Next year marks the convening of the 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and various sectors are speculating about the lineup of the new Political Bureau Standing Committee. Some analysts believe that the next Standing Committee lineup will be very conservative, with difficulties in transitioning some key positions, leading to a state of disarray within the CCP and internal disunity. Xi Jinping is wary of young high-ranking officials and is expected to be the last of his generation in the CCP.
Independent commentator Du Zheng presented an analysis in the Taiwan media “Shang Bao” today, suggesting that Xi Jinping’s biggest characteristic in appointing personnel is to favor “acquaintances” (those with various affinities and good records of interaction with him). In recent years, this “acquaintance politics” has faced setbacks. However, due to Xi Jinping’s fear of the unknown and suspicion of strangers, he will continue to prioritize “acquaintances” in personnel selection.
It is believed that the next entire Political Bureau Standing Committee of the CCP will consist mostly of familiar faces. The composition of the next lineup is expected to be dominated by old figures as Xi Jinping himself has broken the age barrier, and the old guard is likely to stick together. The main considerations include stability, allowing “acquaintance politics” to have its final impact, and the imperative to focus on the so-called “reunification” with Taiwan. Various united front tactics are currently being employed to soften and infiltrate Taiwan in an attempt to foment internal subversion, and high-level personnel changes need to align with this objective.
Du Zheng predicted the lineup of the 21st Political Bureau Standing Committee of the CCP (combined with appointments at the following year’s “Two Sessions”): 1. Xi Jinping (reappointed as General Secretary of the CCP, President of the country, Chairman of the Central Military Commission); 2. Li Keqiang (reappointed Premier of the State Council); 3. Cai Qi (transferred to Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference); 4. Ding Xuexiang (transferred to Chairman of the National People’s Congress); 5. Executive Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing or Liu Guozhong; 6. Li Shulei (promoted to First Secretary of the Central Secretariat); 7. Zhao Yide or Xu Lin (promoted to Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection).
Additionally, it is speculated that Wang Huning may be rewarded by being appointed as Vice President of the country, with significant influence surpassing that of Wang Qishan and Han Zheng when they held the position, possibly still holding duties within the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms.
Du Zheng believes that the turnover of personnel within the CCP poses challenges for the succession of key positions in the party, government, and military.
Regarding the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, currently with only Zhang Shengmin, it is expected that he will still enter the Political Bureau at the 21st National Congress. Under the resurgence of Peng Liyuan’s intervention in military personnel matters, another candidate for Vice Chairman of the Military Commission is Dong Jun, the Minister of National Defense and a member of the “First Lady’s Gang,” who may at least become a commission member. However, after three years of internal turmoil, the Central Military Commission may struggle to achieve full membership, subject to whether the new individuals promoted to senior military positions in the future can pass muster.
Furthermore, concerning the Director of the General Office of the Central Committee, the current Political Bureau Standing Committee member Cai Qi has also served as the Director of the General Office in recent years, overseeing Xi Jinping’s major and minor affairs, making him an important “loyal servant” to Xi. Without Cai Qi, Xi would be facing significant uncertainty. Therefore, once Cai Qi changes position, the issue of who will head the General Office and control the Central Guard Bureau becomes a major concern.
Moreover, Vice Premier He Lifeng is a key figure among the Vice Premiers as he manages Xi Jinping’s financial matters. However, it will be challenging for Xi Jinping to find a suitable replacement. The current Governor of the Central Bank, Pan Gongsheng, is not even a candidate for the Central Committee, highlighting Xi’s trust in him. Recently, both the Director and Deputy Director of the Banking Regulation Division have run into trouble. The financial sector is filled with proteges of Zhu Rongji and Wang Qishan, making Xi cautious about appointing individuals.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi, born in 1953, is reaching retirement age and may need to relinquish his position as Foreign Minister. However, there is a shortage of young talent within the diplomatic system, with two young officials previously groomed, Qin Gang and Liu Jianchao, having fallen from grace. It is said that the Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Chaoxu is considered “not aggressive enough,” possibly losing out to Liu Haixing, the minister of the United Front Work Department who is a second-generation red.
Du Zheng also mentioned that at the level of the Political Bureau, Xi will have to bring in some “strangers.” At the level of Central Committee members, after a previous round of purges, there will be a major influx of new faces, many of whom were initially brought in by Xi’s “acquaintances.”
Currently, there are very few high-ranking officials from the post-70s generation. A previous list of officials from the post-70s generation included six top-tier officials: Liu Xiaotao, Governor of Jiangsu Province (born July 1970); Lu Dongliang, Governor of Shanxi Province (born December 1973); Wei Tao, Chairman of the Guangxi Government (born April 1970); Liu Jie, Governor of Zhejiang Province (born January 1970); Adong, First Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee (born November 1970); and Li Yunze, Director of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (born September 1970). However, Li Yunze was recently dismissed at the end of April.
Du Zheng believes that these young officials are likely targets of factions within Xi Jinping and his close-knit group due to their age. Former China Banking Regulatory Commission Director Li Yunze is considered part of Wang Qishan’s financial clique and might have been implicated due to the fall of the former Deputy Director and Wang Qishan’s former secretary Zhou Liang. However, the stated reasons may be superficial, with the real motivations possibly tied to the power struggles leading up to the 21st National Congress.
Du Zheng suggests that Xi Jinping aims to maintain lifelong dominance and prevent potential successors from eyeing the top leadership position. Young high-ranking officials who didn’t experience the brainwashing of the Cultural Revolution and may have personal experiences from the Tiananmen Square incident and the reform and opening up era, along with a savvy understanding of the internet, are likely viewed with skepticism by Xi. Consequently, there may be increased scrutiny and investigations into more young officials in the future.
Du Zheng concludes by stating that in recent years, there has been a rising number of officials criticizing the central authority, signifying that Xi is not held in high regard behind the scenes, and many officials have been found to engage with what the CCP deems as “reactionary political publications” in private. This constitutes a new trend, with many officials who have not been exposed simply biding their time. If someone takes over this regime in the future, they will need to eradicate the corruption and evil within the CCP. Xi Jinping is considered the “final generation” within the CCP, with no successors to follow him!
Blaine Holt, a retired United States Air Force general, wrote in Newsweek last year stating that the CCP is on the brink of collapse, with Xi Jinping potentially becoming its final ruler.
Xi’s actions since taking office have drawn comparisons to Mao Zedong, the first leader of the CCP, as both were born in the Year of the Snake. There is a folk prophecy that the CCP regime will begin and end with a snake. Another prophecy suggests that after Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, “the river and mountains will return to square one,” indicating that there will be no successor following Xi and everything will reset.
Chris Reed, a Christian pastor and contemporary prophetic figure, asserts that Xi Jinping is not the permanent ruler of China and will be replaced in a surprising manner and at a surprising time.