The Chinese Communist Party’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced the “Ten Measures for Taiwan” on the 12th, attempting to create an illusion of “concession” amidst the tense cross-strait relations. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and experts pointed out that the authorities in Beijing are essentially “mainland-izing” the cross-strait relations, hiding a united front trap disguised under the facade of a “big gift package” with economic coercion as a means, aiming to divide and trap Taiwan internally, while Taiwan should continue to shift towards a “clean supply chain” and break free from economic dependency.
Amidst the “Cheng-Xi meeting” between Kuomintang Chairperson Zheng Liwen and the CCP leader Xi Jinping on the 10th and her return to Taiwan on the 12th, the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office promptly announced the “Ten Preferential Measures for Taiwan,” including increasing direct flights, strengthening imports of Taiwanese agricultural and fishery products, regular communication between the KMT and CCP, and allowing mainland China to broadcast “healthy” Taiwanese TV dramas. These measures are seen by the outside world as highly political united front strategies.
The Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan issued a press release on the 12th emphasizing that the move by the Beijing authorities deliberately bypasses the democratically elected government of Taiwan, trying to “mainland-ize” and “One China framework-ize” the cross-strait relations.
The Mainland Affairs Council sternly warned that any cross-strait affairs involving public power must be negotiated by both governments on equal terms to be effective; any communication mechanisms or platforms established privately between the KMT and CCP should not violate the laws of the Republic of China, and the costs of political transactions should not be borne by the people of Taiwan as a whole.
Senior commentator Zhou Weihang relayed the reaction within the Kuomintang, stating that although the ten measures appear to be rich on the surface, they are actually “illusory.” Most of the issues have been discussed in the past with no new ideas, lacking clear implementation figures and specific commitments.
He bluntly stated, “The ‘illusory’ benefit is that it allows room for interpretation, but upon closer examination, it is evident that there is no substantial change compared to the past; the ‘illusory’ things are as good as not being mentioned at all.”
Despite the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to disrupt Taiwan with economic bait, data shows that Taiwan’s economic reliance on China is at a historic low. Professor Chen Shimin of National Taiwan University’s Political Science Department cited specific data to illustrate that Taiwan’s economic structure has fundamentally transformed.
In terms of export proportions, the share of exports to China (including Hong Kong and Macao) from Taiwan, which was at its highest at 43% in 2020, had significantly dropped to 26.6% by 2025; following this is a reversal in exports to the U.S.: in 2025, Taiwan’s exports to the U.S. accounted for 30.9%, surpassing the share of exports to mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao for the first time in 26 years.
Another significant aspect is the investment flow. During Ma Ying-jeou’s administration in the 2010s, Taiwan’s outward investment to China once reached 81%; however, by 2025, this figure had sharply plummeted to around 2.5%.
Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs responded on the 12th, emphasizing that Taiwan’s economic development is being promoted according to the principle of “Taiwan-based, globally positioned.” According to the latest forecast from the Asian Development Bank on April 10, Taiwan’s GDP growth rate in 2026 is expected to be 7.6%, well above China’s 4.6%.
The data indicates that under the leadership in five key industries and AI construction, Taiwan’s overall economy shows strong resilience, and the actual impact of China’s “Ten Measures” on Taiwan’s economy is quite limited.
Regarding the specific contents of these ten measures, Chen Shimin, in an interview with Epoch Times, pointed out that the core purpose appears to be to help the Kuomintang cope with the upcoming local elections in November. He believes that there was certainly communication between the KMT and CCP beforehand, and this “multi-benefit” package is essentially aimed at boosting the KMT’s election prospects rather than genuinely seeking benefits for Taiwan.
Chen Shimin further dissected several united front traps within the measures. Firstly, concerning the import of agricultural and fishery products, he noted a clear “political labeling” trap. For products to enter the Chinese market, they must be labeled as originating from “Taiwan, China.” This implies that companies must make a political statement in support of “Taiwan as part of China” to be allowed to import. He criticized this as a form of “commercial coercion.”
It is reported that in the 2010s, around eighty percent of Taiwan’s agricultural exports were concentrated in China. However, citing reasons such as discovering oriental fruit flies, the CCP has progressively banned Taiwanese goods such as pineapples, sugar apples, citrus fruits, wax apples, mangoes, etc., since 2020. Former Minister of Agriculture of Taiwan, Chen Chi-chung, stated that there is no scientific evidence from the CCP authorities and that they are unwilling to follow international practices of using fumigation; the inconsistent and unpredictable nature of the Chinese market poses too high a risk.
The second trap mentioned by Chen Shimin is the “four connections” or “Four Compliances” of Kinmen and Matsu Islands. Warning about promoting water, electricity, gas, and bridge connections with Kinmen and Matsu Islands, he cautioned that this is a tactic to economically and infrastructurally “absorb” Kinmen and Matsu into China, akin to how Russia dealt with the Crimean Peninsula, establishing deep dependencies and eventually achieving substantial control.
The third trap involves individual travel and youth groups. Regarding the opening of individual travel from Shanghai and Fujian, Chen Shimin remarked sarcastically, “Taiwan has never banned individual travel; it’s the CCP itself that prohibits Chinese people from coming to Taiwan.” As for the so-called youth visiting groups, they are used as a channel to instill a “Greater China consciousness” in Taiwan’s younger generation.
Veteran media personality Shang Yifu also questioned that Taiwan has had numerous experiences of being at a loss in agricultural product exports to China, often faced with various unilateral cancellations or demands for cooperation under various pretext by the CCP, leading to stopping everything abruptly. Agricultural and fishery workers in Taiwan have become vigilant. He believes that the political significance released in these grassroots and county-level projects far outweighs the actual benefits.
Lai Rongwei, the Executive Director of the Taiwan Inspirational Association (TIA), analyzed the CCP’s tactics from a higher strategic perspective, describing them as “nurture, trap, and kill.”
He explained to Epoch Times reporters that “nurture” is about attracting specific groups in Taiwan with short-term economic benefits, making them accustomed to the current benefits; “trap” is about making participants afraid of losing benefits, which traps them without resistance; and “kill” refers to the CCP withdrawing benefits without hesitation when the other party loses its value or does not meet political expectations.
Lai Rongwei criticized this pattern becoming more evident under Xi Jinping’s rule. Since the CCP does not respect rules and the rule of law, the “concessions” towards Taiwan are entirely controlled by the leadership in Zhongnanhai, making it impossible to expect Beijing to act as per agreements in the absence of a democratic social contract and institutional protection.
Furthermore, Lai Rongwei warned that the CCP is attempting to establish a “benefit federation” by locking onto specific groups, such as agricultural and fishery workers, tourism industry, residents of Kinmen and Matsu, tearing apart Taiwanese society from within.
He continued, saying that these groups, after gaining short-term benefits, may pressure the Taiwan government for concessions, leading to internal conflicts, division, and anger in Taiwan, achieving their united front goal through “emotional extortion.”
In Lai Rongwei’s view, the CCP’s release of so-called benefits at this moment reflects a dual dilemma within the party. In terms of the military, he believes that due to personnel changes and issues with professional expertise within the military, the CCP’s short-term capability and intention to use force have diminished.
Regarding the economy, Lai Rongwei observed that China’s economic decline is severe, urgently requiring Taiwanese businesses to contribute technology and funds once again, mirroring the needs of the early 1980s.
Therefore, he stated that the CCP is turning to threats via military, legal, economic, cultural, and other “grey areas,” playing psychological warfare and extortion tactics.
The Mainland Affairs Council concluded that historical experience has proven that Beijing’s “concessions” are like a “sweet poison” that can be withdrawn at any time. The vast majority of Taiwanese society and people are unwilling to trade “sovereignty” for the existence of tiny benefits with high uncertainty and full of political prerequisites.
Lai Rongwei mentioned that faced with the CCP’s united front enticements, Taiwan’s way to respond lies in strengthening “institutional resilience.” He suggested that Taiwan should continue to establish a “clean supply chain” with global democratic partners, basing equal cooperation on technological and institutional trust.
He advocated that while the whole world is experiencing and breaking away from the CCP’s “nurture, trap, and kill” coercion, Taiwan, as a trustworthy partner, can only safeguard long-term public interests and national security by adhering to democratic values and independent development.