Recently, Finnish broadcaster YLE aired a documentary titled “Spy/Journalist,” which has sparked attention in Finland. The film, produced by YLE’s investigative department MOT, reveals the operating methods of the Chinese Communist Party’s intelligence system in the Nordic countries. The Finnish government is considering following neighboring countries in strengthening sanctions against Chinese spies.
In a court case in Sweden in 2018, a Chinese Communist Party spy named Zhao Guangjun was unexpectedly exposed. Zhao Guangjun had lived in Finland for several years and his cover was as a journalist for the official Chinese media outlet, “Guangming Daily.”
According to a documentary aired by YLE on November 20, 2024, Zhao Guangjun arrived in Finland at the end of 2011 and worked in Finland as a correspondent for “Guangming Daily” from 2011 to 2015. However, he was actually an intelligence officer of the Chinese State Security Ministry, living with his wife in an affluent coastal community in eastern Helsinki.
Neighbors remember the couple well; Zhao’s wife was known for her excellent cooking skills, and Zhao himself was hospitable, often inviting neighbors to dine together. He conversed fluently in Finnish with neighbors, inquiring about various Finnish matters, but never mentioned his life in China. At that time, the Swedish Security Service had already begun investigating his activities.
In the Swedish case, a Swedish spy working for the Chinese Communist Party was convicted for surveilling the Tibetan community in Stockholm. Court records revealed that this spy visited Finland multiple times between 2013 and 2015, meeting Zhao Guangjun briefly at restaurants or shopping centers in Helsinki during each visit. After each visit, significant sums of money totaling thousands of euros appeared in the spy’s account, transferred by Zhao Guangjun.
According to the court ruling, the Swedish spy maintained contact with three intelligence officers from the Chinese State Security Ministry, who were identified as intelligence officials, one of whom was Zhao Guangjun. However, when the Swedish spy case was exposed, Zhao Guangjun had already returned to China.
YLE confirmed Zhao Guangjun’s intelligence officer status through various sources but was unsuccessful in obtaining an interview with him. Although he was not charged with any crimes, revealing his identity was done to expose how the Chinese Communist Party uses the guise of journalists for intelligence work.
In the documentary, YLE’s reporters also interviewed the current correspondent for “Guangming Daily” in Finland, who did not respond to YLE’s questions regarding whether he was a Chinese intelligence officer.
The documentary pointed out that “Guangming Daily,” as one of the Chinese Communist Party’s official newspapers, is widely believed to serve the interests of the Chinese State Security Ministry in its network of foreign correspondents.
During his time in Finland, Zhao Guangjun published very few articles with simple content, averaging 1 to 2 articles per month, mostly covering mundane topics such as Christmas, election results, and Independence Day traditions. This low frequency and depth of writing raised questions about whether he was genuinely working as a full-time journalist.
Peter Mattis, a former CIA China analyst and current head of the Jamestown Foundation, noted in the film that the phenomenon of the Chinese State Security Ministry using journalists for intelligence work is widespread.
Australian researcher and writer Alex Joske echoed this sentiment, estimating conservatively that globally there could be as many as 100 to 200 journalists simultaneously working for the Chinese intelligence department.
The Chinese Embassy in Finland declined to comment on YLE’s inquiry about Zhao Guangjun’s dual identity but requested YLE to stop spreading “false information about the so-called Chinese spy threat.”
In the new documentary “Spy/Journalist,” YLE also recounted the case of Estonian lawyer and businesswoman Gerli Mutso. In the summer of 2022, Mutso was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison for alleged involvement in intelligence activities for China.
Mutso, a former lawyer, entrepreneur, and national-level golfer, spent a significant amount of time in Finland. According to Mutso’s disclosure to YLE, she initially made contact with the Chinese intelligence department through a Chinese businessman residing in Finland. This Chinese individual held Finnish citizenship and became the liaison for her contacts with the Chinese side.
Based on the Estonian court judgment, Mutso provided the latest information on a tunnel project between Finland and the Estonian capital, Tallinn, to the Chinese military intelligence department. Mutso mentioned that her Chinese client claimed to be from the Beijing Information Association and used the names Victoria, Olivia, and Philip.
The Estonian Security Police (KAPO) determined that these individuals actually belonged to the Chinese military intelligence department.
The judgment detailed how Mutso exchanged information with her Chinese clients, using a shared Gmail account and communicating through the draft feature. This method has been widely adopted by the intelligence departments of China and Russia.
Aside from Mutso, the spy case also implicated Estonian marine scientist Tarmo Kõuts, who had access to confidential files at an Estonian and NATO research center in Italy. Mutso was responsible for introducing Kõuts to the Chinese clients.
Mutso and Kõuts had meetings with Chinese clients in locations such as Hong Kong and Bangkok for intelligence exchanges. Tarmo Kõuts has admitted his crimes and served a three-year sentence.
YLE reached out to the Finnish individual involved in this case, who was not charged; he declined to answer any questions over the phone, stating that the matter was “too dangerous” and “endangered his life.”
In the documentary, YLE interviewed relevant enforcement agencies in Finland, regretting that in Finland, assisting in intelligence activities is not illegal. Only obtaining and transferring confidential information constitutes espionage. The Finnish Security Police urged Finland to learn from neighboring countries and criminalize such espionage activities.