serve as the legal basis for the comprehensive nationalization of specific industries owned by private enterprises without the need for normal legislative procedures.
The seventh step involves settling historic debts. The original accumulation of Chinese private enterprises from the 1990s to 2000s was rooted in grey operations. Land transfers at low prices relied on nods from local officials, capital accumulation involved off-the-books funds, stock market financing depended on financial packaging, while cross-industry expansions navigated around the edges of policy regulations. The CCP has meticulously preserved these historical files but has never undergone a genuine settlement until the time when it’s needed.
Finding pointed out that what the CCP is engaging in now is nationalization without declaration. The party committees taking control are termed as “strengthening party construction,” mixed-ownership reforms are labeled “optimizing equity structure,” regulatory rectifications are denoted as “standardizing industry development,” donations and distribution of bonuses are declared as “fulfilling social responsibility,” data hosting as “maintaining national security,” anti-corruption investigations as “governing by law,” and settling historical debts as “purifying the business environment.” Each step is narrated legitimately and operates within the legal framework, yet systematically shifts private wealth towards state power. Xi Jinping’s government logic doesn’t prioritize efficiency but instead control and security.
In conclusion, the series of articles and the underlying intentions portrayed by the CCP’s narratives are seen as alarming signals by many observers, as they perceive a revival of past oppressive measures and further encroachment on private enterprise rights. The ongoing developments in China’s economic and political landscape underscore the need for vigilance and scrutiny regarding the CCP’s policies and actions in the coming future.