In a shocking turn of events, it has been revealed that out of the 994 individuals recently targeted in an anti-corruption sweep in China, these are not ordinary workers, farmers, or intellectuals, but rather officials at the provincial and ministerial levels, as well as other mid-level cadres.
Xi Jinping came into power in November 2012 and has been in office for 14 years. During these 14 years, Xi has purged 994 high-ranking officials, a number that surpasses the total sum of purges during the administrations of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. The purge of senior military generals under Xi exceeds the total number of generals who fell during the Chinese Communist Party’s internal and external wars and the Cultural Revolution since its founding in 1927.
Some describe Xi’s extreme suspicion as having reached a point where he sees enemies everywhere and constantly fears betrayal. Xi’s extensive purges have created a vicious cycle where fear leads to more purges and vice versa.
Now, let’s take a brief look back at and summarize the continuous purges of high-ranking officials under Xi over the past 14 years.
Xi’s first term was from November 2012 to October 2017, spanning from the 18th to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
On January 22, 2013, Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign targeting “tigers” at the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Meeting. In Communist Party terminology, who can be called “tigers”? They are officials appointed by the central government, including provincial and ministerial-level high-ranking officials, as well as other mid-level cadres.
How many “tigers” did Xi take down in his first term?
According to the Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Yang Xiaodu, on October 19, 2017, since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, discipline inspection and supervision organs have investigated and reviewed 440 party members and cadres at the provincial and military levels and other mid-level cadres. This means that during Xi’s first term of five years, a total of 440 “tigers” were taken down.
Since March 28, 2017, the anti-corruption TV series “In the Name of the People” has been broadcast on Hunan Satellite TV. The scriptwriter of this TV series, Zhou Meisen, was commissioned by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Film and Television Center of the Communist Party of China to write the script.
In early April 2017, during an interview at his home in Nanjing, Zhou Meisen said, “From the Nanchang Uprising launched by the Communist Party on August 1, 1927, if you add up all the wars, very few generals were eliminated by the enemy. However, as a result of one anti-corruption campaign, more than 140 generals were wiped out.”
Zhou Meisen wrote the script for “In the Name of the People” under the directive of senior officials of the Communist Party. He had firsthand knowledge of the situation regarding the investigation of “military tigers.” By saying that “more than 140 generals were wiped out” by early April 2017, it indicates that by that time, Xi had targeted over 140 generals.
On September 18, 2017, the official Chinese media outlet People’s Daily published an article reviewing the achievements of the fight against corruption since the 18th National Congress of the Party. As of the end of June of that year, over 280 mid-level cadres had been investigated and reviewed.
On October 19, 2017, Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Yang Xiaodu, stated that since the 18th National Congress, investigations had been conducted into 440 provincial and military-level party members and other mid-level cadres. All these 440 individuals were mid-level cadres.
By June 2017, 280 mid-level cadres had been investigated and reviewed; by October 2017, this number had surged to 440. The sudden increase of 160 mid-level cadres under investigation in just half a year raises questions about why.
It is believed that the 280 individuals may not include senior military generals but rather refer to mid-level cadres in Party and government organs and state-owned enterprises. Upon checking the list of mid-level cadres investigated and reviewed by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection from June to October 2017, only three names were listed. 160-3=157. These 157 individuals are likely the number of “military tigers” taken down during Xi’s first term.
In early April 2017, Zhou Meisen mentioned that Xi had dealt with over 140 generals. By October 2017, the number of generals targeted by Xi had increased to 157, which seems reasonable.
Xi’s second term spanned from October 2017 to October 2022, covering the 19th to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
On October 17, 2022, Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Xiao Pei, reported that between the 18th and 19th National Congresses, disciplinary and supervisory organs had investigated and reviewed 553 mid-level cadres.
According to the statement of Yang Xiaodu, the Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, from 2012 to 2017, 440 mid-level cadres had been investigated by Xi. 553-440=113. This implies that from 2017 to 2022, Xi had investigated 113 mid-level cadres.
However, the reality may be different.
Upon a careful examination of the list of mid-level cadres investigated and reviewed by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, a total of 112 names were found. Xiao Pei’s figures likely came from this list, but he seemed to have overcounted by 1 person, making the actual total 112. These 112 individuals are all mid-level cadres in Party and government organs and state-owned enterprises, excluding senior military generals.
How many “military tigers” did Xi take down during his second term?
Based on public reports, the investigations into “military tigers” in Xi’s second term were mostly conducted in secret, making it difficult for external observers to know the true extent of the situation. However, with thorough investigation, some traces can still be found.
From the end of the 19th National Congress in October to the end of the year, the list of investigated mid-level cadres on the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection website included 3 individuals; in 2018, this number was 22 on the website, but the full report of the Commission mentioned 68 individuals under investigation, indicating an additional 46 individuals. In 2019, the website listed 20 individuals, but the full report mentioned 45 under investigation, showing an additional 25. The 2020 website list showed 18 individuals, while the full report stated 24, signifying an added 6. In 2021, the website had 24 names, but the official report showed 63, adding 39 individuals. From January to October 2022, the website listed 25 individuals.
Adding up these numbers, a total of 228 mid-level cadres were investigated between 2017 and 2020.
In the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, the numbers of investigations reported in the Commission’s full reports were higher than those listed on the website by 46, 25, 6, and 39 individuals, respectively. This totaled an additional 116 individuals. As senior military generals do not appear on the list of investigated mid-level cadres on the website, these 116 individuals are likely the investigations into senior military officers during Xi’s second term.
Therefore, the number of “military tigers” targeted by Xi during his second term may be around 116.
One of the highest-ranking military officers under investigation during Xi’s second term may be Liu Yazhou, the son-in-law of Li Xiannian, the former Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
In December 2021, reports emerged online overseas that Liu Yazhou had been detained. Subsequently, multiple sources overseas in 2022 confirmed that Liu Yazhou was under investigation.
However, none of the major official Chinese media outlets, including CCTV, Xinhua News Agency, and People’s Daily, has reported on Liu Yazhou’s investigation. No spokesperson from the Chinese Ministry of National Defense or officials from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection have released any information regarding Liu Yazhou being under investigation.
In October 2022, Xi Jinping began his third term at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, and has been in office for 3 years and 3 months.
From October to December 2022, the list of investigated mid-level cadres on the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection website contained 7 names. In 2023, this number rose to 45 on the website, but the full report mentioned 87 individuals under investigation, showing an additional 42. In 2024, the website had 58 names, but the full report stated 92, indicating an additional 34. In 2025, the website listed 65 individuals, with 51 at the provincial and ministerial level, and 14 at other mid-level positions.
On January 17, 2026, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection website announced that in 2025, 115 individuals at the provincial and ministerial levels were under investigation. Subtracting the 51 provincial and ministerial-level officials from the list leaves 64 individuals. These 64 may represent investigations into senior military officers in 2025.
From January 1 to February 3, 2026, the list of investigated mid-level cadres on the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection website included 9 names. Additionally, two senior military officers were officially placed under investigation on January 24: Zhang Youxia, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, a member of the Central Military Commission and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Military Commission. As of the present, a total of 11 mid-level cadres have been investigated.
Since the beginning of Xi’s third term, 326 mid-level cadres have been investigated and reviewed.
The number of senior military officers investigated during Xi’s third term may be around 142.
Overall, during Xi’s first, second, and third terms up to the present, a total of 994 mid-level cadres have been targeted for investigation and review, with around 415 being senior military officers.
Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns are not solely focused on eradicating corruption but are also used as tools in power struggles within the Party.
Looking at the lists of officials purged during Xi’s first and second terms, many were appointed and promoted by former Communist Party dictators Jiang Zemin and former members of the Politburo Standing Committee and Vice President of the State Zeng Qinghong. It can be inferred from these lists that Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong were the ultimate sponsors of the most corrupt individuals within the Party, government, and military at that time.
However, has Xi captured Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong? No.
Jiang Zemin not only promoted a large number of highly corrupt individuals but also allowed his son, Jiang Mianheng, to rise in rank while amassing wealth.
In terms of promotions: Jiang Mianheng has held various positions such as the Director of the Shanghai Metallurgical Research Institute, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Deputy Commander of the Chinese Manned Space Engineering, Deputy Commander of the Chinese Lunar Exploration Project, General Commander of the Shanghai Synchrotron Radiation Facility, Director of the Shanghai Branch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and President of the Shanghai University of Science and Technology.
Regarding wealth: In September 1994, Jiang Mianheng became the legal representative of the Shanghai Alliance Investment Company. The company’s investments spanned across various industries including telecommunications, transportation, aviation, finance, and culture. For instance, in the telecommunications sector, China Netcom and Microsoft MSN; in transportation and aviation, Shanghai Automobile, Shanghai Airlines, and Shanghai Airports; in finance, Shanghai Bank; and in culture, Phoenix Satellite Television and Oriental DreamWorks. It is said in the Shanghai business community that Jiang Mianheng holds numerous directorships, and even the board of directors of the Shanghai Cross-River Tunnel includes his name.
The Jiang family is known as the “Number One Corrupt Family in China.” Has Xi pursued Jiang Mianheng? No.
Zeng Qinghong’s son, Zeng Wei, and daughter-in-law, Jiang Mei, in March 2008, spent 32.4 million Australian dollars (about 250 million RMB) to purchase a super luxurious mansion in Point Piper, the most expensive area in Sydney, Australia, overlooking the Sydney Opera House and Harbor Bridge, occupying 1,100 square meters. At that time, this transaction was the third most expensive property deal in Australian real estate history. The address of the mansion was 73-75 Wolseley Road, Point Piper, NSW 2027. The purchase was entirely paid for without a loan.
Later, Zeng Wei and his wife decided to demolish and rebuild the mansion for an additional 5 million Australian dollars (about 38 million RMB). They applied three times to the Woollahra City Council but faced rejection each time due to excavating 2,600 cubic meters of rock and soil, violating building regulations. Only before Christmas in 2010 was the rebuilding finally approved.
Foreign media, including the Sydney Morning Herald, extensively covered their lavish spending in Australia.
The single property transaction and subsequent rebuilding cost Zeng Wei and his wife a total of 37.4 million Australian dollars, approximately 288 million RMB. Where did this money come from? Did they profit illicitly by exploiting Zeng Qinghong’s authority or influence?
Has Xi investigated Zeng Qinghong’s son Zeng Wei? No.
By failing to arrest Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Mianheng, and Zeng Wei, and going as far as to lavish praise on Jiang Zemin as a “great figure” after Jiang’s death, Xi has drawn scrutiny for his selective anti-corruption campaigns.
Out of the 994 individuals targeted by Xi, is there anyone truly content with Xi’s actions? Judging by common sense and logic, it is highly unlikely.
The 994 individuals targeted by Xi pose a significant challenge, particularly the 415 military officers, who once wielded significant power and influence in China. Their families, children, relatives, friends, and connections are likely harboring deep-seated resentment towards Xi. Many of them may have ill intentions towards Xi and his family.
These 415 military officers and their associates represent some of China’s most powerful and wealthy individuals, occupying influential positions in the country. Many of their family members have moved abroad and transferred wealth overseas. This group holds substantial resources compared to ordinary workers, farmers, and intellectuals, making them a formidable force against Xi. They could be at the forefront of the anti-Xi movement with far-reaching consequences.
Conclusion
During the 20th Central Military Commission, besides Xi Jinping, all five members have been singled out by Xi as major troublemakers and faced repercussions. The rocket forces’ Commanders-in-Chief, from the first to the fourth term, who were personally promoted by Xi, have all been targeted. This raises the critical question of who Xi can trust and who can trust Xi.
The 994 “enemies” that Xi has identified, especially the 415 military officers, have become Xi’s greatest adversaries. Xi, now without a way out, seems compelled to perpetuate an endless cycle of purges driven by suspicion and paranoia, bracing a path that offers no return.
When things reach an extreme, a reversal is inevitable.
With Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia removed, one wonders who will be next in line?
Within just over three years since the 20th National Congress, an unprecedented 42 senior generals have been implicated. This is unheard of in the history of the Chinese military and rare on the global stage. Xi has earned a new nickname, “The General Slayer.”
Based on the statistics above, from the 18th National Congress in 2012 to the present in 2026, the number of generals targeted by Xi could be as high as 415.
Among the 994 “enemies” identified by Xi, the 415 military officers, who have held potent positions, are likely deeply harboring resentment towards Xi. These individuals, along with their families, children, friends, subordinates, and backers, each represent a significant threat to Xi, with many potentially seeking to bring harm to him and his loved ones.
These 415 generals and their extensive networks, occupying dominant roles in China’s most lucrative sectors, collective represent a potent anti-Xi force. They may pose the biggest nightmare for Xi, with the potential to challenge his rule substantially.
In the end, the 415 generals and their allies are Xi’s most formidable adversaries, and they have the capability to disrupt Xi’s authority on an unprecedented scale.
As of the present time, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption crusade appears to serve both as a tool for cleaning up corruption and as a means of consolidating power and eliminating opposition within the party.