Recently, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched a new nuclear energy plan, claiming that the installed capacity of nuclear power is expected to become the world’s largest by 2030, with the non-fossil energy supply scale doubling by 2035. However, China’s uranium reserves are inherently insufficient, with a dependence on external sources exceeding 70%. Given the U.S.’s return to Central Asia to secure key supply chain strategies, it may be challenging for the CCP to realize the aforementioned plans.
The State Council Information Office of the CCP held a press conference on April 17th titled “Initiating the ’15th Five-Year Plan'”. Wang Changlin, Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission of the CCP, stated that by 2035, the mainland’s non-fossil energy supply scale is expected to double.
On the same day, the China Nuclear Energy Association and other institutions released the “Energy Development Report (2026) Blue Book,” stating that its additional nuclear power installed capacity has ranked first globally for 19 consecutive years. It is predicted that during the 15th Five-Year Plan, the operational nuclear power installed capacity is expected to surpass the United States by 2030 and become the world’s largest.
Yang Changli, Acting Chairman of the China Nuclear Energy Association, also stated on the same day at the 2026 Spring Forum on Sustainable Nuclear Energy Development that during the 14th Five-Year Plan (2020-2025), the mainland approved 46 new nuclear units, with a total of 112 units operational or under construction, totaling 125 million kilowatts in installed capacity, ranking first globally.
Regarding the reasons for the CCP’s vigorous development of nuclear energy, Wang Changlin stated during the press conference that the CCP’s new energy strategy is aimed at ensuring energy security and gaining an advantage in the great power competition.
Looking solely at the data provided by the CCP and the depicted future vision, this goal seems to have a certain degree of feasibility. However, like the CCP’s other strategic measures, the 2035 doubling of nuclear energy supply faces numerous internal challenges and significant uncertainties due to constraints from the United States.
With the world increasingly focusing on nuclear energy and the current global nuclear energy competition landscape, uranium, as the core resource for nuclear weapons and energy, has become a crucial strategic material for countries, particularly the United States and China. The degree of control over uranium resources will also impact future strategic dynamics.
The main materials required for nuclear power plants include fuel, moderators, coolants, and control materials, with the key nuclear fuel being uranium. Successful acquisition of uranium has become a key factor restricting the CCP from achieving its “non-fossil energy supply” doubling goal.
China’s annual uranium production is relatively low globally, leading to a chronic undersupply situation. By the end of 2024, the mainland’s proven uranium reserves amounted to only 350,000 tons, accounting for 6% of the global total, and facing issues such as low resource grade and difficulties in mining, with uranium production in 2024 at only 1,800 tons.
Industry estimates indicate that China’s mainland has a long-term external dependence on natural uranium of over 70%. However, according to some reports, depending on the calculation method, this import reliance could reach as high as 90%.
The CCP has three ways to acquire natural uranium: domestic production, overseas equity mines, and purchasing on the international market. Industry forecasts suggest that by 2026, the mainland’s demand for natural uranium will need to reach at least 12,000 to 13,000 tons, rising to over 20,000 tons by 2030. Some in the industry believe that the actual demand in the future may be even higher than current predictions.
The main sources of the CCP’s natural uranium ore imports include Kazakhstan (45%), Namibia (25%), Canada (15%), and other countries.
The cooperation between the CCP and Kazakhstan in the uranium ore field is the most critical overseas source in the CCP’s nuclear fuel supply system, primarily involving resource development, fuel processing, and long-term trade supply. The CCP’s partnership with Kazakhstan represents a deeply interlinked relationship.
Enterprises such as China General Nuclear Mining Corporation, along with CCP enterprises, have established joint ventures with Kazakhstan’s National Atomic Company Kazatomprom, with China holding a 49% stake and participating in mining operations. Additionally, Chinese companies have taken over Russian uranium mine stakes in Kazakhstan.
In terms of cooperation in the midstream nuclear fuel processing, the CCP and Kazakhstan are deeply interconnected. The two parties jointly constructed a nuclear fuel plant, with China Guangdong Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. collaborating with Kazakhstan to produce nuclear fuel components at the country’s uranium metallurgical plant, with almost all products supplied to Chinese nuclear power plants. Data indicates that from 2022-2023, Kazakhstan supplied approximately 150 tons of low-enriched uranium products to China.
The CCP and Kazakhstan also reached a long-term supply agreement for strategic materials, with Kazakhstan committed to providing natural uranium ore and other related strategic materials to China for an extended period.
The so-called industry chain cooperation between the CCP and Kazakhstan not only controls uranium mining rights but also regulates nuclear fuel processing, uranium product exports, and nuclear energy utilization. This implies that through controlling Kazakhstan’s uranium supply chain, the CCP is asserting control over strategic material supply, expanding its influence in Central Asia, and furthering its confrontation with the United States.
Namibia, home to approximately 10% of the world’s uranium deposits, is China’s most crucial uranium mining base in Africa. CCP enterprises hold controlling stakes in some of Namibia’s uranium mines.
The Husab uranium mine, in particular, is China’s largest overseas uranium asset and one of the largest investment projects by Chinese entities in Africa, with an investment of around $2 billion. The mine produces approximately 5,300 tons of uranium ore annually, the vast majority of which is directly supplied to Chinese nuclear enterprises. In 2019, CCP’s China National Nuclear Corporation acquired the Rossing uranium mine in the country. In fact, the CCP now effectively controls two of Namibia’s most critical uranium mines, with a significant proportion of Namibia’s mineral products supplied to Beijing.
By the end of 2025, the cumulative electricity generation from operational nuclear units in the mainland was approximately 467.019 billion kilowatt-hours, accounting for about 4.82% of the total national electricity generation, underscoring significant growth potential in the future.
Due to severe inadequacy of uranium resources in the mainland, there is a high level of reliance on imports. Analysts predict that with the continued growth of nuclear power plant capacity in the mainland, the demand for uranium resources will continue to rise.
According to a global market research report by Research and Markets, China primarily imports two types of uranium resources: natural uranium and enriched uranium (U-235), with natural uranium accounting for about 96.6% of imports, while enriched uranium comprises a smaller portion.
Kazakhstan is China’s largest source of natural uranium imports, with 11,132.5 tons of natural uranium imported from Kazakhstan in 2023, accounting for 66% of total natural uranium imports.
In October 2025, Bloomberg reported that in order to compete with the CCP in the nuclear energy field, the Trump administration of the United States was engaging in “unconventional” negotiations with American companies and the country, aiming to secure mining rights to the world’s largest untapped tungsten mine in Kazakhstan. Tungsten is a crucial metal for manufacturing ammunition.
In November 2025, under the active promotion of the Trump administration, Kazakhstan officially signed a crucial mineral development agreement with the United States, implementing a joint mining cooperation through a joint venture. This marked the initial completion of cooperation on the world’s largest untapped tungsten mine.
According to the agreement, Cove Kaz Capital, an American company, acquired 70% ownership of the joint venture and will oversee the distribution of mineral products.
The mine is home to 410,000 tons of tungsten and 380,000 tons of rare earth metals, with the agreement prioritizing meeting U.S. demands. This agreement provides secure tungsten supply for the U.S. in the future.
The U.S. Secretary of Commerce was directly involved in the negotiations, emphasizing that the aim was to significantly reduce the reliance on the CCP-led rare earth and tungsten supply chains.
This agreement is not only an important step for the U.S. to safeguard its strategic material supply chain but is also seen as a significant strategic layout for the U.S. to promote “de-Chinafication” in critical mineral supply chains worldwide.
The Trump administration’s international energy strategy is clear: by controlling upstream resources, it seeks to weaken the CCP’s control in related fields.
However, the U.S.’s containment of the CCP in Kazakhstan is not limited to rare earth and tungsten mines but extends to uranium mines as well.
In November 2025, the United States hosted the “C5+1” summit in Washington, including critical minerals, including uranium, in its strategic cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This marked the U.S.’s return to Central Asia, dedicating efforts to diversify key supply chains and counter the influence of the CCP and Russia.
Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, is the world’s largest uranium supplier, accounting for about 40% of global production. Uzbekistan also possesses abundant uranium, lithium, copper, tungsten, and rare earth metal resources. The summit clearly identified these minerals as key points of cooperation.
The U.S. hopes to help Central Asian countries break free from dependence on China and Russia by providing infrastructure and technical support, integrating them into a supply chain framework supported by the U.S., and reducing the influence of the CCP and Russia in strategic raw materials.
The U.S.’s strategic motives and goals are evident: reducing dependence on Chinese rare earths and Russian uranium, establishing reliable raw material supply chains with Central Asian countries, weakening the dominant positions of the CCP and Russia in strategic materials, and regaining control in strategic material fields to restore American greatness.
Amidst today’s turbulent global dynamics, the CCP’s desire for long-term, stable, and increasing uranium supply from Namibia may also face challenges due to uncertainties. With long shipping routes that require bypassing maritime command points like the Cape of Good Hope and the Malacca Strait, the U.S.’s significant influence in these passages could disrupt the CCP’s maritime supply chain if circumstances change.