The U.S. Department of Defense plans to allocate over 10 billion US dollars to comprehensively upgrade its monitoring capabilities of Chinese military submarines and military satellites. Experts point out that this move precisely targets the Chinese network, underwater nuclear facilities, and space military layout, which will fundamentally shake Beijing’s long-established strategic posture relying on “opacity.”
Earlier this month, the U.S. Department of Defense submitted an 85-page document to Congress, revealing that a special fund of 12.6 billion US dollars has been approved by Congress, separate from the regular defense budget of 893 billion US dollars for the 2026 fiscal year, originating from the approximately 152 billion US dollars defense allocation in the large-scale tax and spending bill passed in 2025.
According to Bloomberg, the document clearly states that this funding “will be used to strengthen critical work within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s responsibility area at the Pentagon to address unprecedented Chinese military expansion and the growing threats in the region to U.S. security interests and economic prosperity.”
The main uses of the funding include: 1 billion US dollars for classified “offensive cyber operations”; 1 billion US dollars to support the operation of the Boeing X-37B classified orbital aircraft for the Space Force; 528 million US dollars to expand the “Silent Barker” early warning satellite system, specifically to track Chinese and Russian spacecraft that may pose threats to U.S. orbital assets; 143 million US dollars for improving anti-submarine warfare technology to strengthen the continuous monitoring capability of enemy submarines.
Shen Mingshi, a researcher at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Security, analyzed for Dajiyuan that from the budget allocation structure, this funding clearly focuses on the three major battlefields of space, cyber, and underwater, strategically targeting the core layout of the Chinese military’s recent power expansion.
Wang Xiaowen, assistant researcher at the Taiwan Institute of Security Studies, also told Dajiyuan that the U.S. move is a “preemptive action” against China’s rapid expansion in the deep sea and space domains.
Citing the experience of the Russia-Ukraine war, she pointed out that communication capability is crucial in future intelligent warfare, “intelligence surveillance capability is just the first step, the United States must quickly strengthen its overall strength in space and the deep sea.”
Shen Mingshi believes that in the background of China’s vigorous development of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and information command systems, the United States is simultaneously enhancing its cyber offensive and defensive capabilities, aiming to gain information superiority in the early stages of conflict and weaken the stability of the opponent’s command and communication systems.
Shen Mingshi stated that orbiters like the X-37B can operate in orbit for a long time, with rapid maneuvering capabilities and can conduct intelligence reconnaissance and specific military missions. He analyzed that the U.S. strengthening of the early warning satellite system is not only for missile attack warning but also for real-time tracking of the movements of Chinese and Russian satellites, constructing a more comprehensive orbital posture sensing capability.
Shen Mingshi pointed out that in recent years, China has continued to expand its fleet of nuclear-powered strategic submarines, developing strategic platforms capable of carrying the “Giant Wave” series of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, with operational ranges extending from the first island chain to the second island chain and even the remote areas of the South Pacific and North Pacific.
He mentioned that the U.S. had previously built an underwater listening system along the first island chain (known as the “Dragon Tooth” project), monitoring the movements of Chinese submarines through the deployment of sensor devices in key maritime areas and sharing intelligence with regional allies. As the activities of Chinese submarines expand, the U.S. military may in the future combine underwater sensor arrays, airborne anti-submarine patrol aircraft, surface fleets, and nuclear-powered attack submarines to build a more comprehensive multi-layered anti-submarine surveillance network.
The two experts have a high degree of consensus on core strategic judgments. Shen Mingshi clearly pointed out, “China will always target stronger countries and establish strategic advantages through opacity or surprise attacks.” Therefore, if the U.S. can achieve high-density, round-the-clock reconnaissance and tracking in space and underwater, it will significantly increase the cost for Beijing to take military aggression.
Shen Mingshi further analyzed that the U.S. strengthening of monitoring and early warning capabilities aims to obtain action signs in advance, judge China’s intentions early, and deploy defensive measures or even pre-emptive countermeasures when necessary, thereby significantly increasing the hidden costs and operational risks of China’s underwater nuclear capabilities.
Wang Xiaowen echoed this assessment from a practical perspective: “If the U.S. can track the real-time positions of all Chinese nuclear missile carriers, it can compel China not to act recklessly.”
She also pointed out that against the backdrop of high-level corruption purges in China and blocked traditional intelligence channels, the strategic value of satellite reconnaissance and space defense systems is increasingly highlighted.
This special allocation of funds is not an isolated action but an important part of a series of recent military strengthening actions by the United States.
Just last month, the U.S. Department of Defense officially released the “2026 National Defense Strategy,” clearly stating that containing Chinese military expansion is a core goal, proposing to establish a robust “deterrence defense” system along the first island chain and proclaiming the advancement of the development of the “Golden Dome” missile defense system and modernization of nuclear deterrent capabilities.
In terms of nuclear power, the U.S. Navy is advancing the construction of the “Columbia” class strategic nuclear submarines, aiming to complete 12 by the early 2040s to replace the existing “Ohio” class submarines. In December 2025, U.S. President Trump also approved the construction of two new battleships as the core of the “Golden Fleet” plan to counter China’s maritime expansion.
In contrast to the ongoing strengthening of military power by the United States, the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense also revealed that corruption has spread to the highest levels of the Chinese military. The report mentioned the downfall of the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong, and the Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, Miao Hua; political commissars of the Rocket Force, Army, and Navy are all under investigation; at least 8 Central Committee members have been dismissed or investigated, and the defense industry system has also been affected.
In the direction of the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese military continues to conduct amphibious landing exercises, long-range firepower strikes, and maritime blockade plans targeting Taiwan, with the clear goal of “achieving military superiority by 2027.”
Wang Xiaowen analyzed that the short-term disruptions caused by corruption investigations may affect the operational efficiency of some units, but it is not enough to fundamentally change China’s expanding trajectory. As long as China has not developed effective means to counter U.S. intelligence surveillance, its military movements in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the vicinity of the first island chain “will be clearly monitored”, producing a substantial deterrent effect on China’s advancing gray-zone conflicts.
Faced with the escalating military pressure from China, Taiwan has also strengthened its defense capabilities on multiple fronts. In December 2025, the U.S. approved 8 arms sales to Taiwan totaling 11 billion US dollars, the largest single arms sale since 2001. In terms of submarine construction, Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program continues to advance, with technical support from at least seven countries including the United States and the United Kingdom, covering core equipment such as combat systems and sonar.
Both scholars have noted China’s “dual-track” approach of saying one thing and doing another. Shen Mingshi summarized that while China publicly opposes arms races and major military deployments, it continues to enhance its capabilities in space, cyber, and underwater. In this context, the simultaneous enhancement of the United States’ offensive and defensive space and anti-submarine systems is not only a strategic response but also a forward-looking layout for changes in future conflict forms.
Wang Xiaowen also pointed out that this “verbal moderation, actual acceleration” dual-track approach reflects Beijing’s deep intentions to reshape the military landscape in the Indo-Pacific under the guise of peace narratives.
Based on the assessments of the two experts, the core logic of the United States’ actions this time is to compress the strategic advantage space built by China’s reliance on “opacity” and “surprise attack capabilities” by comprehensively enhancing situational awareness capabilities, thereby re-establishing strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific region at a higher level. With the continuous upgrading of monitoring and detection technologies, the competition in the underwater and space domains will become the decisive frontier of future great power competition.