In the past, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relied on real estate, infrastructure, exports, and local finances to sustain its narrative of development. However, this narrative is now being replaced by priorities such as security, control, debt resolution, and social stability. While the CCP continues to emphasize economic growth goals, from fiscal arrangements, policy language, and grassroots governance perspectives, national security has been prioritized over development. Emphasizing politics and confrontations has become the norm in governance, with the definition of enemies continuously expanding.
Since May, the CCP has been continuously expanding its control under the guise of “national security,” with restrictive measures extending to areas such as technology, military, business sectors, internet information, and foreign investments. The State Council issued regulations on foreign investments, tightens capital, technology, and data outflows; the Cyberspace Administration released regulations on Internet information content distribution services, incorporating cross-platform content dissemination into scrutiny.
Bloomberg revealed that Beijing has restricted overseas travel for core personnel in artificial intelligence companies like Alibaba and DeepSeek. The Central Military Commission issued 26 measures for senior military management, indicating a deepening purge within the military. Following the implementation of new judicial interpretations by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on May 1st, individuals from private enterprises, foreign enterprises, and the business sector are also included in an increased range of criminal accountability.
Retired professor Xie Tian from Anhui Province (alias) told Epoch Times, “From the development situation in the first half of this year, it is clear that China’s regression is accelerating. All economic indicators show they are no longer prioritizing the economy but focusing on espionage and so-called destabilizing factors. For the CCP, politics override everything, and in the face of politics, economic development is no longer significant.”
For over 20 years, the CCP has used economic growth to achieve social compliance. Rising real estate prices, urban expansion, infrastructure investments, export growth, and employment absorption formed the core of the so-called development model. However, since the beginning of the pandemic lockdowns, the CCP’s ruling model has rapidly shifted.
Xie Tian told reporters, “After the CCP’s 19th National Congress, policies began to tighten. By acquiring, establishing party branches in enterprises, they blocked the development of private enterprises. Following the pandemic lockdowns, they started clearing out private enterprises with annual revenues exceeding 200 million RMB, by first proposing acquisitions and demanding to buy out 30% to 51% of the shares. If you refuse, they check your taxes. This is how they use power to take over private wealth.”
The regulations of the State Council on foreign investments, which took effect on July 1st, demonstrate that the CCP is tightening controls on capital, technology, services, data, and personnel under the pretext of “national security.”
These regulations stipulate that investors engaged in overseas investment activities must not export, use goods, technology, services, or related data prohibited for export by the state; without permission, they must not export, use goods, technology, services, or related data restricted for export by the state. Additionally, it prohibits the transfer of controlled technology, services, and data abroad through dispatching technical personnel, working overseas, cross-border technology guidance, or overseas training.
Zhao Ran, an independent scholar from Shanxi Province (alias), stated in an interview that the CCP is no longer focused on economic development but is strengthening control under the guise of “grassroots governance.” He said, “They are now busy all day with so-called grassroots governance, claiming it’s for the good of the people, but it’s actually for control, to maintain political power, with little regard for economic development. I’ve heard that street offices and township-level officials are all engaged in maintaining stability, emphasizing ‘social governance, clearly defined responsibilities,’ and establishing early warning mechanisms. Responsibilities at the grassroots level are becoming increasingly detailed, subject to quarterly assessments.”
Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the concept of “security” has continued to rise in the CCP’s policy system. National security, economic security, financial security, food security, energy security, supply chain security, data security, and social stability are constantly integrated within the same governance framework.
Zhao Ran stated that this control model of the CCP did not suddenly appear this year but has been escalating over time. He said, “Now, they have defined the economy as a part of security issues. This model already exists. When the CCP deals with economic problems, the first consideration is not economic benefits but control, whether it threatens their political power. Continuing in this manner, contradictions between the people and the CCP will deepen, and internal divisions within the top echelons of the CCP will likely emerge. There may be factions in the future; one side may seek to ease tensions and address people’s livelihoods, while the other continues stability maintenance and control. Political changes within the CCP may start from the top echelons.”