After the “beheading” of the Iranian dictator Khamenei by the United States and Israel, Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, has taken over as Iran’s Supreme Leader. However, he has yet to make a public appearance, and with external pressure and internal discontent mounting, the regime is facing a crisis. This situation is also being compared to that of the Chinese Communist Party. Analysts point out that the dictator of the CCP, Xi Jinping, has not designated a successor. In the event of his sudden downfall, there may be no one capable of taking over in Zhongnanhai, and any successor from Xi’s circle could potentially cause further chaos, ultimately leading to the nation being taken over by others, whose identities remain unknown.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba, released a message on his Telegram account late Sunday night (March 15), reiterating that Iran would “demand compensation from its enemies no matter what.”
However, Mojtaba has yet to make a public appearance or clarify his health status since assuming power a week ago.
On March 16, independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in Taiwan’s newspaper “Shang Bao,” analyzing that Mojtaba did not personally attend the ceremony where allegiance to him was supposed to be pledged. Instead, a cardboard cut-out of him was used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Mojtaba appears to have been forcibly pushed forward by the Revolutionary Guard, indicating that he is being controlled.
Du Zheng believes that the situation of Xi Jinping, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, not openly preparing a successor, mirrors that of Iran’s former Supreme Leader, Khamenei, who was “beheaded” by the US military. Xi Jinping may also be planning for his wife or daughter to succeed him, a secret plan that cannot be revealed. If Xi were to fall, whether due to sudden health deterioration or a military operation by the US, even if Xi’s family members desired to take over, they might be subject to control by senior officials within the party.
Du Zheng points out that currently in the party-state system, the Fujian gang led by Cai Qi is dominant, yet the Zhejiang gang, led by Li Qiang, has been quietly accumulating power. The new leader of the Shanghai gang, Ding Xueyang, the youngest member in the current Politburo Standing Committee, has been aspiring to succeed Xi. Ding has a good relationship with the Fujian gang’s Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong, while Wang Xiaohong is at odds with Cai Qi, another member of the Fujian gang. The Minister of State Security of the Zhejiang gang, Chen Yixin, backed by Cai Qi, has been assertive, but he does not have a close relationship with Li Qiang, the Zhejiang gang’s leader. The head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Li Xi, could be a target for affiliation by various factions. Meanwhile, Zhang Shengmin, a native of Shaanxi who currently dominates the military, poses an unknown factor in terms of whether he can support Peng Liyuan and Xi Mingze.
The article suggests that while Iran is experiencing a change in leadership, the option of selecting a successor through a “Council of Experts” composed of so-called religious scholars could provide a temporary lifeline for the regime. However, Xi Jinping has recently dismantled the “Decision-making and Coordinating Mechanism” established by former CCP elders upon taking down Zhang Yexia. If Xi were to fall, power struggles would inevitably ensue, with no one available to mediate, potentially leaving Zhongnanhai leaderless.
In a program on March 14, well-known independent media personality Wen Zhao analyzed that a commonality between Iran and China is that organized opposition forces in both societies have endured decades of authoritarian suppression followed by systematic brainwashing. The people remain atomized, and internal power struggles may play a decisive role in the transitions.
Wen Zhao contrasts Iran, where Mojtaba remains silent and does not appear, likely due to the endorsement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s hardline stance. Currently, the Iranian upper echelon is striving to cover up any cracks and project stability. Mojtaba, being the Revolutionary Guard’s chosen successor, has deep ties with the Guard, having been responsible for handling the work between his father and the Revolutionary Guard and intelligence agencies. However, the late Supreme Leader Khomeini established the system of clerical oversight, making it difficult for Mojtaba to gain acceptance within the religious circle, rendering him overly reliant on the support of the Revolutionary Guard, effectively becoming its puppet and a mere figurehead.
Wen Zhao states that in the midst of power struggles, Xi Jinping has made enemies everywhere, making it possible that he could be successfully attacked by political adversaries or experience sudden health deterioration. If Xi were to fall one day, following the current events in Iran, the successor could potentially be Prime Minister Li Qiang. However, the Central Secretary of Ideology, Cai Qi, along with Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission—who controls the real power—may not support him. Would this administration be able to stabilize without their backing? If the Iranian high echelons fail to restore leadership, the regime may disintegrate, leading to regional warlords seizing power, resulting in a period of turmoil in post-Xi era China.
However, Wen Zhao believes that the Iranian Supreme Leader serves as a coordinator for various factions, each maintaining a certain level of independence and political status. In contrast, Xi Jinping has stripped away the independent positions of various factions, transforming himself into an executor. Therefore, if Xi were to fall, the power vacuum at the top of the CCP could last longer than in Iran, creating greater chaos and being more uncontrollable.
Wen Zhao suggests that once Xi Jinping is absent, the uncertainty of who would assume the highest power in reality is even greater than in Iran. Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and Li Qiang are potential candidates, yet aside from politicking, they have not demonstrated any exceptional abilities. Perhaps at a critical moment, retired CCP elders could play a role, but the absence of determined individuals capable of managing the country’s reset is noticeable.
“If Beijing also faces a Tehran moment, where the leader is no longer present, who would take over China is not an optimistic scenario in the short term. The likes of Wang Huning and Cai Qi do not resemble statesmen, and even if they were to grab hold of the highest power, they may not be able to maintain control. This could likely lead to more turbulence and internal strife, causing the nation to fragment for a period. However, considering China’s geographical conditions, prolonged division is not sustainable. Therefore, no matter the circumstances, there will eventually be individuals capable of taking charge of the country, and the prospects for China transitioning towards a more positive direction remain viable. Perhaps this individual is currently hidden in some corner of society, their name yet unknown,” he remarked.
Wen Zhao emphasizes that the future leader who abandons the CCP would reap substantial political rewards, as the baggage of retrograde livelihoods and human rights abuses is solely the fault of the CCP, thus allowing for a clean reset of the political system.