California High-Speed Rail Costs Soar to $231 Billion, 7 Times Higher Than Original Budget

The California High-Speed Rail Authority submitted its 2026 business plan draft to the state Senate Transportation Committee at the end of April, proposing to increase the total cost of the high-speed rail segment from San Francisco to Los Angeles to $231 billion, which is seven times the estimated value of over $33 billion shown to voters in 2008.

Currently, the state government has shifted the focus of high-speed rail construction to the initial section between Merced and Bakersfield, a stretch of 171 miles, with approximately 119 miles in intense construction phase, scheduled to be completed by 2030. Since the initiation of the California High-Speed Rail project, not only has the cost skyrocketed, but the timeline has also been continuously delayed. The Trump administration withdrew $4 billion in federal funding citing slow progress – a delay of a full 12 years from the initial plan.

On April 27, Tony Strickland, Vice Chair of the State Senate Committee and Republican Senator of the 36th District, warned that the Rail Authority’s plan is from “Fantasyland”.

He stated, “The California Legislative Analyst’s Office pointed out that the Rail Authority arbitrarily changed the project scope and cost estimates, ignored specific requirements set by the California Legislature, presumed significant changes in state law when formulating the plan, and significantly revised cost estimate data once again.”

“Even if the Rail Authority reluctantly considers the above requirements, they still cannot produce a clear and viable funding plan to ensure the project’s completion,” Strickland said, calling the plan completely detached from reality. He added, “We must immediately put a stop to this reckless waste of public funds, destined to be remembered as one of the worst public construction projects in world history.”

Both lawmakers and the general public have severely lost confidence in the project, Strickland said, “In my view, trust in the overseeing agency of this project – excuse my directness – has been completely shattered.”

Given the need for massive funding to support the project, the High-Speed Rail Authority is looking to attract private investors and build a larger, commercially viable vision, aiming to achieve full connectivity between Los Angeles and San Francisco.

Strickland questioned the ongoing construction of the high-speed rail in the central California section from Merced to Bakersfield, where funds have not yet been raised entirely, yet some funds are being attempted to be shifted to the southern Los Angeles segment and the northern San Francisco segment – how does this make sense?

Ian Choudri, CEO of the Rail Authority, stated that the strategy of expanding simultaneous construction is to attract external funding, saying, “Once private investors come on board, they should be able to view the entire high-speed rail system – this first phase from Los Angeles to San Francisco – as a comprehensive whole.”

Choudri mentioned that allowing private financiers to consider the extension from San Francisco through San Jose to Gilroy, as well as the Los Angeles Union Station/Anaheim segment, is feasible commercially, with the private sector conveying this message.

In response, Strickland said, “If you manage to successfully bring in private sector resources into a project that started with a budget of just over $33 billion and has now ballooned to $231 billion, and can raise substantial private capital, then I must commend you greatly.”

On March 27, Lou Thompson, former Chair of the High-Speed Rail Authority Peer Review Group, sent a detailed analysis of the draft to state legislative leadership, offering harsh criticism and stating that the project has hit a dead end.

Thompson had served as the chair of the review group reporting on the high-speed rail project to the state legislature from 2009 to 2024. In his resignation letter, he emphasized the recommendations made by the group that called for an independent agency to investigate the issues encountered in the project, how to address those issues, and the lessons to be learned.

In his March letter, he expressed the view that existing funds cannot complete the Merced-to-Bakersfield project by 2032; and that the 2008 plan promised to spend $33.8 billion to complete the first phase of the project, achieving a travel time of 2 hours and 40 minutes from San Francisco to Los Angeles, now estimated to cost $231 billion.

The high-speed rail project is not California’s first major project, nor will it be the last, Thompson pointed out that lessons should be learned: 1) The project was destined to fail from the beginning due to unclear goals and scope definition, as well as inaccurate cost, schedule, and project difficulty estimates; 2) Large projects rarely receive sufficient funding from the start, and should not be initiated if funding support is not obtained correctly; 3) Inadequate oversight; 4) Weak personnel and new management entity setup; 5) Delay in land acquisition, relocation of utilities, and railroad easements; 6) Environmental laws; 7) Related litigation.

According to Fox News, the Rail Authority stated that the $231 billion is just the cost ceiling; the draft reassessed the project scope, design standards, and construction processes from the ground up, estimating the delivery cost of the first stage project from San Francisco to Los Angeles/Anaheim at about $126.3 billion; the first phase project is expected to be completed by 2032, with operations expected in 2033.

The Authority plans to identify approximately $105 billion in costs that can be avoided by reasonably adjusting the infrastructure scale and adopting a more efficient delivery model, meaning they could save $105 billion by simultaneously starting construction in the north, central, and south segments, resulting in a total price of only $126.3 billion. ◇