The China Digital Times website released internal network content control instructions leaked from the Chinese video platform LeTV, spanning a period of 3 years and containing a total of 718 directives. Various departments of the Chinese Communist Party, including the Cyberspace Administration and Internet supervision, have long issued deletion, filtering, and control requests to the platform. The platform complies with these requests in a standardized format and reports disposal data regularly. The topics under review include Xi Jinping, nationalities and religions, diplomacy and international affairs.
Xue Yixiang (pseudonym), who focuses on internet censorship, told Epoch Times that the value of these censorship orders lies in revealing how platforms under CCP control execute censorship. He stated, “This is not just about deleting posts in the general sense; this comprehensive process illustrates how meticulous the CCP is in controlling online speech. Once orders come from above, platforms comply, report numbers and samples. Essentially, the platform acts as an outsourced department of the CCP censorship system, and they are very diligent in their work.”
These materials, compiled by China Digital Times, are archived daily in the “Truth Hall” of the Chinese digital space under the format “LeTV directives + date”. The LeTV censorship directives differentiate between “deletion” and “filtering,” with the former targeting information already displayed on the platform and the latter focusing on information intercepted before publication. Some directives also require platforms to report the quantity of disposals within the last 24 hours at fixed intervals, along with highlighting samples and tables.
The LeTV directives cover a wide range of censorship topics, from Xi Jinping to nationalities and religions, diplomacy and international affairs, the Hong Kong extradition bill protests, public sentiment towards celebrities, public events, public health, rights lawyers, and incidents involving police and military. These directives extend from core political figures to social cases, from current events to public sentiments about past issues, essentially encompassing the major areas of public discussion on the mainland Chinese internet.
Zou Qian, a former internet platform worker from Guangdong, explained to reporters that in mainland China, content censorship on platforms is not solely managed by one department but involves a collaboration between regulatory bodies, platform review teams, and technical systems. She said, “I used to work for a news website where we had such a review procedure. Initially managed by the Propaganda Department, later taken over by the Cyberspace Administration, new forbidden words were added to the repository almost daily. Published articles had to pass through the word repository review to check for banned words. We were most afraid of being singled out by the Cyberspace Administration.”
Regarding content related to Xi Jinping, the directives establish a fixed categorization template. The material lists 7 types of so-called “negative harmful information,” targeting aspects such as Xi Jinping’s personal health, education background, wealth, lifestyle, negative narratives about his family and relatives, negative information linked to policies, high-level personnel, social hot topics, official visits, as well as reprints of overseas articles.
Professor Zhang, a scholar in the United States, told reporters that the categorization of Xi Jinping-related content reflects the CCP’s highest goal of maintaining control over power. He noted, “If a regime needs to meticulously categorize and clear away negative information about its leader, it shows how sensitive they are to real public opinion. Health, education, family, wealth, official visits – none of these topics are open for discussion; it’s classic personality cult. What Deng Xiaoping abolished years ago is now being resurrected; this is the reinstatement of an old system. I believe they cannot contain this, and blocking netizens from bypassing restrictions is also futile.”
A LeTV directive from January 2, 2020, mentioned the appearance of “unexplained pneumonia” in Wuhan, Hubei province, and required that related reports rely on information released by authoritative departments and avoid baseless speculation. Another directive on February 7th cautioned against using the concept of “whistleblowers” in various reports.
Professor Zhang remarked that the early directives during the Wuhan pandemic did not prioritize open information but focused on controlling the narrative. He commented, “Back then, I was also in Wuhan, and the situation of the epidemic circulating within the university was more severe than what was known outside. Internally, it was already understood that human-to-human transmission was occurring, yet externally, it was denied. Some doctors wore three layers of protective gear, and some were afraid to go to work. But the CCP’s initial response was taming your speech. Later, with the Li Wenliang incident, the term ‘whistleblower’ resonated with the public, which is why they even prohibited its use.”
The materials also show that diplomatic and international narratives are subject to scrutiny. Directives related to rumors about Wang Yi’s luxurious residence in Canada, the Huawei Meng Wanzhou incident, spoofs on North Korean leaders, etc., are included in these orders. Platforms are instructed to clean up “harmful information,” tally news clicks, media reports, netizen comments, negatives deleted, and filtered messages while providing typical samples.
Concerning nationalities and religions, content related to Tibet is further subdivided into rumors, ethnic separatism, religious extremism, attacks by foreign media, slanderous information about Tibet-related departments and patriotic religious figures, incitement to illegal gatherings, sensitive incidents in Tibet, dissemination of circumvention tools, dissemination of terrorist and explosive material production methods, and so on. The directives related to Xinjiang also mention cleaning up information on the distribution and usage of circumvention software among internal personnel in Xinjiang.
China Digital Times notes that the “LeTV censorship directives” complement other materials leaked from the same platform, such as the “LeTV Video 2017 Sensitive Keyword Repository” and the “LeTV Video 2015-2016 Partial Retracted Content”. These 718 directives document the process of orders issued by regulatory bodies, platform deletions and filtering, regular reporting of data, and submission of samples, serving as primary material for studying the operational methods of information control on the Chinese internet.