Before the Beidaihe Conference in the summer, there have been frequent personnel changes among senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party, with signs of changes also in military leadership. CCP leader Xi Jinping once again emphasized “fighting against corruption” in his speech at the party celebration. However, analysts believe that under the authoritarian regime of the CCP, the more they crack down on corruption, the more it thrives. According to their political purge rules, these high-ranking officials may not be immune to further purges.
The timing of the convening of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP remains unknown. Next year’s 21st National Congress of the CCP involves a reshuffling of the top leadership. The Beidaihe Conference, which traditionally gathers attention from the outside world, usually takes place from late July to early August.
At the end of last month, a CCP Political Bureau meeting made decisions on a series of high-level personnel changes, including appointing Cheng Fubo, Chairman of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, as Secretary of the Party Committee of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, as well as its head; Li Changguan, Deputy Minister of Civil Affairs, as Secretary of the Party Committee of the Ministry, to succeed Lu Zhiyuan as Minister of Civil Affairs; and Lu Zhiyuan to succeed the ousted Xu Liuping as Secretary of the Party Committee of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.
Li Changguan, 57, of Zhuang ethnicity from Guangxi, held various positions before becoming a full minister within just under two years after being appointed as Deputy Mayor of the Guangxi government in September 2024. Cheng Fubo, who has been appointed to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, is from Chongqing and has held various positions in the aviation industry.
In the first half of 2026, at least nine provincial and ministerial-level positions in China have seen changes in leadership. Apart from Li Changguan, Cheng Fubo, and Lu Zhiyuan, other new appointments include Tang Fangyu, Director of the Central Policy Research Office; Zhang Zhu, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs; Zhang Chengzhong, Minister of Emergency Management; Ding Xiangqun, Director of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission; Zhang Yuzhuo, Secretary of the Party Committee of the Chinese Academy of Engineering; and Guan Zhio, Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee.
A new round of personnel changes has taken place ahead of the Beidaihe Conference. Independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in the Taiwanese media “Shang Bao” today that the upcoming conference in July and August will no longer feature scenes of veteran officials in power, but rather intense infighting among Xi’s loyalists vying for political influence.
In a music concert commemorating the 105th anniversary of the CCP on June 29, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong made an appearance. He was relieved of his duties as deputy minister in April and is rumored to have taken on the role of Executive Deputy Director of the Central National Security Office.
In a televised news report, it was shown that Sun Weidong’s seating arrangement indicated his new position as the Executive Deputy Director of the Central National Security Office. The role is low-key and mysterious, and has previously been held by current Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi.
It is worth noting that Sun Weidong’s appointment came after the dismissal of Liu Jianchao, former Minister of the United Front Work Department. Following Liu Haixing’s promotion to Executive Deputy Director of the United Front Work Department, Sun Weidong took on the new role.
In 2023, the CCP military underwent a major purge which saw several senior generals removed from their positions, with many lieutenant generals temporarily assuming key roles.
The seating arrangement in a Central News broadcast revealed that Army Discipline Inspection Secretary Zhang Shuguang and Air Force Deputy Commander Wang Gang, both major generals, were seated alongside the Minister of National Defense Dong Jun and Central Theater Commander Han Shengyan, both senior generals. The arrangement suggests that Zhang and Wang have been promoted to a higher rank, with speculation indicating that they may soon become senior generals.
Wang Gang, 61 years old, a former stunt pilot, has held various high-ranking positions within the Air Force over the years. Recent changes within the Air Force leadership have led to Wang Gang’s promotion to Deputy Air Force Commander.
In the lead-up to the Beidaihe Conference, the Chinese Air Force Political Commissar Guo Puxiao recently lost his status as a National People’s Congress deputy. This indicates that the practical military work within the Air Force is now under Wang Gang’s supervision.
Zhang Shuguang, 62, a member of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP, has seen an upward career trajectory, culminating in his promotion to major general and various key positions within the military.
Tsinghua University’s Institute of East Asian Studies honorary professor Ding Shufan believes that the recent personnel changes within the CCP are likely related to the upcoming 21st National Congress, including within the military. He suggests that Zhang Shuguang and Wang Gang have likely undergone scrutiny without any detected issues at present.
Xi Jinping’s goal is likely to gradually change the political climate through long-term anti-corruption efforts. However, the military operates independently and it remains uncertain how far these reforms will go.
Researcher Gong Xiangsheng from the Taiwan Institute of National Defense and Security Studies believes that following the significant clean-up within the CCP military, vacancies in senior leadership positions would likely be filled before the Fifth Plenary Session and the reorganization of senior military commission members before the 21st National Congress. However, due to the large number of military officials removed from their positions, it may take time for these branches and departments to recover.
Overseas democracy advocate and University of Sydney scholar Qin Jin told Epoch Times that opaque politics within the CCP make it difficult to discern the intentions behind these changes. Xi Jinping, having already solidified his power by the 19th National Congress, does not necessarily need the 21st National Congress to further his political goals, as his ultimate aim is likely lifelong rule.
Associate Professor Feng Chongyi from the University of Technology Sydney pointed out that the CCP regime is a centralized authority with the Supreme Leader wielding absolute power over subordinates. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, officials were apprehensive due to past purges, leading to collective leadership. However, Xi Jinping has reinstated centralized authority, which involves continual purges, reshuffles, and loyalty tests among officials.
The process involves showcasing an official’s achievements when promoting them and collecting evidence of wrongdoing to justify their removal. The fear of being targeted has resulted in officials prioritizing avoiding mistakes over making progress, fostering a culture of bureaucratic stagnation. Feng Chongyi noted that inactivity among economic officials can paradoxically benefit economic development, as less intervention from those who engage in these power struggles can be favorable for the public to pursue their endeavors.
During the CCP’s 105th anniversary celebration, Xi Jinping emphasized the need to be prepared to face challenges and vowed to persist in the anti-corruption struggle.
According to the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection website, in the first half of 2026, 36 mid-ranking cadres were removed from their posts, including Politburo member Ma Xingrui and seven senior officials.
In January 2026, the CCP Ministry of National Defense reported that Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia and Commission member Liu Zhenli were under investigation, although they were not officially listed as mid-ranking cadres who had been dismissed.
Qin Jin emphasized the importance of observing Xi’s actions rather than his words, given that the CCP’s system itself breeds corruption, and Xi’s anti-corruption efforts have inadvertently fueled further corruption. He highlighted that Xi Jinping’s control over China’s wealth and resources through his family members illustrates his own corruption.
Gong Xiangsheng pointed out that while Xi aims to combat corruption to maintain his grip on power, he is unlikely to challenge the existing system or pursue thorough reform. The internal logic of his personnel decisions relies more on upward loyalty rather than competency, leading to an increasing cycle of corruption.
Ultimately, the ongoing changes in leadership reflect the CCP’s systematic flaws. As officials navigate this environment, they are incentivized to prioritize self-preservation over meaningful progress, perpetuating a cycle of fear and inaction. While this may offer a semblance of stability, it stifles innovation and progress.