On March 13 this year, the Communist Party of China (CPC) released its “Fifteenth Five-Year Plan” outline, which unusually did not directly mention the policy of military-civil fusion, marking the second consecutive five-year plan that has almost no mention of military-civil fusion. According to American experts, the fact that the CPC no longer openly mentions this topic does not mean it has stopped promoting this strategy.
This move by the CPC is seen as a possible attempt to ease the increasingly tense relations between China and the United States. However, Ryan D. Martinson, a researcher at the China Maritime Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War College, pointed out in a recent article in “Foreign Affairs” that the CPC’s actions are just a cover-up and do not signal any genuine effort to improve relations with the U.S.
For many years, military-civil fusion has been a major sticking point in U.S.-China relations, endangering the overall relationship. The CPC’s policy on military-civil fusion requires all Chinese companies, research institutions, and individuals, especially those closely cooperating with the U.S., to actively cooperate with the CPC.
Over the past few decades, the CPC has openly promoted military-civil cooperation. Since 2015, Xi Jinping has elevated military-civil fusion to a national strategy through speeches at the Two Sessions, the Central Military Commission reform work conference, and the “Defense White Paper.”
In March 2016, the CPC released the “Thirteenth Five-Year Plan,” which included a section specifically dedicated to military-civil fusion, emphasizing Xi Jinping’s call for it and outlining agendas and measures for military-civil fusion in the fields of ocean, space, and cyberspace. Following this, various Chinese provinces also incorporated significant military-civil fusion content into their respective five-year plans.
Subsequently, the CPC has continuously improved its military-civil fusion strategy through numerous policy documents, establishing institutions to oversee the nationwide implementation. In 2017, the CPC established the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development Committee, with Xi Jinping serving as the first chairman. Consequently, provinces also set up military-civil fusion development committees, which then established “offices” to execute relevant directives.
The author of the article pointed out that the CPC’s public promotion of military-civil fusion has finally caught the attention of the U.S. government during President Trump’s first term, making military-civil fusion a primary target for U.S. countermeasures. Leaders in Trump’s administration have repeatedly highlighted the significant threat posed by the CPC’s military-civil fusion to the U.S. and the global community.
In May 2020, President Trump issued a proclamation suspending entry for Chinese students and experts associated with any military-civil fusion entities in China. In November 2020, he issued an executive order restricting U.S. companies and funding from supporting Chinese companies linked to the CPC’s military.
President Trump’s administration vigorously and consistently pushed back against military-civil fusion, posing a threat to Chinese enterprises, research institutions, and individuals. By the end of Trump’s first term, the CPC’s authoritative documents no longer openly promoted military-civil fusion, Xi Jinping refrained from mentioning it in public speeches, and various provincial five-year plans ceased to mention military-civil fusion.
The 2019 CPC Government Work Report was the last mention of military-civil fusion. The 2019 “Defense White Paper” briefly touched on the “strategic requirements” of military-civil fusion in the strategic support forces section, deliberately translating military fusion as “coordination of civil and military operations” in its official English version to cover up.
In March of this year, the CPC’s “Fifteenth Five-Year Plan” outline did not mention military-civil fusion at all, leading many to believe that the CPC had completely changed course. However, the CPC’s official “Party Charter” still upholds the banner of military-civil fusion. After the 2022 revision of the Charter, although the term military-civil fusion was no longer explicitly mentioned, the concept is still retained within the Charter and is listed as one of the CPC’s seven major strategies.
The article also revealed that the CPC has not disbanded the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development Committee, established to promote military-civil fusion. In the 2022 “Fourteenth Five-Year Plan,” it is still referred to as the “office.” Provincial-level central military-civil fusion development committees continue to operate normally. For example, as of last year, the central military-civil fusion development committees in Shandong and Hainan provinces were still functioning, and the Fujian provincial government’s list of party and government agencies still prominently includes the provincial central military-civil fusion development committee.
Analysis indicates that a simple investigation reveals the CPC’s game of cat and mouse. Even though the official texts of the 2021 “Fourteenth Five-Year Plan” in Guangdong Province did not mention military-civil fusion, the appendix boldly announced Guangdong Province’s plans to release the “Fourteenth Five-Year Plan for Deepening the Development of Military-Civil Fusion.”
This demonstrates that not only do other provinces have their own military-civil fusion development plans, but the CPC also has a national-level plan, all conducted covertly, thinking they can go unnoticed.
Chinese enterprises and institutions have been trying to conceal their involvement in CPC’s military-civil fusion (MCF) efforts, but their methods are crude and easily discernible. For example, in 2016, the Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology and the PLA Naval Submarine Academy jointly established the “Military-Civil Fusion Joint Laboratory,” led by PLA Navy scientist Major General Daliang Long. After the term “military-civil fusion” became tainted, the laboratory changed its name to the “Joint Laboratory for Applied Marine Science and Technology” to obscure its activities.
Although Chinese research institutions no longer publicly acknowledge their involvement in CPC’s military-civil fusion, they continue to support it covertly. For instance, Xing Lulu, a staff member at the Hainan Institute of Deep-sea Science and Engineering of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, specializes in “military-civil fusion and safeguarding classified information” work, clandestinely transferring professional knowledge and skills to the PLA, possibly on behalf of the military.
In conclusion, the CPC says one thing but does another, never truly abandoning military-civil fusion. Given the high cost of public promotion, the CPC has resorted to clandestine means to pursue this strategy.
The author notes that outsiders have long believed that CPC’s five-year plans, Defense White Papers, Government Work Reports, and important speeches by CPC leader Xi Jinping are authoritative sources for interpreting CPC’s intentions. However, the CPC’s shift from public to covert on the military-civil fusion issue demonstrates its habitual dishonesty and lack of credibility.
The author believes that in the eyes of the CPC, nothing is sacred or inviolable. Anything, even a national strategy like Xi Jinping’s call for military-civil fusion, can be entirely deleted from public documents if it risks damaging the CPC’s image or provoking international backlash. This casts doubt on the experiential value of all CPC’s authoritative documents, especially in sensitive areas like defense/security, making it impossible to know which content has been omitted.
The author points out that the CPC’s military-civil fusion cases confirm the adage that not finding something does not mean it does not exist. This rule applies uniformly across all research areas in contemporary China, cautioning against relying solely on CPC’s official documents to study CPC policies. Unfortunately, many continue to make this mistake.
Analysis suggests that relying solely on CPC’s public documents does not reveal the full truth. In July 2013, when Xi Jinping spoke about the “Maritime Power” strategy at a Politburo meeting, the speech summary released by Xinhua News Agency initially seemed to exclude the navy’s aspect from the strategy. However, a full transcript of Xi Jinping’s speech later leaked online from Xiamen University staff clearly called for “accelerating the modernization of the navy.” Foreign experts who were quick to notice could predict to some degree the significant expansion of the CPC’s navy since 2012.
In conclusion, selectively publicizing content in official CPC documents and analyzing CPC’s intentions and ambitions based solely on them leads to misunderstandings and underestimations of the CPC’s military ambitions. Fortunately, no matter how meticulously the CPC tries to conceal its actions, there are always clues, and the truth will eventually come to light.