The summer in Beidaihe has once again become restless.
For the third time, Cai Qi appeared in public here, but this time, his speech was noticeably cooler, and there were changes in the list of accompanying officials. The names that used to be praised in a high profile manner have been deliberately played down this time, replaced by a familiar but subtle term – “the Party Central Committee”.
This is not a regular event, nor a simple summer condolence visit. It seems more like an ongoing power reshuffle, with calm on the surface but turbulent currents underneath.
In October, the Chinese Communist Party is set to convene the long-delayed fourth plenary session. Historically, whenever personnel changes are involved in the plenary session, it often accompanies drastic political turbulence.
Starting from the details of the changes in Beidaihe, this video takes you through a high-level power struggle in progress, quietly reshaping the direction of power under the pretext of “keeping the rules unchanged”.
On August 3, CCP Politburo member Cai Qi appeared in Beidaihe, stating it was a “condolence visit to experts on summer vacation”. At first glance, it seems quite normal, right? But if you look closely, you will find two very unusual aspects here.
First, the enthusiasm for Xi Jinping has noticeably cooled.
In 2023, Cai Qi was fervently praising Xi Jinping, with phrases like “major deployments,” “historic achievements,” “historic changes,” filling his speech.
By 2024, these exaggerated terms began to shrink, with only “important instructions” remaining.
And by 2025, Xi Jinping’s name was hardly mentioned, instead focusing on “the Party Central Committee focusing on talent” and “implementing the strategy of building a country with talents” – isn’t this sudden coldness a bit abrupt?
The second abnormality: the rhetoric shifted from “Xi as the sole leader” to “collective leadership”.
This is not just a matter of Cai Qi’s personal wording, but a change in the overall “direction” of the CCP leadership. Especially since the third plenary session in July, there have been frequent rumors about Xi Jinping’s unstable health and internal power struggles.
Even Party media and military newspapers have started downplaying the “sole leader” narrative, emphasizing “Party Central Committee leadership” and “collective decision-making”. This is not just casual language.
Therefore, Cai Qi’s speeches in Beidaihe over the past three years seem to quietly draw a timeline, from fervent praise, to moderate low-key, and now deliberately maintaining a distance – what does this imply? Perhaps it is much more complicated than what meets the eye.
Not only has Cai Qi’s speech cooled down, but the people around him have also started to “change faces”.
This time in Beidaihe, one fewer vice-ministerial official accompanied him than last year.
In 2023 and 2024, when Cai Qi appeared, he was accompanied by three vice-ministerial officials – Li Ganjie, Chen Yiqin, and the Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC Jiang Xinzhi. The lineup was complete, looking like a high-end team.
But this year? Jiang Xinzhi was suddenly absent, leaving only Li Ganjie (actually replaced by Shi Taifeng) and Chen Yiqin present. In the CCP system that values protocol and where “where you stand signals something,” the image of one person less cannot help but make people speculate.
Jiang Xinzhi is not a minor role; he is a vice-ministerial official and a veteran who has long held the position at the Organization Department, staying there for nearly ten years. His absence, is he retired? Or has he been “arranged” to take a break?
Looking at the whole personnel layout changes, it becomes even more hair-raising.
In April this year, Shi Taifeng and Li Ganjie suddenly switched positions – Shi Taifeng went to the Organization Department, and Li Ganjie to the United Front Work Department. Both of these individuals are no strangers, especially Li Ganjie, who is an old schoolmate of Xi Jinping and Chen Xi from Tsinghua University and had an originally smooth career path but now seems to have hit a roadblock.
More strangely, after Li Ganjie’s transfer, several high-ranking officials in the Organization Department were successively investigated and transferred, even his fellow villager fell one after another – this is no longer a coincidence, is it that before someone gets into trouble, they “clear the accounts”?
Then on July 1st, the name Huang Jianfa suddenly emerged. He appeared for the first time publicly as a deputy minister “assisting in managing daily work”, and was present at the handover scene of the Xinjiang Party Secretary, which was quite a grand occasion. His appearance is almost equivalent to an official announcement – he has been promoted to a full minister.
In fact, as early as February, Huang Jianfa was arranged to sit in the middle of key personnel in the CCP’s foreign affairs system, with a seat almost rivaling Liu Jianchao and Qu Qingshan. It was clear to the discerning eye – he was being earmarked for a significant role.
Therefore, when we look back, Jiang Xinzhi’s “absence” this time likely indicates that he has been “passed the baton” by Huang Jianfa.
Putting together this series of actions, it can be noted that in the Organization Department, from ministers, deputy ministers, to vice ministers, there is a quiet bloodletting happening.
Let’s not forget, the CCP’s Beidaihe meeting and the fourth plenary session at the end of the year are crucial moments for determining the personnel arrangements of the next leadership. At this time, the frequent personnel changes in the Organization Department definitely do not mean they are just idly “shuffling positions”.
Behind this, it is very likely that a high-level power reshuffle is brewing within the CCP – just not yet at the moment of formal unveiling.
Speaking of which, you might wonder – with so many personnel changes, does it have anything to do with the upcoming fourth plenary session?
Indeed, this upcoming meeting may be when the real drama unfolds.
On July 30, the CCP Central Committee held a routine meeting of the Political Bureau, finally confirming the long-postponed fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee, scheduled for October. Although the exact date has not been announced, based on past practices, it is likely to be in the mid-to-late October.
Do not underestimate this meeting; it may set in motion high-level power configurations for the next five or even ten years. Therefore, not only Chinese people are watching closely, but many foreign governments are also closely observing.
Now the question arises: will this fourth plenary session, involve high-level personnel changes?
Although the CCP has not yet disclosed, based on past practices, it is not impossible.
Let’s quickly review the routine of CCP plenary sessions. The first plenary session is a transition meeting, deciding the central leadership team and military high command; the second plenary session arranges personnel of state institutions; the third plenary session is the main arena for major reform themes; and the fourth to sixth plenary sessions annually seem to handle daily issues such as the economy, agriculture, and party construction, but do not be fooled by appearances because once power becomes unbalanced, and the situation becomes unstable, these regular meetings can become an opportunity for emergency clearance.
Especially in the current turbulent atmosphere in Beidaihe, the shift from “Xi as the core” to “Party Central Committee leadership” is becoming apparent. If the fourth plenary session is really about to make changes, it is not a hasty decision but a long-planned “targeted adjustment”.
So, this October meeting is more than just about discussing policies, it might just be the watershed moment for high-level power struggles within the CCP.
Although the CCP plenary sessions seem to have a fixed process, rules are dead, people are alive. As long as there are changes in the party atmosphere, the fourth plenary session can also wield the knife, as history has shown numerous precedents.
One can go back to the fourth plenary session of the 12th CCP Central Committee in September 1985. It was outwardly focused on discussing the draft of the “75 Plan,” but in reality, the meeting was about pushing for a major change in high-level personnel. At that time, the plenary session agreed that 64 people, including Ye Jianying, Deng Yingchao, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen, would no longer serve as central committee members or alternate members. The reason? It was all written as “due to health reasons,” but those in the know understood that this massive resignation was actually a polite retirement wave.
Looking back at 1989, things were even more classic and terrifying. During the shocking “June Fourth Incident” in June, the student movement was suppressed, and then CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who sympathized with the students and opposed the use of force, ended up being “cleared out” by a small clique.
According to Zhao Ziyang’s later memoirs, the decision to remove him was not made in a Politburo meeting or through formal discussions but during an “old man meeting” held at Deng Xiaoping’s house on May 20. At that time, out of the five Politburo Standing Committee members, only three were invited: Li Peng, Yao Yilin, and Qiao Shi; Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili were not informed. Also in attendance were a bunch of elders: Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen…they gave the final approval, and Zhao Ziyang was done.
But the CCP values procedural justice (of course, “surface procedures”), so they still needed an on-the-books process. Thus, shortly thereafter, the 13th plenary session convened urgently, officially passing the removal report, stripping Zhao Ziyang of all his positions consecutively – not just the General Secretary, Politburo Standing Committee member, even the Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission was removed.
At the same time, the appointment of Jiang Zemin as General Secretary was announced, Song Ping and Li Ruihuan joined the Politburo Standing Committee, and there were a series of secretariat adjustments. This wave of operations was like a “high-level version of a personnel earthquake”.
Hence, the fourth plenary session might look like a routine meeting but is actually the storm center of a dark and turbulent wave. When the party needs personnel changes, a cleanup, or a show of strength, the session becomes a legitimate tool for packaging.
So, the question arises, will there be a similar operation this October?
Indeed, it is not just the 1989 incident, but various CCP fourth plenary sessions over the years could have hidden critical personnel adjustments, even involving changes to the General Secretary, or Chairman of the Military Commission – these are events of “rewriting the situation.”
At the fifteenth plenary session of the 15th Central Committee convened in 1999, with a topic ostensibly about state-owned enterprise reform, the meeting directly appointed Hu Jintao as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and stripped Xu Yuhong of his alternate committee membership, expelling him from the party – no leniency was shown.
Moving on to the sixteenth plenary session of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2004, this meeting was crucial. It not only passed a decision on “Strengthening the Party’s Governance Capacity,” but more importantly, formally announced Hu Jintao would succeed Jiang Zemin and become the Chairman of the Central Military Commission – meaning, two years after Jiang Zemin’s holding on, he was finally asked to step down. In the same meeting, Tian Fengshan was also dismissed, expelled from the party; the extent of the purge was severe.
The eighteenth plenary session of the Eighteenth Central Committee in 2014 also wielded the knife. This event confirmed the expulsion from the party of Li Dongsheng, Jiang Jiemin, Yang Jinshan, Wang Yongchun, Li Chuncheng, and Wan Qingliang – each heavyweight name, categorized as “anti-corruption,” but more like a political clearance.
Therefore, you will notice that the idea of “the fourth plenary session only talks about policies, not people” is baseless. History has shown us that whenever the CCP internally requires it, the fourth plenary session can turn into a stage for a major change in leadership.
Returning to the current session. The third plenary session, which was supposed to be held in the fall of 2023, was delayed until July 2024. This nearly year-long delay is also extremely unusual. At the time, there were many speculations – some said internal party opinions were too divergent to unify; some said the economy was severely impacted after the epidemic, and reform plans were not forthcoming; another saying that some central committee members were in trouble but not yet resolved, hence the delay in convening the meeting.
Whatever explanation one believes, they all point to the same thing: there are problems within the party, and not minor ones.
Last summer, after the delayed third plenary session was finally completed, abnormal occurrences began to surface in the entire leadership, especially within the military. There were successive changes in military leadership, with high-ranking officials in the Rocket Force falling one after the other, and even rumors about Xi Jinping’s health circulating. It is said that he is no longer able to lead official duties for long periods, and his power is gradually slipping away.
The CCP will certainly not admit any abnormalities, but whether these rumors are baseless or not will likely be answered by the fourth plenary session in October.
This meeting, will it really touch Xi Jinping’s position? Which familiar high-level figures may suddenly disappear or unexpectedly appear? Feel free to share your thoughts in the comments.
– Production team of “Epoch Focus”