The announcement of the investigation into the Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, and CCP Military Commission member Liu Zhenli has sparked high attention both domestically and internationally. Several experts have analyzed that this incident reveals intensified power struggles among the top CCP leadership and a breakdown of mutual trust within the party. Experts have applied the “iron triangle” model of a coup to analyze the current situation, indicating that the morale of the CCP military is low, with top officials feeling insecure. Anti-Xi forces are trapped in a dilemma of “protect the Party or perish,” and the CCP system is in a highly unstable state.
The news of the investigation into CCP Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Military Commission member Liu Zhenli has sent shockwaves through international opinion. On the show “Good Morning China,” political commentators Zhang Tianliang and Tang Jingyuan offered their analyses.
Zhang Tianliang, a professor of humanities at Flyer University in the United States, pointed out that the speed of this action exceeds the norm. In the past, when individuals like He Weidong and Miao Hua were cleansed, the CCP authorities maintained a transitional period of several months, but this time, the transition from rumors to official announcement only took a few days.
He believes that this method reflects Xi Jinping’s time anxiety and security concerns when planning the personnel layout for the 2027 CCP “21st Congress.” In a situation of highly centralized power, the feeling of distrust towards others has reached its peak. Even Zhang Youxia, a “princeling” with a family background, is not exempt from this.
From another perspective, Tang Jingyuan, a current affairs commentator in the United States, analyzed that the arrest of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli is a strong counterattack by Xi Jinping when his power is challenged.
After the news of Zhang Youxia’s arrest surfaced, major CCP war zones, the National People’s Congress, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and the State Council system all remained unusually silent. Tang Jingyuan believes that this silence reflects a widespread contradiction and passive response within the CCP and the military to the current situation.
Tang Jingyuan analyzed that despite having the upper hand during the Fourth Plenum period, Zhang Youxia and the anti-Xi forces missed the opportunity to completely remove Xi Jinping’s power due to a lack of “compassion.” This weakness lies in the “protect the Party” mentality of the anti-Xi faction and CCP elders.
He said that the anti-Xi forces tried to emulate the “peaceful transition” model of removing Hu Yaobang by gradually reducing powers to achieve a power transfer while maintaining party stability. However, this strategy severely misjudged Xi Jinping’s political character – when faced with a crisis of power loss, he tends to resort to extreme measures to counterattack.
Tang Jingyuan stated that Xi Jinping is well aware of the anti-Xi faction’s fears and is reluctant to collapse the CCP’s ruling structure by cleansing the Xi family army. Xi Jinping does not care about the survival of the party itself; his true goal is to shift towards a model similar to the Kim dynasty in North Korea.
Zhang Tianliang proposed that interpreting the military upheaval requires an understanding of the political coup “iron triangle” model. He believes that under the current CCP system, any coup capable of shaking the supreme ruler must possess three key points:
First, control of the Central Guard Bureau responsible for the leader’s personal security, which is crucial for physically controlling the top leader.
Second, support from the Party-government system to ensure the governance system does not collapse after a power transition.
Third, the endorsement of respected military generals to suppress the major war zones and prevent regional separatism or civil war.
Looking back at the 1976 “Huairen Hall Incident,” Zhang recalls that it was the joint effort of Wang Dongxing (Central Guard Bureau), Hua Guofeng (Party-government system), and Ye Jianying (military marshal) that completed the power transition.
Currently, Xi Jinping controls the Central Guard Bureau through Cai Qi, subjecting Political Bureau members and elders to strict monitoring. Zhang believes that in this surveillance network, any intention to establish connections is nearly impossible to achieve physically. Therefore, Xi Jinping’s removal of Zhang Youxia fundamentally aims to prevent anyone with potential prestige from becoming a military support point in the “iron triangle.”
Zhang analyzed the paradox brought by the supreme leader’s extreme cleansing for security – the high risk of the “second in command” role. Anyone viewed by the supreme leader as a potential threat is a natural target for elimination.
He mentioned an incident involving Deng Xiaoping at a Political Bureau meeting. When Mao Zedong ordered criticism of Zhou Enlai, others criticized based on policies and historical issues, but Deng Xiaoping, going against the norm, only said, “For the Chairman, you are unattainable; but for you, the Chairman regards you as attainable.”
This statement revealed the most dangerous position in the CCP’s power system – not opponents but those “too close” to the leader. He emphasized that when power is highly centralized, the highest authority often fears not distant enemies but those closest – the “second in command.”
Following this historical logic, Zhang shifted focus to the current situation, noting that the remaining Zhang Shengmin in the Central Military Commission is in a highly risky “second in command” position.
He pointed out that it is easy for outsiders to assume that continued utilization means safety, but in a highly personalized power system, being used often means being targeted for cleansing.
Analyst Cai Shunkun held a different view on the investigation into Zhang Youxia. On January 28, he mentioned in a self-media program that the announcement of the investigation into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli is not a sudden decision but a long-term result of Xi Jinping’s post-“20th Congress” layout.
Following the official announcement of the investigation into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, domestic and international opinions are in turmoil, with a vast amount of information circulating online. Cai Shunkun noted that in the highly closed political environment, this information chaos can easily mislead the public.
Cai Shunkun believes that the investigation into Zhang Youxia can be traced back to at least 2023 and was not triggered by a single event. Prior to the last “20th Congress” meeting, Xi Jinping secured his third term as CCP General Secretary after Mao Zedong, marking the first full re-election.
Various sources indicate that Zhang Youxia had differences with Xi Jinping regarding the Taiwan Strait issue, communication with the US, and Russia’s stance, especially his cautious attitude towards the ability of the PLA to launch a war in the Taiwan Strait in the short term.
Cai Shunkun stated that the investigation into Zhang Youxia was not due to a “failed palace coup” or a “sudden purge” but was a systematic takedown after his military command authority was essentially deprived following military reforms, leaving no room for resistance.
In recent years, frequent changes of the heads of the five major war zones have noticeably weakened their power and influence, falling short of the impact during the previous large military region period.
He further inferred that in the future, there may be the establishment of a larger comprehensive military commission to incorporate military industry, military-civilian integration, and veteran affairs into a unified structure, further weakening the actual power of purely military leaders. Meanwhile, the space for military involvement in high-level politics may continue to shrink.
Regarding the current CCP political ecosystem, Zhang Tianliang cited the anecdote of “accompanying a tiger” to describe the situation. He believes that Xi Jinping’s confidants such as Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and Zhang Shengmin are also under extreme psychological pressure.
Zhang Tianliang cautioned that when the pressure exceeds a critical point, the retaliation launched by those around a dictator for self-protection often becomes a fatal threat to the tyrant.
He cited the historical case of An Lushan in the Tang Dynasty as a typical model of structural collapse in the late stage of high centralization of power. In his later years, An Lushan was tyrannical and suspicious, continuously hitting close aides. It was the union of the three closest and most reliant individuals who, out of self-preservation, ultimately jointly assassinated An Lushan.
Zhang Tianliang predicted that 2026, as a precursor year for the CCP’s “21st Congress,” involving large-scale changes in provincial and ministry-level offices, will be a year of intense power struggles. After the “all-encompassing purge,” a system without anyone feeling secure is not far from its ultimate disintegration.