The “Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime” (GI-TOC), based in Geneva, released a report on Tuesday titled “Policing Partnerships in the Pacific,” highlighting China’s ongoing expansion of law enforcement presence in traditionally US-aligned Pacific island nations. This reshaping of local security dynamics by China is seen as part of Beijing’s global security strategy.
Based on around 60 interviews conducted in the Pacific region, the study analyzes how China’s involvement, starting from infrastructure and training support, has evolved into more politically influential partnerships that in some cases have integrated into actual law enforcement actions.
Over the past two decades, China has been steadily broadening the scope of its external law enforcement “assistance,” with Pacific island nations increasingly becoming targets of its law enforcement interventions. What initially began as support and training actions has developed into deeper practical cooperation in multiple countries. The report examines the scale and nature of China’s law enforcement cooperation in the South Pacific region and analyzes it within the broader framework of China’s strategic objectives.
The main authors of the report, Virginia Comolli and co-author Martin Thorley, note that China’s law enforcement activities through its Ministry of Public Security currently cover around a dozen countries in the Pacific region.
Among the 18 members of the Pacific Islands Forum, only three of Taiwan’s remaining Pacific diplomatic allies – Tuvalu, Palau, and the Marshall Islands – have not been influenced by China. (Nauru switched to recognizing China in January 2024.)
The overall situation presents an uneven trend. Solomon Islands has become China’s most prominent law enforcement cooperation partner in the Pacific region, with smaller nations like the Cook Islands also continuing to receive China’s attention.
For example, as of January this year, around 60 Solomon Islands police officers have received training from China’s Ministry of Public Security at a training center specifically established for Pacific island countries in Fuzhou, Fujian Province.
In 2024, China completed a $11 million police training academy in Samoa, with Chinese diplomats referring to the Fuzhou center as their “counterpart” and urging enhanced cooperation. Additionally, a “China Police Special Liaison Group” has organized at least 70 training programs in the Solomon Islands since 2022.
The report was compiled based on several months of on-the-ground investigations.
Comolli points out that these small Pacific nations may derive short-term benefits from China’s police presence, such as new police academies, vehicles, technology, equipment, and uniforms, but they could face long-term risks.
The report also raises two suspicions: firstly, individuals with suspected links to Chinese criminal groups have been observed at joint law enforcement activities involving Chinese Ministry of Public Security officials – sometimes wearing police uniforms or holding organizational positions. Secondly, in some cases, members of China’s Police Liaison Group have attempted to pressure Western countries like Australia and New Zealand to prevent their law enforcement advisers from operating in the same environment – effectively exerting influence to edge out Western competitors.
Thorley, who specializes in geopolitical criminality, points out that individuals suspected of being linked to Chinese international criminal groups have held organizational positions in law enforcement activities in at least two countries, even wearing police uniforms. There are records of Beijing allowing suspected criminals to participate in activities when they align with China’s national goals.
According to U.S. media Newsweek, Anne-Marie Brady, a China politics professor at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, highlighted that China’s Ministry of Public Security is responsible for counterintelligence, suppressing dissent, and counterterrorism. Once Chinese police are embedded locally, it is equivalent to introducing Chinese intelligence personnel.
She cited a 2025 report from the Czech research institution Sinopsis on Samoa, indicating that law enforcement cooperation has become a crucial means for China to expand its dual-use presence in the Pacific (ostensibly civilian but substantive military), with Beijing intending to establish a trans-Pacific law enforcement network parallel to the existing order.
Both Comolli and Brady emphasize that while Pacific island nations are relatively small and in need of law enforcement assistance, they should still exercise their national sovereignty and reject measures they are unwilling to accept, such as fingerprint collection or CCTV surveillance systems.
Brady believes the most vulnerable areas are Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Vanuatu, with the rest of the Pacific island countries recognizing that they cannot go too far in law enforcement cooperation with China.
During his visit to Samoa in March this year, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon signed a law enforcement agreement aimed at curbing the influx of Latin American drugs into the Pacific region.
The report also notes that China’s law enforcement expansion sometimes leads to competitive friction with traditional partners like Australia, with China’s Police Liaison Group attempting to hinder or intimidate law enforcement advisers from other Western countries.
In response, the Chinese foreign ministry continues to state in official terms that the relevant cooperation aims to promote friendship, assist in development, and uphold law and order.