In many countries around the world, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasingly using infiltration and influence to pressure foreign governments, forcing many countries to collaborate with the CCP to suppress dissenters.
On April 13th, 19 activists in Kazakhstan were sentenced for organizing a demonstration, burning the Chinese national flag and images of Xi Jinping in protest against the CCP’s persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Eleven of them were sentenced to five years in prison for “inciting ethnic hatred,” while the others were given suspended sentences.
According to Angela Howard, a senior research analyst with the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) China Program at the non-partisan think tank the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), although the case involved Kazakhstani citizens and courts, human rights organizations believe that the verdict was a result of pressure from the CCP.
Reports have revealed that Kazakhstan has begun issuing the first batch of Renminbi bonds in Central Asia, transporting goods for the CCP, cooperating with Chinese investments, and participating in the CCP’s Belt and Road Initiative. Foreign media believe that Kazakhstan may be using this case as a repayment to the CCP, given the CCP’s past support for the Kazakhstani authorities’ repression.
In this case, the protesters were initially fined or given a few days of detention for the unauthorized gathering. However, after the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed “deep concern,” the Kazakhstani authorities added criminal charges, with the indictment directly citing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement. One protester’s husband is a Uyghur truck driver who renounced his Chinese citizenship five years ago, but the CCP insists that he is still a Chinese citizen.
The CCP routinely uses bilateral relations to persecute Uyghur Muslims. In February 2025, Thailand forcibly repatriated 40 Uyghurs back to China out of fear of CCP retaliation, publicly rejecting proposals from the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Australia to accept these refugees. In response, the U.S. State Department canceled or restricted visas for several high-ranking Thai officials involved in the repatriation operation and publicly warned other countries against repatriating Uyghurs to China.
It is believed that at least 28 countries, including Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates, are also cooperating with the CCP to repatriate Uyghurs back to China.
The CCP is known to target various critics overseas, including through pressure from foreign powers. During Xi Jinping’s overseas visits, there have been at least seven incidents of foreign law enforcement agencies cooperating with the CCP’s pressure to suppress protests. Meanwhile, since 2009, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have agreed to arrest and extradite alleged “criminals” from China without evidence.
The author points out that the CCP’s crackdown on foreign dissidents aims to cover up its human rights abuses and strengthen domestic control. By drawing international attention to the CCP’s actions in Kazakhstan, the truth that the CCP is trying to suppress can be exposed, ultimately leading to the CCP shooting itself in the foot.
In conclusion, the author suggests that the United States has significant diplomatic influence that can be used to reveal the conditions under which many countries collaborate with the CCP. U.S. investments in Kazakhstan’s mining sector should not ignore the Kazakhstan authorities’ tacit approval of the CCP’s coercion. The U.S. can also leverage sanctions investigations as a bargaining chip under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act to punish officials and individuals involved in human rights violations.