In the lead-up to the 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party next year, power struggles among the top echelon of the CCP have intensified, often accompanied by purges and personnel changes. With current Party leader Xi Jinping seeking a continuation of his leadership at the upcoming congress, analysts have noted unusual trends in power dynamics within the Zhongnanhai leadership compound.
Following the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022, where Xi Jinping’s faction consolidated its influence by sidelining other groupings, unexpected developments began to unfold from 2023 onwards. Several key figures promoted by Xi within the party and military hierarchies suddenly fell from grace, including two Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, prompting speculation and unease internationally.
On the other hand, former Vice President of the PRC, Wang Qishan, has recently faced scrutiny as some of his associates have come under investigation or been purged, suggesting that he may be a target of the ongoing power struggles.
Political analyst Sun Guoxiang from Taiwan highlighted to Dajiyuan that Xi Jinping’s purge efforts leading up to a potential fourth term are not just about anti-corruption measures but also aimed at eliminating uncertainties before seeking reelection, by reestablishing absolute control over crucial military and party systems.
Sun analyzed the post-20th Congress purges within the CCP, which involved a series of dismissals of high-ranking military officials including those in the rocket forces, equipment systems, as well as figures like Wei Fenghe, Li Shangfu, He Weidong, Miao Hua, followed by Zhang Youxia, and Liu Zhenli among others. Another line of action targeted Wang Qishan’s network within the financial, disciplinary, and inspection systems. This latter wave of purges signifies Xi’s deep unease towards those not directly aligned with him.
Researcher Gong Xiangsheng from the Taiwan Institute of National Defense and Security Studies conveyed to Dajiyuan that Xi’s actions against figures like Zhang Youxia are aimed at intimidating any military factions not in sync with his strategic vision. Moreover, the comprehensive removal of Wang Qishan’s associates may ultimately extend to Wang himself, reflecting Xi’s preparations for a potential fourth term.
Sun Guoxiang pointed out that from the 20th Congress leading up to the 21st, various anomalies have emerged, such as the frequent turnovers within the military leadership, a shift in purge targets from Jiang Zemin-aligned factions to Xi Jinping’s own supporters, the absence of a clear successor to Xi while preemptively sidelining potential contenders, and the increasing politicization of anti-corruption campaigns.
He emphasized that the true threat to Xi at this juncture may not necessarily come from someone capable of replacing him but rather from dissatisfaction within the military, the pressure from old establishment networks, the economic challenges, and the convergence of risks in the Taiwan Strait.
With over a year remaining until the 21st National Congress of the CCP, Sun Guoxiang speculated that the next phase of purges in Beijing might not target overt anti-Xi elements but instead focus on individuals holding critical resources, potentially to create a chain of control disconnected from non-Xi loyalists.
In Sun’s assessment, the current phase leading up to the 21st Congress presents anomalies worth monitoring closely, particularly in the military commission’s continuity or restructuring, abnormal absences of Central Committee members and members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection; any recurrence of cases involving Wang Qishan’s associates within the financial and disciplinary systems; potential adjustments in roles or reduced public appearances of senior Xi loyalists like Cai Qi, Li Xi, Ding Xuexiang, Chen Min’er, and Li Qiang, signaling political shifts.
Sun noted that the recent reassignment of duties for Cai Qi, who was no longer a Central Committee member post-20th Congress, involving Chen Xi, who relinquished the position of President of the Central Party School to Cai Qi only recently, signify significant anomalies ahead of the 21st Congress. He explained that the control of the Central Party School has historically been held by figures associated with succession planning or organizational systems, such as Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, while individuals like Zeng Qinghong, Liu Yunshan, and Chen Xi belonged to the latter category.
Despite Cai Qi being placed in the latter category, owing to his role as the head of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, overseeing Xi Jinping’s internal operations, his additional appointment as the President of the Central Party School consolidates even more power related to crucial documents, leadership security, cadre training, political loyalty assessments, and ideological indoctrination.
Gong Xiangsheng highlighted that the delayed replacement of Chen Xi with Cai Qi appeared unusual yet helped avoid the emergence of potential successors to Xi. By taking over the Central Party School, Cai Qi’s appointment seems unlikely to pose a threat to Xi as it avoids potential contenders for Xi’s leadership.
Sun Guoxiang believed that the absence of a clear successor to Xi Jinping at this stage indicates a trend where power continues to concentrate around Xi’s close associates like Cai Qi in the military, financial, disciplinary, party school, propaganda, and Central Organization Department systems. This illustrates that Xi’s concern lies not in arranging a successor but in preventing dissent within the party demanding a change in leadership.
However, Sun cautioned that this phase could be both the peak of Xi Jinping’s personal power and the system’s most vulnerable moment, as authoritarian systems typically retain some form of internal consultations, factional balancing, succession rules, and policy error-correction mechanisms. With the current concentration of power, information, and responsibility solely vested in the top leader, the regime heavily relies on fear, outward displays of loyalty, and purges to maintain order.
The accumulation of risks under this system is distinct. While vulnerabilities may not be apparent in ordinary circumstances, they could lead to a lack of buffer in times of crisis. This dynamic explains why Xi, despite appearing unassailable, continues to generate adversaries and even those in high-ranking positions close to him are not safe.
Sun suggested that Xi’s ascending to power was marked by a perpetual sense of insecurity, making it unlikely for him to relinquish control during his lifetime, thereby propelling further towards authoritarianism at the cost of increased stability maintenance and internal political risks within the party. The tipping point would be when the costs outweigh the benefits, resulting in either internal or external ruptures within the party.