On April 10th to 21st, Japan released three major military signals in succession. Senior researcher Song Guocheng from the International Relations Research Center at Taiwan’s Political University recently analyzed the deep significance of Japan’s strategic shift in an exclusive interview on NTD Asia-Pacific’s program “News Decoded”.
Song Guocheng pointed out that Japan has constructed a mature strategic framework towards China. At the same time, the U.S.-Japan relationship has entered a “golden era”, with Japan beginning to take on more defense responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region and moving to the forefront of a multilateral effort to contain the security threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
On April 10th, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released its annual “Diplomatic Bluebook”. The report highlighted China’s actions, such as trade restrictions and laser attacks on Japanese Self-Defense Force aircraft, as threatening and undermining Japan’s strategic space. For the first time, Japan reclassified China from its “most important cooperative partner since 2016” to an “important neighboring country”.
According to Song Guocheng, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s statement last November of “when Taiwan is in trouble, Japan is in trouble” provoked strong and aggressive reactions from China. The revision of Japan’s description of China’s role as an “important neighboring country” is a response to China’s retaliatory actions. This terminology carries negative diplomatic implications, indicating a deteriorating Japan-China relationship on the surface but holding multiple deeper meanings.
Firstly, China’s recent actions such as laser attacks on Japanese Self-Defense Force planes and drone intrusions have made Japan realize that the Japan-China relationship has entered a zero-sum game, where there are no mutual wins but only adversarial outcomes.
Secondly, Japan has identified China as a regime harboring hostile intentions that threaten Japan’s survival – an external hostile force. In this scenario, Japan is less likely to view China as a cooperative partner diplomatically. China’s threats have made Japan feel existentially threatened, surpassing the impact of past economic cooperation between Japan and China.
Thirdly, Japan is aiming to reduce its risk exposure to China. In areas such as semiconductors and critical mineral resources, Japan is seeking to decrease its reliance on China and mitigate risks.
In February of this year, the number of Chinese tourists traveling to Japan decreased by 45.2%, almost halving. Song Guocheng believes this indicates that the diplomatic stalemate between Japan and China is significantly impacting Japan’s economy. With economic sanctions escalating, economic and commercial exchanges between Japan and China have reached their most serious level since the end of the Cold War. The lack of strategic mutual trust between Japan and China has put their relationship in a constant brink of rupture.
On April 17th, a week after downgrading China’s role, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer “JS Ikazuchi, DD-107” crossed the Taiwan Strait en route to the Philippines to participate in the “Balikatan 2026” joint military exercise with the U.S., Philippines, and other countries, deploying 1,400 personnel.
Song Guocheng made four analyses of this military action by Japan:
Firstly, since the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s successful transit through the Taiwan Strait, it is estimated that there will be a second passage soon. Previously, Takaichi Sanae’s discussion of Taiwan’s security issues involved many hypothetical conditions, mainly for political representation. However, this action of the Maritime Self-Defense Force crossing the Taiwan Strait has transitioned Takaichi’s parliamentary statements into normalized military behavior.
Secondly, Japan’s warship navigation also affirms the legal status of the Taiwan Strait as an international waterway. This action by Japan serves as a countermeasure against China’s claim of the Taiwan Strait as its internal waters. By joining the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, and the Philippines in the “Balikatan” exercise, Japan is helping construct a collective defense against China. This collective defense aims to uphold the legal status of the Taiwan Strait as an international waterway. In other words, Japan is no longer staying solely under the protection of the U.S. but proactively challenging Beijing’s exclusive jurisdiction in the Taiwan Strait through international law.
Thirdly, this action signifies an expansion of Japan’s strategic framework. The transit of Japanese warships through the Taiwan Strait to participate in exercises in the South China Sea indicates a movement of Japan’s Self-Defense Force defense role southward, passing through the Miyako Strait, Taiwan Strait, and into the Bashi Channel before reaching the South China Sea. In essence, Japan has formed a trilateral strategic link with the U.S., the Philippines, and potentially one other country. Deploying escort destroyers from the Ryukyu Islands into the South China Sea implies that within Japan’s version of the first island chain, Japan considers China as its primary security threat, leading to a comprehensive encirclement.
Looking at the “Balikatan” joint exercise, involving over 17,000 military personnel with significant Japanese participation, deploying a combat force of 1,400 members for the first time. The primary focus of this exercise is sinking ships at sea. This demonstrates Japan’s readiness for collective defense rather than independent preparation, coordinating with many countries for a multinational military preparedness.
Moreover, on April 17th, which marks the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki between Japan and the Qing Dynasty in 1895, Japan passed a legislation that relaxed weapons export controls. The Takaichi Cabinet and the National Security Council (NSC) officially revised the “Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer” by abolishing the ban on lethal weapon exports and adding exceptions.
In the past, Japan strictly adhered to three principles for weapon exports. Firstly, excluding rescue, transportation, surveillance, and mine clearing activities, weapons were not to be exported, and equipment transfers were prohibited. Secondly, weapon export recipients had to be allied with Japan. Lastly, weapons could not be exported to countries engaged in conflict, even for defensive purposes.
The April 21 revision broke these three principles.
Song Guocheng believes that Japan has now bid farewell to pacifism and transitioned to an offensive form of realism. Previously, Japan’s stance on weapon exports was restrained and underwent stringent reviews. Now, through legislation, the door has opened for weapon exports. Previously, final products had to pass exceptions such as “joint development” for export, but now the export rights for combat aircraft, escort ships, missiles, tanks, and other lethal equipment have been normalized. This signifies a self-adjustment of Japan’s national positioning, moving from providing non-combat materials like bulletproof vests and radars to attempting to intervene regionally through military industry exports, becoming a regional power with complete influence.
Song Guocheng further mentioned that the revised law states that weapon exports aim to “enhance the deterrence of allied and like-minded countries”. He analyzed that while the U.S. had primarily been Japan’s security ally, Japan’s security cooperation now takes the form of a multi-nation alliance. Japan seeks to establish a “common equipment circle” in the Indo-Pacific region. By supplying Japanese-made equipment to countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, and India, Japan can enhance these nations’ defense capabilities and ensure “interoperability” during wartime operations with allies.
Furthermore, Japan is assuming the role of a strategic pillar in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. hopes that Japan will share more defense responsibilities in the region, leading Japan to actively engage with likeminded countries within the first island chain, using Japanese systems collectively. This enables Japan to play a leading role in the regional security framework.
Song Guocheng highlighted a very practical consideration that Japan aims to boost its domestic defense industry through the legislation amendment.
Historically, Japan’s defense industry market was limited to the Self-Defense Forces, causing defense enterprises to face challenges like small volumes, high unit prices, and low profits. “Equipment transfer” can restore the defense industry economy and assure continuous combat capabilities.
He also mentioned a key detail in this amendment: while exports to conflicting parties were generally prohibited, under special circumstances based on Japan’s security needs, resolutions could approve exports.
He analyzed that this signifies that if the U.S. requires equipment supply for regional operations, Japan now has the legal basis to provide lethal support, paving the way for “U.S.-Japan joint combat”. Weapon exports have also become a crucial diplomatic tool for Japan, used to solidify strategic partnerships with specific countries.
Song Guocheng maintains that when the U.S. faces limitations, the strategic complementarity between the U.S. and Japan becomes more pronounced. Japan sharing more defense responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region allows genuine allies to address strategic gaps in U.S. operations.
In conclusion, Japan’s recent strategic shift signals a transition from an “economy reliant on U.S. protection” to a “politically eminent regional power defining regional security and actively exporting military influence”. This transformation will significantly impact the situation in the Taiwan Strait, disputes in the South China Sea, and the China-Japan relationship, triggering profound and chain reactions.