On March 9, 2026, the China Aerospace Studies Institute of the United States Air Force University (CASI) released a report on the management of nuclear warheads by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), exposing the process of transporting nuclear warheads from the central base in the Qinling Mountains to various locations, involving unit designations and specific entities. Experts say that the publication of this report has a deterrent effect on the Chinese Communist Party ahead of the anticipated visit of President Trump to Beijing and his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
The PLARF, formerly known as the Second Artillery Corps (PLASAF) before 2016, is the ground-based strategic missile force of the CCP. It is equipped with various nuclear and conventional missiles, including short-range, medium-range, intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles. Since 2015, a range of new weapons systems and at least 11 new missile brigades have been added, most of which likely have nuclear capabilities.
The report from the China Aerospace Studies Institute of the United States Air Force University delves into the units of the Rocket Force responsible for the storage, protection, testing, and transportation of nuclear warheads. The report tracks these warheads from the central storage facility deep in the Qinling Mountains of Shaanxi, to military operational bases, and then to various missile brigades and camps. It covers questions such as how and where warheads are stored, by whom, and who responds in case of emergencies. (Report link)
The report mentions Base 67 (MUCD 96607), a deputy military unit stationed in Baoji, Shaanxi, which is the sole base specialized in managing nuclear warheads for the entire military, under direct control of the Military Commission. Established in 1958, it was transferred to the Second Artillery Corps (now the Rocket Force) in 1980. It includes a technical service brigade (designation 96037), core units numbered 96038 and 96771, as well as brigade-level units for training, communication, operational support, comprehensive logistics, air defense, electronic countermeasures, equipment inspection, and specialized transport. The personnel of this unit refer to themselves as “Guardians of the National Treasure.”
Hongchuan is the most core underground or semi-underground nuclear warhead reserve depot of the Rocket Force, located deep in the Qinling Mountains, extremely remote, accessible only through a narrow road, managed by the technical service brigade, responsible for storage, precise temperature and humidity control, regular testing, and highway transport.
The Equipment Inspection Research Institute, designated 96877 and a brigade-level unit, is responsible for quality control of warheads, reliability monitoring, environmental monitoring, telemetry support, working in collaboration with the Third Research Institute of the Rocket Force. Although this unit has a high proportion of highly educated personnel, recruitment has been challenging since relocating to Hongchuan in 2017.
Unit 96038 is stationed in Luzhou, Sichuan, with an undisclosed formal name, responsible for some warhead inspections, testing, maintenance, transportation, potentially serving as a complementary or auxiliary facility to Hongchuan, with the “Blade” special operations team as an escort. Recent information (around 2021) indicates that this unit may have been reorganized as a group, at least comprising nine squads. Similar to the technical service brigade at Hongchuan, the mission of this unit appears to include warhead management, inspection, security, and transportation.
Other details cover air defense systems such as HQ-11/HQ-16, LD-2000, and the Second Integrated Defense Brigade (designation 96876), as well as the Nuclear Biochemical Emergency Management Group, utilizing a large number of imported equipment including U.S. Demron protective suits, Swedish Brokk robots, French radiation sensors, among others. The comprehensive logistics unit is responsible for fuel, maintenance, medical care, etc.
In terms of warhead transportation, railway transportation is handled by Special Transport Brigade (designation 96878) using dedicated railway cars, while road transportation is managed by the Technical Service Brigade Road Transport Company employing disguised transport fleets. Information on air transportation capabilities is scarce.
Each operational base has an Equipment Inspection Brigade/Regiment responsible for receiving warheads from Base 67, conducting storage, testing, and then transporting them to missile brigades. The separation of warheads and missiles is still the standard practice. Generally, only a small number of personnel in missile brigades are responsible for receiving warheads, short-term storage, and preparing for integration with missiles. There are no permanent large warhead storage facilities, emphasizing rapid loading capabilities.
The report notes that military information sources rarely use the term “warheads,” opting for phrases like “special equipment” or “national treasure.” Due to increased secrecy by the CCP, researchers have had to piece together scattered fragments of information to construct a coherent narrative.
The report indicates that despite this, the gathered information reveals some potential weaknesses in the CCP military’s nuclear weapons storage management system. For example, most nuclear arsenals are stored in a single facility, which poses a high concentration of risk. Additionally, the infrastructure around these facilities is rudimentary, possibly with only one narrow road for entry and exit, blocking these roads could severely delay actions. Furthermore, military information also shows issues of organizational chaos and laxity in storage facilities and procedures in the past, indicating health concerns among personnel.
Since 2000, the Pentagon has published an annual “China Military Power Report,” assessing the structure of the PLA Rocket Force, modernization progress, missile inventory, nuclear capabilities, deployment status, and related strategic influences on China. This is part of the U.S.’s effort for military transparency towards China. These reports are based on open-source intelligence, satellite images, and other publicly available sources but also reflect American intelligence assessments.
The China Aerospace Studies Institute of the United States Air Force University has previously independently released more focused reports on the Rocket Force, such as the 2022 October PLA Rocket Force Organization, detailing base coordinates, unit designations, commanding officer names, and so on, which sparked extensive discussions in Chinese circles and was even thought to be related to subsequent personnel changes in the Rocket Force.
Against the backdrop of U.S. and Israeli military actions against Iran, President Trump is expected to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2.
Xie Peixue, Deputy Researcher at
the Institute of Cyber Security and Decision Simulation of the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Security, told Da Ji Yuan that the report from the U.S. Air Force University exposes the detailed management of China’s most top-secret and adversarial asset — nuclear weapons — in broad daylight. The release of the report ahead of the Trump-Xi meeting carries strong diplomatic psychological warfare and strategic deterrence implications, sending a clear message to the Chinese side: “We have comprehensive knowledge of your nuclear weapon arsenal.”
He stated that the report would force the CCP to reconsider transportation routes, surveillance procedures, expend more resources, and especially concern Beijing’s top leadership, particularly Xi Jinping, about internal security issues and potential leaks, deepening their distrust of the military.
Xie Peixue further stated that the report demonstrates that the depth of intelligence mastery possessed by the U.S. military far exceeds public imagination, encompassing core information such as the structural diagrams of underground bunkers at various bases, even personal habits of specific commanders, and real-time pinpoint locations. Judging from previous U.S. actions in Venezuela and the joint U.S.-Israeli operations against Iran, the U.S. essentially has the ability to pinpoint targeting against adversaries. Therefore, the report is a form of cognitive warfare launched by the U.S. against the CCP.
“Telling Beijing that I not only can see the fist of the Chinese army — missiles but can also see through one of your nerve systems, your management and command. The deterrent power generated by such intelligence transparency is, to some extent, more efficient than directly deploying an aircraft carrier strike group against you,” he said.
Su Ziyun, Director of the Strategic Resources Division at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Security, told Da Ji Yuan that ultimately, Trump aims to concentrate forces in the Indo-Pacific to confront China. He is now eliminating peripheral threats to China, including Venezuela and Iran. The emergence of this report signals to China that the U.S. has a grasp on its secrets.
The report from the China Aerospace Studies Institute of the United States Air Force University states that the expressed views represent the personal opinions of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official U.S. government or Department of Defense policies or positions.
Su Ziyun stated that ordinary scholars would not have the intelligence capability to produce such information, indicating that this is certainly a research effort utilizing materials from relevant units, issued by academic units (not the government), creating ambiguity but with clear warning implications. This is part of a hybrid psychological and intelligence warfare, similar to the earlier release of short videos by the CIA targeting Chinese military officers to provide intelligence.
Su Ziyun also believes that the exposure of this strategic intelligence will give Trump overwhelming strategic leverage in negotiations with Xi Jinping.