The Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption campaign, which has been ongoing for over a decade, continues to target senior officials. Analysts point out three noticeable characteristics of the anti-corruption efforts: a shift from merely combating corruption to emphasizing political loyalty among officials, criticism of officials who incur debt through unfinished projects, and heightened scrutiny on retired officials.
The latest official to fall from grace is Chen Yujian, the Deputy Mayor of Shanghai, who was taken down on June 10. Chen rose through the ranks during Han Zheng’s leadership in Shanghai.
In 2025, the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission reported a record high of 65 investigations involving high-ranking officials above the level of deputy minister, the highest since the 18th National Congress of the Party.
According to an official report released on January 17, 2026, China’s disciplinary inspection and supervisory agencies handled over 1.02 million cases and sanctioned approximately 983,000 individuals last year.
The Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese law enforcement authorities disciplined nearly a million individuals last year, marking a historical peak and surpassing the numbers seen at the beginning of Xi Jinping’s administration by over five times. The focus of scrutiny has shifted from economic crimes and lifestyle issues to so-called “political offenses.”
The narratives surrounding fallen officials increasingly resemble political critiques, not only accusing them of corruption but also emphasizing charges of disloyalty to the Party, dual-dealing, and failing to implement central directives. Terms such as “unwarranted criticism of the central government” and “lack of loyalty and honesty” are frequently present in official reports.
Analysts suggest that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the crackdown has evolved from tackling corruption to a sweeping movement to reinforce political loyalty.
Chinese affairs expert Li Linyi expressed to Dajiyuan that the Party’s pivot from anti-corruption to demanding political allegiance indicates the failure of the anti-corruption campaign as a smokescreen and underscores a severe crisis in governance.
Independent commentator Du Zheng previously revealed in Taiwanese media that Xi holds power without authority. Various anecdotes about Xi circulate even in banquets, triggering laughter among attendees.
Scholar Yuan Hongbing, currently based in Australia, remarked that most officials in the CCP are “two-faced,” showing negligence, passivity, and inaction. As Xi’s influence declines, China’s governance capability deteriorates rapidly. The entire bureaucratic system is reportedly anticipating Xi’s removal, but he sustains his personal dictatorship through a technologically armed modern espionage apparatus that instills fear of state terrorism.
Since 2020, when reporting on fallen officials, the CCP departments have started denouncing local officials who accumulate debt through unfinished projects.
On June 18, the Supreme People’s Court of China unveiled a case study on dereliction of duty, highlighting the case of Cao Jiongfang, who, during his tenure as Secretary of the CPC Central Committee of Xiangtan City, Hunan Province from 2016 to 2021, pursued political achievements disregarding the region’s financial capabilities, leading to a staggering debt of 43.5 billion yuan and leaving behind 33 unfinished projects.
In the same report, Cao was noted to have orchestrated the burning of ill-gotten gains with his wife upon anticipating an investigation, claiming it as a secret they would take to their graves. This case had been featured in an official anti-corruption documentary in January 2024.
In a similar vein, the CCP authorities earlier this year publicized a batch of cases termed as “typical violations of the spirit of the CCP central leadership’s eight-point code of conduct.” Among them, Jiang Duntan, former Deputy Mayor of Chongqing, was flagged for reckless and aggressive pursuit of achievements, resulting in a substantial increase in local debt burdens.
Chinese economist Li Hengqing remarked to Dajiyuan that the issue of local debt stems from a comprehensive action linking the central and local authorities. While Beijing criticizes local officials for distorted performance perspectives, the central government’s historical approach has been to boost the economy, often inflating GDP figures, resulting in debt accumulation through investments in high-rise buildings and infrastructure projects. This pattern has been observed with former high-ranking CCP officials who operated in local regions, including Xi Jinping himself when he held office in Fujian and Zhejiang.
In fact, Xi Jinping has been mockingly labeled as the “King of Unfinished Projects.” The Xiong’an New Area, touted as a “millennium project” involving a mega-scale urban development worth trillions, has intermittently been dubbed an “unfinished project” despite official promotion.
Li Linyi highlighted the profound economic challenges in China in recent years, particularly the deepening local debt crisis, which has led to shifting blame battles between the central and local authorities.
Official movements also indicate intensified efforts to pursue retired officials.
On June 17, Yuan Guangyu, former Deputy General Manager of China National Offshore Oil Corporation, was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve for allegedly accepting bribes exceeding 152 million yuan. Yuan, 67 years old, retired in September 2019 and was investigated on March 1, 2025.
Yao Xiaoping, former Vice President of China Life Insurance Company, has been retired for nearly 9 years but was recently scrutinized by the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision. Numerous officials at the deputy provincial and ministerial levels, many of whom retired years ago, are still being investigated, some falling from grace after 8, 9, or even 18 years of retirement.
A recent article in Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Daily highlighted the focus on the central government’s pursuit of corrupt retired officials, whose confiscated assets are deemed as financial windfalls for the state treasury.
In 2026, 22 senior officials faced corruption charges, totaling nearly 3 billion yuan. Bribes received by officials, along with assets such as real estate, jewelry, and gold, are usually recovered and turned over to the state treasury upon investigation.
Authorities are concerned about retired officials transferring assets abroad or fleeing. Earlier reports in February indicated stricter controls on the emigration of retired officials in provinces like Hunan. Sources within the CCP system disclosed that some regions have extended monitoring from retired officials at the bureau level to those in key departments, and even to personnel at the section level. Upon retirement, if individuals need to leave the country, the process has shifted from mere registration by the original unit to requiring official approval.
Legal expert Yuan Hongbing based in Australia informed Dajiyuan that in Xi Jinping’s current political landscape, the most vulnerable group is retired CCP officials who have become Xi’s “bank” through the anti-corruption campaign, allowing him to confiscate their wealth without compensation. Over the past decades, corruption was rife within the CCP, making these officials repositories of wealth for Xi, especially when his military expenditures strain the budget.