The victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan is a historic achievement of the Republic of China. The Republic of China integrated the Chinese war against Japan into the Second World War, with the help of Allied forces, ultimately achieving victory. However, due to assistance from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union gained immense benefits in China.
Many historical works, such as Paul Johnson’s “Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties,” believe that the only major power interested in the Sino-Japanese War at that time was the Soviet Union. The biggest winner of the Sino-Japanese War was also the Soviet Union, while the only ones to benefit from this war on the Chinese side were the Communist Party of China.
So, during the process of Japanese invasion of China, what did the Soviet Union, under Stalin’s leadership, do? In this episode, let’s delve into this topic.
According to some historical facts, from July 1937 to September 1945 during the War of Resistance, the Soviet Union was also involved in invading China.
In 1944, the Soviet Union illegally annexed 170,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory in Tangnu Uliang Sea and manipulated the “independence” of Outer Mongolia. After the victory in the eight-year War of Resistance, most of the Chinese territories occupied by Japan, except for the disputed Diaoyu Islands, had been recovered. However, the Chinese territories annexed, occupied, and divided by Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union amounted to 5,883,880 square kilometers by 1945, accounting for 60% of China’s current land territory, with no resolution in sight.
In 1934 and 1937, the Soviet Union sent troops to Xinjiang, China. In 1940, they forced Sheng Shicai to sign the “New Sino-Soviet Treaty,” also known as the “Tin Agreement.” In 1944, they plotted the Yining Uprising and established the “East Turkestan Republic.”
From late 1937 to the first half of 1938, the Soviet Union thoroughly purged so-called “unreliable” ethnic groups in the Far East region in half a year, fabricating charges to arrest over 10,000 Chinese individuals, with over 3,000 executed. Before the so-called “October Revolution” in 1917, there were over 200,000 Chinese workers in Russia; in the 1926 Soviet census, there were still 100,000 Chinese people in the Soviet Union, with 70,000 in the Far East region. By the 1940s, Chinese people in the Far East region had nearly disappeared.
More seriously, during the Japanese invasion of China, the Soviet Union played a role in inducing, acquiescing, tolerating, and supporting Japan.
The Soviet Union inherited a significant amount of benefits in the Chinese Northeast region from Czarist Russia, one of which was the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese Eastern Railway was metaphorically described as the “revolutionary finger” inserted by the Soviet Union into China. Stalin had no intention of resolving these historical issues with China, instead aiming to safeguard and expand Soviet interests and security in the Far East.
In 1928, Zhang Xueliang, a warlord ruling over the Chinese Northeast region, replaced the original Five-Colored Flag of the Beiyang Government with the Nationalist Government’s Blue Sky, White Sun, and Red Earth flag, announcing acceptance of the Nanjing Nationalist Government’s rule, known as the “Northeast Facelift.”
In 1929, Zhang Xueliang hoped to reclaim the rights over the Chinese Eastern Railway supposedly jointly managed with the Soviet Union. As a result, Stalin used the excuse of “self-defense” to once again send troops to invade Manchuria, leading to a major defeat for the Northeast forces. This marked China’s first foreign conflict after the unification following the Northern Expedition, and though it was an action to reclaim its own rights, the failed outcome had significant implications for Japan’s strategy in invading China.
Why was the Mukden Incident crucial for Japan’s invasion of China?
According to an analysis by Epoch Times columnist Wang He in “Did Stalin Help Japan Invade China?” the “Manchurian Incident” was the Soviet Union using force to resolve conflicts with China and expand its influence. This made the Kwantung Army of Japan more eager to take action in Northeast China.
Moreover, the humiliating defeat of Zhang Xueliang’s Northeast forces in the Mukden Incident let Japan understand the Northeast forces’ strength. At that time, the Northeast forces were one of the most formidable military forces domestically, and Zhang Zuolin, by leading the Northeast forces into Beijing three times, had temporarily controlled the Beiyang Government, causing concerns for both Japan and the Soviet Union.
When the Mukden Incident occurred, Chiang Kai-shek was embroiled in the Central Plains War against factions like Feng Yuxiang and had no strength to mobilize national support to confront the Northeast against the Soviet Union, only relying on local authorities in the Northeast to manage the situation themselves. Through the reaction of the Nanjing Nationalist Government, Japan perceived internal disunity in China’s government, rendering it incapable of handling an external threat effectively, especially if any issues arose in the Northeast region.
Another critical point is that the expected scene of major western powers jointly supporting China did not materialize after the Mukden Incident. This failure to form the anti-Soviet unity predicted by the Soviet Union made Japan understand to what extent the international community might intervene in the Northeast issues of China.
Shortly after the Mukden Incident, on July 17, 1929, the Soviet government announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Nanjing Nationalist Government. Observing a tense situation between China and the Soviet Union, the Kwantung Army of Japan became extremely urgent from top to bottom to seize the initiative.
On the night of September 18, 1931, the Kwantung Army of Japan, following a meticulously planned conspiracy, orchestrated by the Chosen Army department, blew up the railway tracks near Lutaigou in Shenyang on the South Manchuria Railway built by Japan, falsely blaming the Chinese army. Using this as a pretext, the Japanese bombarded the Northern Camp of the Northeast Army of China. On the 19th, the Japanese occupied Shenyang and subsequently invaded the three northeastern provinces. During this period, Zhang Xueliang repeatedly ordered “no resistance.”
By February 1932, the entire Northeast had fallen, and on March 1st, Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo in the three provinces of the Northeast. The “September 18 Incident” marked Japan’s attempt to subjugate China through force and was the beginning of China’s resistance against Japan.
The September 18 Incident shocked the world and surprised Zhang Xueliang, Chiang Kai-shek, and various factions both domestically and internationally. The general belief was that Stalin would not easily give up his vested interests in Northeast China. Indeed, the real factor capable of influencing the situation in the Northeast at that time was the Soviet Union’s control over the Chinese Eastern Railway.
The Japanese closely monitored Soviet movements to avoid provoking the Soviet Army. However, following the incident, the Soviet Union not only refrained from sending troops but also insisted on a so-called “non-intervention policy,” remaining indifferent to Japan’s annexation of the entire Northeast region of China. The Soviet Union recognized “Manchukuo” immediately in 1932 and began negotiations with Japan to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway.
Why did Stalin continue to compromise with Japan? Many researchers attribute this to the Soviet Union’s need to focus on countering the German threat from the western front. However, it should be noted that this explanation does not apply to the international situation before 1933. Before 1933, the Nazis had not come to power, and the restructuring of Germany’s military took place after 1935.
Why did the Soviet Union choose to acquiesce to Japan’s annexation of Northeast China without direct pressure on the western front, especially after the Mukden Incident? What were the motives behind the series of actions taken by the Soviet Union?
One viewpoint suggests that Stalin sought ways to redirect Japan’s war efforts towards China. At that time, the animosity between Japan and the Soviet Union was deeper than that between China and Japan. For Japan, the Soviet Union was a serious threat. Japan’s strategic goal was to simultaneously advance southward and northward, with the army still focused on war with the Soviet Union. In a strategic outline written in 1936 by the Japanese Army General Staff for conducting a prolonged war essential for a world war, the operational steps included eliminating northern threats first, thoroughly destroying the Soviet military presence in the Far East as the primary task.
Moreover, shortly after the Mukden Incident, on November 7, 1931, the Temporary Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in the Jiangxi Central Soviet Area was established. Japan’s invasion of China provided a significant historical opportunity for the development of the Chinese Communist Party, which was precisely the strategic pawn in Stalin’s hands.
Stalin not only remained indifferent to Japan’s annexation of the entire Northeast region but also further stimulated the ambitions of the Japanese military.
On the night of July 7, 1937, at Lugou Bridge in Wanping County, Hebei Province, a military conflict occurred between the Chinese troops stationed there and the 29th Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Subsequently, the Battle of Pingjin occurred, with the 29th Army defeated and retreating to Baoding, leading to the occupation of the Pingjin region by Japanese troops and the outbreak of the full-scale Sino-Japanese War. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident opened the curtain for the nationwide resistance against Japan.
However, at the beginning of the Incident, neither China nor Japan had specific plans for a full-scale war. Chiang Kai-shek had hoped to “buy time to prepare for anti-Japanese operations.” While the Incident had a level of inevitability, it also contained elements of chance. Despite various theories about who fired the first shot at the Lugou Bridge Incident, including the Japanese army, the Chinese army, or the Communist army, some also attribute it to a Soviet spy.
For a long time, there was a doctrinal dispute within Japan on adopting either a “northward advance” or a “southward advance” strategy. Northward advance aimed at attacking the Soviet Union, while the southward advance focused on securing dominance over the Chinese mainland, followed by expanding into the Pacific region, with major enemies including the United States and the United Kingdom. In August 1936, the Koda Cabinet’s “National Defense Policy Guidelines” established the “twin advance” strategy of northward and southward progression.
At that time, the Soviet Union faced significant international pressure. For instance, in November 1936, Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire signed the “Anti-Comintern Pact,” targeting the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union faced the prospect of fighting on two fronts. Additionally, sporadic clashes increased along the Japanese-Soviet border. Just a week before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, armed conflicts erupted between Japan and the Soviet Union on the northeastern border of China, nearly escalating into a full-scale war.
However, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan quickly shifted from an “active northward advance” to a “selective northward advance.” Deploying military forces to fight against the Soviet Union in China significantly weakened Japan’s ability to implement the northern advance strategy.
In order to address the international crisis he faced, Stalin made efforts to redirect Japan from a northern advance to a southern advance strategy. He even dispatched spies to operate within the Japanese military. A Comintern spy, Sorge, directed the Prime Minister’s confidential secretary Aoto, and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau Muto, to sideline Ishihara, an advocate for fighting against Russia. The spy operation was not exposed until October 1941 when Aoto was arrested, but by then, Japan had advanced southward and had no capacity to further expand northward.
Based on the above facts, the assertion that Stalin helped facilitate Japan’s invasion of China is not unfounded. Stalin supported China’s resistance efforts aiming to entangle Japan in China, thereby eliminating the threat Japan posed to the Soviet Union. For instance, in 1935, receiving the “August 1 Proclamation” from Moscow, the Chinese Communists called for an end to the civil war; under Stalin’s intervention, the Xi’an Incident ended peacefully, leading to renewed cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, China and the Soviet Union signed the “Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact,” with increased military aid provided by the Soviet Union, despite refusing to form an alliance, among other actions.
As Professor of Eastern European History at Stanford University, Norman M. Naimark, once said, “Stalin was a very good strategist. Of course, Stalin is a devil; it is well known that the devil can appear in various forms.”
That concludes today’s program, thank you for joining. Stay tuned for our next episode.
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