【Epoch Times March 12, 2026 news】Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia had an “incident”, the Xi Jinping regime promptly announced it to the public and the next day pinned “five major charges” on Zhang, condemning him outright.
Another Politburo member, Ma Xingrui, has not made any public appearances for over 4 months since November 28th last year, missing several important meetings. These circumstances clearly indicate that Ma Xingrui must have had an “incident.” However, the Xi regime has been procrastinating and has not yet announced Ma Xingrui’s “incident.”
Why did Xi swiftly take action against Zhang Youxia with a “lightning crackdown” but has yet to disclose Ma Xingrui’s situation?
It is easier to understand why Xi carried out a “lightning crackdown” on Zhang Youxia, mainly because a major accusation levied against Zhang by a CCP military newspaper is “seriously trampling and undermining the Chairman’s responsibility system of the Military Commission”.
“Trampling” means to step on forcefully. Zhang Youxia “seriously trampling” the Chairman’s authority system means that he deliberately trampled on Xi Jinping’s authority system in the military. In other words, Zhang seriously offended Xi’s absolute authority in the military, posing a significant threat to Xi’s military power.
In Xi’s view, if Zhang is not apprehended immediately, Xi’s military power would be completely in jeopardy, which is something Xi absolutely cannot tolerate.
The delay in announcing Ma Xingrui’s “incident” may be due to five reasons:
What does the top Chinese leader fear the most? It is a coup. Who is most likely to carry out a coup? One is the person holding the “gun handle” (senior military generals); the other is the person holding the “knife handle” (leaders of the Public Security Bureau).
In the past, when Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution, the first high-ranking official targeted was Luo Ruiqing. Why? Because Luo Ruiqing was the Chief of the General Staff and Secretary of the Military Commission of the CCP’s military at the time, holding real power over the “gun handle.” Luo had also served as the Minister of Public Security for a decade, holding real power over the “knife handle,” and was known for his domineering and sharp character. Therefore, in Mao’s view, when he decided to launch the Cultural Revolution, Luo posed a great threat, so he had to be eliminated first.
Xi’s “lightning crackdown” on Zhang Youxia, similar to Mao abruptly taking down Luo Ruiqing, indicates Xi’s concern that Zhang Youxia might be plotting a coup to seize Xi’s power.
Ma Xingrui comes from a technical bureaucratic background, without control over the “gun handle” or the “knife handle”, he has no soldiers, no guns nor ammunition at his disposal, which means he does not pose a real threat to Xi’s power, especially in terms of military authority. Therefore, Xi can afford to delay the public disclosure of Ma Xingrui’s situation without much consequence.
After taking office, Xi promoted and trusted a group of senior officials from the military industry. Ma Xingrui, known as the “Marshal of the Aerospace”, was the first trusted ally in the military industry promoted by Xi.
Ma Xingrui had worked in the military industry for 17 years. Since 2013, Xi has deliberately promoted Ma Xingrui as an important member of the “Xi family army”, gradually promoting him to various positions such as Vice Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Deputy Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee, Secretary of the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee, Vice Governor, Acting Governor, and Governor of Guangdong Province, Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and finally a member of the CCP Politburo at the Twentieth Party Congress.
In this way, Ma Xingrui had both work experience in the military industry and various government departments, as well as experience working in economically developed Guangdong and serving as a high-ranking official in the border areas of the northwest. If all goes well, Xi may further promote Ma Xingrui to a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee at the Twenty-First Party Congress.
Why did Xi value Ma Xingrui so much?
As reported by the British Financial Times, Ma Xingrui and Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, have a long-standing relationship. Ma Xingrui used to frequently visit Xi’s home before Xi came to power, making him one of the high-ranking officials closest to Xi.
Ma Xingrui and Peng Liyuan are both from the same hometown in Yuncheng, Shandong Province. While Ma Xingrui was working in Guangdong, he may have had some business dealings with Xu Xingjian, the brother-in-law of Peng Liyuan. In addition, he may have had business interactions with Xi’s second sister, Xi Qiaoqiao, and her husband Deng Jiagui. Ma Xingrui’s wife, Rong Li, and Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, are close friends within the circle of high-ranking CCP officials’ wives, and there are overseas rumors that Rong Li has provided benefits to Peng Liyuan.
In July 2025, Ma Xingrui was suddenly removed from his position as Party Secretary of Xinjiang, likely not in accordance with Xi’s original intentions but rather due to opposition forces presenting issues related to Ma Xingrui to Xi, who had to respond. Xi had no choice but to remove Ma Xingrui as Party Secretary, adding a phrase “alternate appointments” behind it in an attempt to let him land “softly”.
Upon returning to Beijing from Xinjiang, there has been no official announcement from the Xi regime regarding Ma Xingrui’s “alternate appointments,” but Ma Xingrui continued to make occasional public appearances until the Fourth Plenary Session in October 2025.
However, anti-Xi forces may have been monitoring Ma Xingrui all along. Since November 28, 2025, Ma Xingrui had been in a state of “disappearance.” Perhaps at that time, he was already under “isolated inspection” by the Discipline Inspection Commission.
Nevertheless, being Xi’s top military industry ally and with special ties between the Ma family, Xi’s family, the Peng family, and Ma’s possible connection to Li Xi, Xi would take his time in handling Ma Xingrui due to these relationships.
Xi’s handling of Ma Xingrui shares similarities with how he dealt with Qin Gang.
Qin Gang was the first trusted foreign affairs official personally promoted, unusually rapidly promoted within three months from the deputy ministerial level to the ministerial level, then being appointed as a vice-state-level official, becoming a member of the Central Committee, State Councilor, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, making him the youngest party and state leader promoted by Xi in his third term.
However, Qin Gang “incurred an incident” in less than half a year in office. From Xi’s perspective, the cresting of events came too rapidly and audibly. Xi found it humiliating, so he chose to postpone and downplay the situation to save face.
It is unlikely that Xi will protect Ma Xingrui as he did with Qin Gang; instead, Xi may only reveal Ma’s situation when he perceives the political risks to be relatively low.
From October 2017 to October 2022, Li Xi, then a member of the CCP Politburo, also served as the Party Secretary of Guangdong Province. From January 2017 to December 2021, Ma Xingrui was the Deputy Secretary and Governor of Guangdong Province.
Ma Xingrui had served as Li Xi’s deputy for four years. During these four years, they were the top two officials in Guangdong, with one being the highest-ranking official and the other the second-highest, forming a direct superior-subordinate relationship.
Ma Xingrui was well aware that Li Xi was an important confidant of Xi Jinping, and Li Xi was also well aware of Ma Xingrui’s position as an important confidant of Xi Jinping. Both of them were likely to receive further promotion from Xi. Hence, they collaborated well in their work.
Overseas sources have disclosed that Li Xi’s wife and Ma Xingrui’s wife, Rong Li, collaborated to gain considerable benefits exploiting their husbands’ power.
This disclosure cannot be confirmed at present. Yet, corruption in the CCP’s officialdom is widespread, and Li Xi and Ma Xingrui, immersed in this environment, could not have remained above this fray. It is not impossible that their wives exploited their influence together to amass wealth.
If Ma Xingrui’s issues are linked to Li Xi and Li Xi prefers not to expose Ma Xingrui prematurely.
Ma Xingrui had long worked in the military industry system and later served in the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. He had experience working in economically developed regions like Guangdong and worked extensively in Xinjiang where the state invested heavily. These systems, departments, and regions are lucrative areas.
Since the Twentieth Party Congress, a group of high-ranking officials from the military industry system had been investigated, many of whom had connections with Ma Xingrui. Starting from February this year, Gao Shiwen, the former secretary who worked with Ma Xingrui at the Aerospace Science and Technology Group, and currently serving as the mayor of Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, had been absent from several important meetings in Nanchang, appearing to have encountered an incident.
A former subordinate of Ma Xingrui during his tenure as Secretary of the Shenzhen Municipal Committee, Dai Beifang, President of the Shenzhen Political Consultative Conference, was investigated for “serious violations of discipline and law” on December 15, 2025. Reports indicated that Dai Beifang revealed issues involving several individuals, including Ma Xingrui.
Additional reports stated that after Evergrande Group’s founder Xu Jiayin was arrested in September 2023, he provided a list of high-ranking CCP officials to the disciplinary committee, which included Ma Xingrui.
Many former subordinates of Ma Xingrui in Xinjiang were falling one after another, including Liu Chen, Deputy Secretary of the Xinjiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Jin Zhizhen, Vice Chairman of the Xinjiang Political Consultative Conference, Ma Zhijun, Secretary of the Urumqi Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Guo Lianshan, Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the Xinjiang Prosecutor’s Office, Chen Weijun, Executive Deputy Governor of the Xinjiang Government, Li Xu, Deputy Commander of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and Muyong, former Deputy Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Department among others.
If Ma Xingrui’s problems are connected to the aforementioned high-ranking officials, the situation becomes more complex. It will take time to investigate the interconnections between them. Therefore, the Xi regime is likely to delay based on this complexity.
Since the Twentieth Party Congress, a number of party, government, and military officials personally promoted and trusted by Xi have been falling from grace or disappearing, especially among the active generals whom Xi promoted. The majority of the active generals promoted by Xi have been compromised. This has severely damaged Xi’s reputation.
Out of the seven individuals who Xi personally selected for the twentieth Central Military Commission, five have been taken down as “seriously corrupt elements.” That is to say, among the seven, five are considered “bad individuals.”
The twentieth CCP Central Politburo, which Xi personally formed, has experienced three waves of upheaval:
The first wave came on April 31, 2025, when the member of the Central Politburo and Minister of Central Organization Department Li Ganjie swapped positions with the member of the Central Politburo and Minister of Central United Front Department Shi Taifeng. This was a rare occurrence in the more than 40 years of the CCP’s reform and opening up. Overseas sources revealed that Li Ganjie’s wife was involved in a sale of official rank. Although this information cannot be verified at present, the sudden transfer of Li Ganjie, the youngest member of the Central Politburo and the Minister of the Central Organization Department, who was expected to enter the Central Politburo Standing Committee at the Twenty-First Party Congress, is highly unusual. Throughout CCP’s history, there has been no precedent of the head of the Central United Front Department being promoted to the Central Politburo Standing Committee.
The second wave occurred on October 17, 2025, when member of the Central Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong and nine other generals were abruptly expelled from the party, relieved of their military duties, and turned over to the judicial authorities for investigation. Overseas sources had disclosed that on March 11, 2025, He Weidong was arrested after returning from the National People’s Congress Closing Meeting to the Bayi Building. He had been in a state of “disappearance” since then. Suddenly, before the Fourth Plenum in October, the Xi regime announced He Weidong’s investigation along with others.
The third wave occurred on January 24, 2026, when the Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesperson announced that member of the Central Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia was under investigation for serious violations of discipline and law.
At present, if the Xi regime were to proclaim that member of the Central Politburo, Ma Xingrui, is being investigated for serious violations of discipline and law, Xi’s reputation would be damaged. Therefore, there might be further delays before Xi decides to reveal Ma Xingrui’s case.
In summary, the Xi regime’s prolonged withholding of the investigation into Ma Xingrui, who has been “missing” for over four months, can be attributed to Xi’s personal political calculations. Xi is not prepared to immediately expose his top military industry ally in whom he had placed great trust.
There are three main purposes: first, to demonstrate that Xi is in control of the overall personnel situation; second, to safeguard Xi’s personal reputation; and third, to minimize the impact of Ma Xingrui’s issues on Xi’s family, Peng’s family, and Li Xi’s family.
It is estimated that like Qin Gang, Xi may not be able to protect Ma Xingrui to the same extent; Xi is likely to reveal Ma Xingrui’s situation when he deems the political risks to be relatively low.
Epoch Times exclusive